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# Journal of International Politics and Development

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# **Journal of International Politics and Development (JIPAD)**

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The Journal of International Politics and Development (JIPAD) is a bi-annual peer-reviewed journal with an international and distinguished editorial board. It is published jointly by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ilesan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Kokomo, USA. The journal is currently in its twelfth edition and is published in January and June.

## **Our Mission**

JIPAD seeks to publish original research that advances knowledge about politics, economy, society and development at the global, international, regional and domestic levels. The journal is interdisciplinary in scope and welcomes full-length articles, briefings, book reviews, essays, conference reports and research notes that draw from, or can inform developments across disciplines, and across national boundaries. JIPAD also provides a forum for interaction between policy and practice on questions of governance and development, and thereby informs policy debates among scholars, researchers, policy makers and relevant audiences. The main criterion for acceptance of an article, though, is the high intellectual quality of such a submission, and the clear potential to contribute distinctly to debates in the subject of discourse.

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## **Editor's Note: Revamped Editorial Board**

It is our pleasure to present to you, after a difficult fourteenth edition, Volume 15, Number 1, January 2017 of the Journal of International Politics and Development. We begin the New Year on a note of advancement: JIPAD has a revamped editorial advisory board, featuring international scholars from across the globe who are excited to contribute their ideas and expertise to the advancement of the Journal. We look forward to taking the next steps towards global recognition and ranking of our Journal under the guidance of this set of distinguished scholars. The Department of Political Science and Public Administration and the Administration at Babcock University are indeed enthused to welcome on board all the new – and old! – members of the Editorial Board.

In this edition, we continue the recent tradition of the Ideologue section, foregrounding original think-pieces that hold ideas that cannot be contained in one place by the sublimity of their essence. In this edition, Virginia Tech professor of Sociology, Biko Agozino, challenges us to re-think time and law. Other authors masticate various burning issues on the national stage, from social protection to female trafficking to Almajiris.

For our readers, we ask you to continue to have faith in our vision and mission and continue to partner with us towards the achievement of the Journal's noble objectives.

Thank you.

**Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso**  
Editor.

## IDEOLOGUE

# The Gift of Time and the Gift of Law

Biko Agozino

### Abstract

This article offers a socio-legal perspective on time and law. The article analyzes 'Given Time' by Derrida to see whether his theory of time and 'the law as gifts' comparable to The Gift analyzed by Marcel Mauss is applicable to the lawmaking process. If we understand the law as a gift in democratic societies rather than a threat to liberty or as a command ('The Empire of Law') then this article can make a significant contribution to the current literature by examining the implications of 'a gift theory of legislation' for the good of the people. The paper outlines the mythology of the Greek Gift to the people of Troy, and then contrasts that model with the reciprocity of gift-giving by South Trobriand islanders, American Indian Natives and Africans compared to Europeans as analyzed by Mauss. The writings of Derrida on 'The Force of Law', 'Before the Law', 'Forgiveness' and 'For Nelson Mandela' are part of the background of his thesis on the law as a gift similar to economic gifts and similar to the laws of economics. Finally, oppressive laws will be highlighted as lacking the legitimacy inferred from the notion of law as a gift or the gift theory of legislation. In conclusion, this article invites legal scholars to re-examine the concept of

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lawmaking by deepening its democratization through the logic of gift-giving, reciprocity, fairness and harm-reduction.

### **Introduction: The Science Of Time-Consciousness**

European scholars have written about 'A Short History of Time'<sup>1</sup> and the 'Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time'<sup>2</sup> without even a single glance to the foundational contributions of Africans probably because people like Hegel had already tried in vain to dismiss Africa as a land that never made any contribution to history. This papyrus will try to correct this error by placing Africa at the center of time-consciousness to see what difference this approach would make.

Philosophers and scientists of time-consciousness insist that there must be more to the world than the present time.<sup>3</sup> Past, present and future times are eternal realities to eternalists; possibilists suggest that the future can only be imagined while conceding that there is empirical evidence to support the existence of the present and the past and presentists accept only the present as real while questioning the reality of the past and the future.<sup>4</sup> In light of these three perspectives, perhaps we could argue that lawmakers and lawyers in general have a 'presentist' orientation to time consciousness. In law, retroactivity of law is prohibited or limited to a set of conditions, reformatio in peius is not allowed when giving the law as a gift (given that the idea of legislation as law giving and the practice of giving time to some convicts to serve in custody are already common in jurisprudence, the idea of law giving or time giving as gift giving is not as far fetched as it may sound at first). The law could in principle be amended or ruled unconstitutional in the future, calling for reciprocal gifts of more law over time. This interaction is mainly prospective and not entirely reciprocal: law in the present is conceived to last for the future, but the future can always destroy the past and rule itself by creating new rules or by letting some old legislations wither away to allow the people more democratic freedom to choose. The gift of law, and even more so, the gift of time, could be the metaphorical Greek gift to the people of Troy when the law given is destructive rather than healing and when the time given is punitive rather than loving.

Since human life originated in Africa before spreading to other continents, time-consciousness originated in Africa as well. When posed as

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<sup>1</sup> Hawkins, S. (1988) A Brief History of Time, London, Bantam Books.

<sup>2</sup> Callender, C. (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Callender, C. (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

an Africa-centered problem, the metaphysical problem of the gift of time and the gift of law in Eurocentric philosophy of science loses its mystery: Does the present lifeworld have anything to do with Africa in the past, present and in the future? Eternalism will answer correctly that the present world has a lot to do with Africa – the birthplace of humanity. Africa is the source of the labor power and material resources that continue to be largely responsible for the construction of the modern world; the Africa of the future without which the world would be impossible to imagine. This papyrus chooses to focus on Africa because of its neglected history of the present, past and future of time and the law, especially given the history of slavery and colonialism that imposed Eurocentric legal perspectives on Africans who tend to embrace some of those Greek gifts with passion even after Europeans have since abolished them in their own countries.<sup>5</sup> (what is the relevance for law? Could you link this to the legal dimension? Perhaps in international trade agreements, or the fact that some African countries tend to transplant legal perspectives and solutions from European countries which have a 'presentist' perspective of law (?))

Time consciousness in legislation is relevant to Asia (which was once imagined as the birthplace of humanity, 'Mother Asia', according to Du Bois), Europe, the Americas, Australia and in any part of the world that would be missed were it to disappear someday. But Africa is peculiar in this respect as the undisputed origin of, not only humanity but also, the place of origin of the first ever recorded time-consciousness, earliest forms of science, technology and society, according to Diop.<sup>6,7</sup>

Africa and Africans are more likely to be overlooked in the sociology of science related to time-consciousness.<sup>8</sup> This may be due to the age-old white-supremacist assumption that Africans are incapable of scientific discoveries or contributions to philosophy despite abundant evidence to the contrary.<sup>9</sup> For instance, a huge larger-than-the-bible volume, Oxford University Handbook of Philosophy of Time committed the error or mistake of never mentioning Africa even once or including any African author among the contributors. Given the miserable technological challenges facing the majority of those who are identified as Africans today, it is not surprising that

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<sup>5</sup> Agozino, B. (2010) 'Editorial: What is Criminology? A Control-Freak Discipline' in African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, Vol. 4, No 1

<sup>6</sup> Diop, C.A. (1981) *Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology*, Chicago, Lawrence Hill

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> See Callendar, Op. Cit

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

they are neglected today in the discourse of time-consciousness in legislation and in science but widening participation in science and scholarship is always a worthy goal. Moreover, the crisis conditions of people of African descent and Native people under settler colonialism especially in the criminal justice system of countries like the US and Australia should serve as a motivation for further study of time-consciousness among Africans for a unique perspective on the gift of time and the gift of law.

Nanni suggests that the colonizers saw themselves as bringing time-consciousness to colonized Africans who apparently did not have a notion of a day off work until the missionaries brought them the tradition of the Sabbath.<sup>10</sup> What Nanni neglected to point out is that the very calendar that is still in use today is almost exactly the same as the one designed by ancient Egyptians around 5,000 BC – the 24 hours day, the seven day week, the 360 day year of 12 months with equal 30 days each, leaving five days at the end of the year as free days for religious festivals (according to Diop). Moreover, Nanni could have focused more on the legislation of time and the punitive uses of time (especially given his play on the words, Greenwich Mean Time, with emphasis on the meanness of colonialism, according to Nanni) because these are even more characteristic of colonialism and legislation in general than the regulation of work days in a colonial situation where the vast majority of the people worked outside the colonial structures and so regulated their own time until they resisted forced labor and came to be given time to serve for their 'crimes'.<sup>11</sup> A criminological as opposed to a historical perspective on time would highlight for us the idea that giving time and giving law as 'gifts' go hand in hand supposedly for the good of those at the receiving end.

Some philosophers of time suggest that the placement of harm and benefits in human history is usually ordered with a preference for the harms to be in the past while the benefits lie in the future. People of African descent can relate to this preference because of the peculiarly cruel hand that history dealt them in the past. No other group of human beings has endured what people of African descent went through in recent history and survived the way Africans did. As Du Bois suggested, this makes the study of people of African descent ideal for those interested in the dynamics of social change or time-consciousness in legislation, science, technology and society.<sup>12</sup> By

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<sup>10</sup> Nanni, G. (2012) *Colonising Time: Ritual, Routine and Resistance in a British Colony*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

<sup>11</sup> Agozino, Biko (2003) *Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason*, London, Pluto Press.

neglecting this peculiar history of harms backed by legislation of time in the African past and continuing into the present while philosophizing about 'the temporal locations of benefits and harms'<sup>13</sup> is a disservice to legislation studies, technology and society.

In quantum mechanics, Gerhart Luders and Wolfgang Pauli developed the CPT theorem, also developed independently by John Bell. According to the CPT Theorem; 'local quantum fields that are relativistic must also be invariant under the combined operations of charge reversal (replacing matter with anti-matter), parity (changing the right-handedness with left-handedness), and time reversal (changing the sign of the momenta). Since CPT holds, the 1964 violation of CP meant that T was violated'.<sup>14</sup>

I do not pretend to understand this theorem but philosophers also find the theorem strange. However, if applied to the history of time-consciousness among African Americans, the secret meaning might become more apparent. By some coincidence, CPT is commonly understood as Colored Peoples Time among African Americans. But this appears to be more than an analogy or coincidence given that the Civil Rights Act was passed in the same year that CPT was violated, 1964, and given that keeping colored peoples time frequently results in technical violations of probations punishable by being given time to serve or heavy fines to pay as the Department of Justice report on the city of Ferguson, Missouri suggested: arriving late to a court appointment could be ruled a no-show with a warrant for arrest and possible time to serve. According to the DOJ report:

Even as Ferguson City officials maintain the harmful stereotype that black individuals lack personal responsibility—and continue to cite this lack of personal responsibility as the cause of the disparate impact of Ferguson's practices—white City officials condone a striking lack of personal responsibility among themselves and their friends.<sup>15</sup>

Philosophers resolve the CPT Theorem by asserting that time is not real, 'fundamentally, there is no time at all'. People say it all the time, 'we have no time left, we are running out of time, please give us more time'. Derrida plays on this concept by wondering what it means to give time when time is not a

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<sup>12</sup>Du Bois, W.E.B. (1903b) *The Souls of Black Folk*, Chicago, A.C. McClurg & Co.

<sup>13</sup>Calendar, C. (2011) op. cit.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid

<sup>15</sup>US Department of Justice (2015) *Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department*, Washington, D.C., DOJ, p. 75.

possession of anyone to give to others as gifts.<sup>16</sup> This is a suggestion that the world is timeless but the suggestion should encourage us to research time further and with a specific reference to people of African descent – a timeless people who have been legislating here on earth since the beginning of the time of homo sapiens, a people with their own relativistic and invariant violation of time under a theorem of their own that is known as Colored Peoples Time, CPT. This Africana Theorem that posits that appointments are usually later than advertised has all but been ignored by western legislators, philosophers and scientists without any scientific explanation for the ignorance. The participation of under-represented people in scholarship tends to improve the quality of knowledge for the benefit of all.

The Africana time-consciousness is reflected in the innovation of historical sociology in the 14th century by the North African, Ibn Khaldoun, with emphasis on his cyclical, rather than lineal, theory of history. To Khaldoun, waves of rugged warriors from the desert tend to invade and conquer city dwellers but with time, the conquerors tend to become soft and therefore ripe for a new invasion from other bands of desert warriors.<sup>17</sup> Khaldoun suggested that time is cyclical just as most clocks of today appear to demonstrate with the recursion of time whereas European scholars privilege a lineal passage of time. How common or rare is Khaldoun's cyclical model of time in African cosmology compared to the relatively lineal conceptions of logocentric thought in modern European traditions and legislations?

The theory of African Fractals by Ron Eglash highlights the fact that Africans prefer to design their lived environments in fractal rather than Cartesian or Euclidean patterns, favoring non-linear geometry over grids and, chaos over straight lines that are apparently easier to be subjected under imperialist control. In other words, Colored People's Time could be seen as an aspect of the non-linear geometry that is relatively common in African cultures compared to other cultures and may hold a clue to the 'perplexing CPT Theorem' in quantum mechanics. According to Frank Arntzenis:

The CPT theorem says that any (restricted) Lorentz invariant quantum field theory must also be invariant under the combined operation of charge conjugation C, parity P, and time reversal T, even though none of these individual variances need hold. The CPT theorem is *prima facie* a

<sup>16</sup> Derrida, J. (1992) *Given Time: Counterfeit Money*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

<sup>17</sup> Khald n, Ibn (1958) *The Muqaddimah : An introduction to history*. Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal. 3 vols. New York: Princeton

perplexing theorem.<sup>18</sup>

If philosophers of science find the theorem perplexing, I cannot claim to understand it but I propose to explore the theorem beyond the fields of physics to see if legislative time-consciousness will help us to solve the theorem. To clarify the theorem further, Arntzenics (2011) provides the following analogy and a few more analogies like this:

Suppose we describe a world (or part of a world) using some sort of coordinates  $(X, Y, Z, t)$ . A passive PT transformation is what happens to this description when we describe the same world but instead use coordinates  $(X1, Y1, Z1, t1)$  where  $X1 = X$ ,  $Y1=Y$ ,  $Z1=Z$ , and  $t1=t$ . An active PT transformation is the following: keep using the same coordinates, but change the world in such a way that the description of the world in the coordinates changes exactly as it does in the corresponding passive PT transformation. Suppose now that we have a theory which is stated in terms of coordinate dependent descriptions of the world, that is, a theory which says that only certain coordinate dependent descriptions describe physically possible world, that is, are solutions. Such a theory is said to be PT invariant if PT turns solution into solutions and non-solutions into non-solutions.<sup>19</sup>

Suppose we are describing a legislative world that is governed by time-consciousness, using the coordinates of time and space. A transformation of law happens when we describe the same world but instead use the coordinates of people of African descent to suggest that CPT is equal to Colored People's Time, as far as the law is concerned. Suppose then that we have a European theory of legislative time that supposes that only European approaches to time consciousness in legislation is valid and that Colored People's Time is invalid, then European descriptions of time-consciousness will be solutions while Colored People's Time would be non-solutions. But since Colored People's Time makes sense to colored people the same way that the Greenwich Mean Time makes sense to Europeans, it would be dogmatic to rule any existing time-consciousness as a non-solution or to ordain any time-consciousness as always the solution universally especially given that scientists have concluded that the CPT theorem does not hold universally:

Whether a particle has positive or negative charge is

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<sup>18</sup> Arntzenics, F. (2011) 'The CPT Theorem' in Callender, C. (2011) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 634

determined by the temporal direction in which the four-momentum of a particle points. What is standardly called the CPT - theorem should be called the PT – theorem. It holds for classical and quantum tensor field theories, fails for classical sprior field theories, but holds for quantum prior fields. The fact that it holds for quantum field theories suggests that space-time has neither a temporal orientation nor of spatial handedness.<sup>20</sup>

The above conclusion appears to suggest that no time-consciousness should be applied universally and so there is no assumption that Colored People's Time will be applied to the entire world without reference to the preferences of people of African descent. We propose to look at artists, scholars and scientists of African descent to understand how they would approach the solutions to the CPT – Theorem and how their time-consciousness could help us to understand problems of time-management and increased productivity better. In the 1960s after the uprisings following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., a public television series aired on the theme of Colored People's Time in Detroit and this papyrus calls on scholars to review the archives of the series to see how it attempted to take a racist stereotype about black people always being late and turn it on its head to underscore Africana creativity with time and attitude to the law as gifts to be reciprocated with love or with war depending on whether the gift of law/time is a Greek gift or an African gift of human life and human rights.<sup>21</sup>

### Conceptual Framework

The project of studying time-consciousness in legislations could be framed with the discourse of African Fractals as detailed by Ron Eglash.<sup>22</sup> Although the focus of Eglash was the common use of fractals in modern computing and the prevalence of fractal designs in African architecture, belief systems, games, kinship patterns, hairstyles and textiles, this papyrus will demonstrate that similar fractal patterns are relevant to the explanation of Colored People's Time, Caribbean Time or African Time. Whereas Eglash<sup>23</sup> and Wariboko<sup>24</sup> adopted an anthropological approach to ethnography with the

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> Agozino, Biko, 2014, 'Contributions of Africana Scholars to the Theory of Human Rights in Sociology' in *Theoria and Praxis*, Vol. 2, No. 1: The Idea of Human Rights: <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/theoriandpraxis/article/view/39370>

<sup>22</sup> Eglash, R. (1999) *African Fractals: Modern Computing and Indigenous Design*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.

help of largely western theorists by asking African priests, chiefs and elders to explain the symbolism of African material cultures and history, this papyrus proposes to attempt a jurisprudence of this fascinating phenomenon of African time-consciousness.

According to Eglash, African fractal geometry is at the cutting edge of the connections between the disciplines of mathematics and information technology. I once found a huge fractal computer design on the wall of the Maths Emporium at a college in the United States, when I hosted a group of leading African officials of colleges of education on a study tour. When the African American professor guiding the tour of the Maths Emporium was asked what the picture on the wall represents, he said that it was fractal geometry. 'African fractals', I said, citing the work of Eglash but the guide said that he had not heard of it and surprisingly neither had the visiting African professors. Eglash suggests that if students of African descent knew that the technology that is powering faster internet connectivity today has deep African roots, they would probably take to STEM disciplines like fish to water and more easily overcome any angst about the complexity of those disciplines and the discipline of law or the practice of legislation in representative democracies where they still tend to be under-represented among those officials who give the law or give people time to serve. I would add that if other students knew the debts of modern science to African designs, they would perhaps show more respect to African knowledge systems and thereby learn even more from Africana Studies.

Whereas city planning in Europe and North America follows the Cartesian grids of Rene Descartes, Chinese artists privilege hexagons that are geometrically precise and closely reflecting the significance of the number 6 in Chinese fortune-telling traditions (I Ching), and American Indian Natives prefer three-dimensional Euclidean designs all quite unlike African fractals. As Eglash put it:

...fractals are characterized by the repetition of similar patterns at ever-diminishing scales. Traditional African settlements typically show this 'self-similar' characteristics: circles of circles of circular dwellings, rectangular walls enclosing ever smaller rectangles, and streets in which broad avenues branch down to tiny footpaths with striking

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Wariboko, N. (2010) *Ethics and Time: Ethos of Temporal Orientation in Politics and Religion of the Niger Delta*, New York, Lexington.

geometric repetitions.<sup>25</sup>

Eglash argues that the reason why fractals are more common in African design systems is not because such patterns are common in nature and the Africans are closer to nature than Europeans and Asians. American Indian Natives are every bit as close to nature if not closer than Africans, and yet their designs are predominantly three-dimensional or Euclidean. Africans however consciously make use of fractal designs implicitly, explicitly and have rules to practically generate such fractals mathematically. Following the requirement of Karl Popper to avoid a priori proofs of our hypothesis but to seek to falsify them in order to validate them, Eglash calls for examples in which fractal designs are not obvious as the best strategy for demonstrating the fact that Africans consciously design their environments in fractal patterns rather than sub-consciously. One example that Eglash touched upon in passing is that of time-consciousness which exhibits fractal geometry among people of African descent in the Diaspora and at home in Africa with amazing regularity. However, I shall inquire later whether the time-consciousness of Western-trained legislators seems to be completely lineal in western patterns or whether there is a retention of elements of African fractals among legal scholars of African descent with reference to Colored People's Time.

This article argues that the following five principles of fractals outlined by Eglash are easily applicable to the discourse of Africana time-consciousness:

1) **Recursion** – a circular process in which the output of one process becomes the input for the next process with results endlessly recycled and repeated in 'iterative feedback loops'. This sounds very much like the description of the most common machine that can be found in most homes and offices – the clock, although Eglash did not use this example nor did he mention the fact that the earliest-known clocks were invented by ancient Africans.

2) **Scaling** – the jagged edges of the coastline or the clouds in the sky, the foliage of the forests, or the different shades of color of people of African descent can be referred to as scaling because there are similar patterns at different scales of, for example, shades of blackness. This papyrus calls for projects that use the scales (and they are actually scales for real) of the clock – hour, minute, second, nanosecond – to illustrate this idea of scaling and see if African legislators scale their time in patterns significantly different from the time-scaling of European scholars and scientists in accordance with the CPT-

Theorem, Colored People's Time.

3) **Self-Similarity** – the parts do not have to be identical in order for the pattern to qualify as fractal. The Koch curve in mathematics is exactly self-similar but the fractal patterns on an acacia leaf are self-similar without being exactly so at every scale because the stem is not exactly the same as each leaf, etc. Thus, the time-consciousness of people of African descent – Colored People's Time, African Time, Caribbean Time – are self-similar but not exactly so. There appears to be a 'family resemblance' in the time-consciousness of people of African descent without assuming that such consciousness must be exactly identical.

4) **Infinity** – time can be best conceived as an infinite category – time and tide waits for no one as a European saying puts it. Yet mathematicians regard infinity as a historical construct to be pursued but never attained and it was in its pursuit that some mathematicians stumbled upon the idea of fractal non-linear geometry. For this reason, many mathematicians are not fond of the idea of fractals and some are hostile to it, dismissing the Cantor sets as irrational numbers, according to Eglash. Therefore, in this article I call for the consciousness of African time to be used in the discourse of the concept of infinity in fractals.

5) **Fractional Dimensions** – European scientists are more used to thinking of dimensions in whole numbers (one-dimensional line, two-dimensional plane) but the theory that frames the discussion of African Fractals assumes that dimensions can be fractions too. This can be illustrated in this article by representing the time-consciousness of legislators of African descent as fractional dimensions of African time-consciousness. To the above five principles, we could add the principle of interconnectivity among people of African descent which helps them to predict, for instance, that it may be considered rude to show up right on time for a party when the hosts are not nearly ready for the guests. Yet peasant women enforce the chronological time by fining women who are late to meetings in the villages of Africa.

6) To the above five principles of African fractals, we can add the principle of inter-connectivity which is implied above but which needs to be spelled out especially in the discussion of legislation and time-consciousness where almost everything is connected to everything else or made to appear so despite attempts by Western jurists to focus on one case at a time while

sociologists seek to isolate specific race effects without realizing that racism is always articulated with sexism and with class exploitation in societies structured in dominance. The different systems of power exercised through the law and in real time are different but not separate, they are articulated, disarticulated and rearticulated in fractal patterns.<sup>26</sup>

### **Modernity's Time-Consciousness and the Need to Transgress it**

'Modernity is an unfinished project', according to Jürgen Habermas who advocates that the project needs to be pursued further rather than be negated or abandoned.<sup>27</sup> Habermas is particularly critical of neoconservatives who announce triumphantly that the history of ideas has come to an end because there is nothing new under the sun; and of postmodernists who insist that modernity has since been transgressed because, according to the postmodernists or those that Habermas calls anarchists, we live in a world that is no longer easily characterized by the classification of people and events simply into the ancient and the modern, the digital and the analog, the good and the bad, the progressive and the retrogressive, the true and false, the beautiful and the ugly, the raw and the cooked, male and female, real and virtual, natural and cultural, powerful and the powerless, God and Satan, rich and poor, criminal and law abiding, simply because these dualities serve to conceal a will to power that should be the real focus of analysis in order to reveal it and make it more accountable.

In the lecture, 'Modernity's Consciousness of Time and Its Need for Self-Reassurance', Habermas questions the above neoconservative perspective that only European values are viable at the end of history.<sup>28</sup> On the one hand, and the postmodern assumption that modernity is over and so should supposedly be abandoned in favor of the project of hybridity rather than seeing modernity as an incomplete project that is in need to be continued towards future possibilities. According to Habermas, we need to go back to Hegel to understand that he was the first person to theorize modernity as a distinct age that started around the year 1500 and continued to unravel while he wrote the philosophy of history in 1800. It is scandalous that Hegel stated in that philosophy of history that Africans contributed nothing worthwhile to

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<sup>25</sup> Eglash, R. (1999), Op. Cit, p.4.

<sup>26</sup> Hall, Stuart (1980) 'Race and Class Articulation in Societies Structured in Dominance' in UNESCO, ed., *Sociology of Race*, Paris, UNESCO.

<sup>27</sup> Habermas, J. (1995) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

history and Habermas is completely silent on this slander while praising Hegel for emphasizing individualism, autonomy, the right to criticism, and scientific innovation as the hallmarks of modernity compared to the ethics of community, homogeneity and tradition that characterized the ancient regime.

However, Habermas supports the multidisciplinary approach of this papyrus by demonstrating that the problem of time-consciousness emerged first in the arts communities in Europe as a battle between the ancient concept of permanent beauty and the modernist idea of relative beauty before being incorporated in the designation of Chairs in History Departments that were divided between Ancient History, Classical History and Modern History. Finally, the idea of modernity was appropriated by sociology and rendered as a project of modernization or Westernization in development studies. Accordingly, this papyrus will not restrict the discourse of time-consciousness to the STEM disciplines but will make the debate thoroughly multidisciplinary.

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said critiqued Habermas and Foucault for their apparent deliberate refusal to engage with Africa and other Orientalist locations even while theorizing a universal history of European consciousness of time.<sup>29</sup> In the case of Habermas here, it is astonishing that anyone could outline the history of Europe from 1500 to 1800 and miss the elephant in the room – the unprecedented enslavement of people of African descent that produced the wealth that smothered Europe, according to Fanon,<sup>30</sup> Du Bois,<sup>31</sup> James,<sup>32</sup> Williams,<sup>33</sup> Rodney,<sup>34</sup> and Gilroy<sup>35</sup> – that characterized this period of modernity more than anything else.

It may be that since Hegel was focusing on the history of ideas as characterized by the individualism of Rene Descartes' assertion, *Cogito ergo sum*, if he could not identify the individual African genius (or collective) who invented the Calendar that is still in use in the world today, the individual architect (or commune) who designed the great pyramids, the individual potter (or group) who made the roped pot of Igboukwu, or the single artists (or family) who crafted the African masks that influenced Picasso, then Hegel would conclude that Africans do not fit into his individualist philosophy of history according to which social change is powered by the

<sup>29</sup> Said, E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*, New York, Penguin.

<sup>30</sup> Fanon, F. (1963) *Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Penguin.

<sup>31</sup> Du Bois, W.E.B. (1935) *Black Reconstruction in America*, New York, Basic Books.

<sup>32</sup> James, C.L.R. (1938) *The Black Jacobins*, London, Allison and Busby.

<sup>33</sup> James, C.L.R. (1938) *The Black Jacobins*, London, Allison and Busby.

<sup>34</sup> Rodney, W. (1978) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London, Bogle l'Ouverture.

<sup>35</sup> Gilroy, P. (1993) *The Black Atlantic*, London, Verso.

battle of ideas between individuals.

Karl Marx was one of those who tried to set Hegel straight back on his feet for he appeared to be standing on his head given his obsession with the history of ideas. Marx paid more attention to Africans than almost all the other European thinkers of his time put together and he came to the conclusion that it is impossible to understand the history of Europe without a thorough study of the enslavement of Africans and their struggle for emancipation that point to a future world beyond the modern. According to Marx, after the abolition of slavery, the emancipated Africans in Jamaica refused to become wage slaves and simply adopted subsistence farming while the former slave-holders fumed against the 'laziness' of the Africans and called for the restoration of slavery as they watched their plantations go to ruin to the bemusement of the Africans.<sup>36</sup> Whereas development economists would dismiss this as evidence of a lack of a futurist temporal orientation among Africans, according to Wariboko,<sup>37</sup> it makes ethical sense since the investment of the plantation farmer in the future does not benefit the wage slave in the present.

This papyrus will try to go beyond the Hegelian philosophy of history and time-consciousness as outlined by Habermas and seek to dwell on the contributions of people of African descent to time-consciousness specifically because such contributions have been ignored by Eurocentric writers even while the crucial contributions of people of African descent are indeed canonical in the study of time from the classical period, through the modern period to the post-modern era. It is not being suggested that the history of European thought as detailed by Habermas and Hegel is completely wrong, rather it is being suggested that when any such history attempts to devalue African contributions to the study of time, then it is deeply flawed in terms of objectivity but also in terms of its claim to universalism due to the ethnocentrism that tends to blind scholars to the possibility of breakthrough discoveries when research is more inclusive by attempting to focus analysis on a neglected but foundational area of Africa-centered knowledge. Bauman warned against the danger of following Weber uncritically because overemphasis on rational time-consciousness without humane compassion might lead to another holocaust.<sup>38</sup>

Cheikh Anta Diop helps us to understand the importance of African foundational contributions to astronomy – the origins of time consciousness

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<sup>36</sup> Agozino, B. (2014) 'The Africana paradigm in Capital: the debts of Karl Marx to people of African descent', *Review of African Political Economy*, 41:140, 172-184,

<sup>37</sup> Wariboko (2010), *Op. Cit.*

<sup>38</sup> Bauman, Z. (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, Polity.

– thousands of years before the birth of the Greek philosophers that Hegel and Habermas presume were the founding fathers of time-consciousness. Going beyond Eurocentric perspectives on time-consciousness to study the rich subject matter of time-consciousness from the perspective of people of African descent will only enrich the STEM, arts and humanities disciplines by including the usually excluded and by exposing even European scholars to the wealth of knowledge that they traditionally ignore at the expense of scientific growth, societal development and the tolerance of multicultural sources of multidisciplinary knowledge about science, technology and society.

According to Diop, 'Africa's contributions to science and technology' range from the 'undeniable contributions' of Egyptian mathematics and especially geometry that thousands of years later became 'discoveries that made celebrities out of Greek scholars such as Archimedes and Pythagoras', through Algebra, Arithmetic, Medicine, Chemistry, Architecture to Astronomy. With specific reference to the time-conscious field of Astronomy, Diop refers us to verifiable sources such as 'the diagonal calendars of the sarcophagi, the orientation of the monuments, the establishment of the astronomic calendar since 4236 B.C., and the Demotic Papyrus Carlsberg 1-9 (A.D. 144)'.<sup>39</sup> Carlsberg 1-9 documented systematic methods of calculating the phases of the moon and without any evidence of influence from Hellenistic sources but with indication of more ancient Egyptian treatises. Thus, according to Diop:

Just as with geometry, the Egyptians are the exclusive inventors of the calendar, the very one which, barely changed, regulates our life today, and about which Nuegebauer says "that it is truly the only intelligent calendar that has ever existed in human history"... They invented the 365-day year, breaking it down as follows: 12 months of 30 days = 360 days, plus the 5 intercalated days, each one corresponding to the birthday of the following Egyptian Gods: Osiris, Isis, Horus, Seth, and Nephthys.<sup>40</sup>

According to Diop, the ancient Egyptians knew about the problem of the leap year but preferred to correct it every 1,460 years until the conquest of Egypt by Rome in 47 B.C. when the Caesar changed this and introduced the correction every 4 years. This remains the calendar that regulates time-

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<sup>39</sup> Diop, *Op. Cit.*, p.278.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. 279.

consciousness across the world today and yet Diop may be critiqued for over-emphasizing the documented history of ancient Egypt even when oral history and social history of contemporary African societies could have strengthened his theories. For instance, I grew up among subsistence farmers in Africa without any clock or wrist watch but learned to tell time by dividing the day into sunrise, sun-above-head, and sundown as many non-western societies continue to do. The vast majority of African societies had no alarm clocks and so relied on the three cockcrows at dawn to wake up in time for their chores and duties. The word month is synonymous with moon in many African languages and there are clearly understood methods for calculating moons that make up years. They all have words for the week even if the number of days in a week varies from four market days of the Igbo after which children born on those days are named to the seven-day week of the Akan but the difference is resolved in calculating the duration of one moon or month by having seven four-day weeks to correspond to one moon among the Igbo and vice versa. They know exactly when to plant their crops and when to harvest them in tune with the cycles of rainy and dry seasons. Of course Diop knew about these methods found in agrarian societies like ancient Sumeria but he concluded that they were less sophisticated compared to the Egyptian calculations that did not depend on sightings of the crescent.

Dorothy Pennington differs slightly by insisting that time-consciousness is a rare experience because human beings managed to survive for thousands of years and continue to do so without obsessing about time. 'Few people consciously ponder their concept of time; it often goes unarticulated. Therefore, many cross-cultural judgments are made out of an ignorance of one's own culture and of the foundations of temporality, in general. The subject of temporality is, many times, outside the boundaries of conscious awareness'.<sup>41</sup> She goes on to detail the rich culture of time-consciousness among Africans to dispel any assumption that Africans might be among those who lack time-consciousness even while she cautioned against generalizing African time-consciousness without respect to Africana cultural diversity.

### **The Gift of Mauss**

Marcel Mauss based his theory of the gift on a multicultural study of the exchange of gifts but the study of time-consciousness is typically Eurocentric. In the field of physics where most of the scientists who do research on time are affiliated, there is also a resounding silence on the

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<sup>41</sup>Pennington, D.L. (1990) 'Time in African Culture' in M.K. Asante and K.W. Asante, eds, *African Culture: The Rhythms of Unity*, Trenton, Africa World Press, p. 123.

contributions of people of African descent to the discourse of time-consciousness. In the field of electromagnetism, researchers struggle with the twin hypothesis about a twin who left on a rocket and travelled through the universe only to return younger than the twin who stayed put. This puzzle could have been solved more easily by using the African Diaspora to represent the traveling twin who returns to Africa more modern, and therefore younger, than the twin left in Africa. Leaving Africa out of the equation weakens the theories on offer, according to Cheikh Anta Diop.<sup>42</sup>

Time consciousness is more common in legislative discourse and in the natural sciences than in the theorization of sociology of law. Yet, temporal issues are more common in legislation than in the eternal laws of natural sciences and the atrophy of social sciences. In legislation, time consciousness governs the applicability of law with little room for retroactivity and little room for prospectivity except when human rights legislation retroactively covers past violations under principles of international law or when the coming into effect of a law is delayed with commencement clauses or when the law is contingent on certain conditions. Laws are given for 'the time being' (a phrase that is used repeatedly by Marcel Mauss in *The Gift*) and laws may be changed to keep in line with the changing times. Convicted offenders may be given time to serve and they are often said to be doing time if the sentence is custodial as opposed to a fine or community service which are also subject to temporal regulation – a fine must be paid within a time period or wages may be garnished over a period of time and community service orders are always periodized and temporalized in terms of the duration of the service; probation is also time-bound in terms of the length of supervision, the frequency of reporting to the officer at specific times or else the offender would be found in technical violation of the order and sent to prison to complete the outstanding time given by the court.

For the time being is a homological expression suggesting among other things, that the human species is a time-conscious species. For the time-specific being could mean that the expression does not normally apply to timeless or 'eternal' beings. Human beings are possibly *homo temporaliticus* compared to other beings that are instinctive regarding the making and passing of history especially as reflected in legislation and law enforcement. Other species are conscious of the passage of seasons and the phases of night and day but only control-freak beings like human beings, for the time being, are obsessive about the division of time into seconds, minutes, hours, days,

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<sup>42</sup>Diop, *Op. Cit.*

weeks, months, years, decades, centuries, and millennia. For a long time, Europeans believed that they were the only beings, for the time being (or for the mean time), who were capable of time consciousness and the presupposed that other human beings were governed by instinct in ahistorical stagnant timeless stasis until the white man came bearing the burden of enlightening to the darker races with rational ideal bureaucratic administration of justice compared to traditional authority of the patriarch, the fashionable sway of the charismatic religious leader for the time being, the khadi justice of the Islamic judge or the substantive rationality of the common law judge and jury, lacking the technical superiority of the ideal bureaucratic administration, according to Weber. The work of Mauss suggests that even pre-modern societies conduct legislative activities that stipulate reciprocity in the time-conscious giving and returning of gifts in ways that do not always follow the rationalism of Weber but always reflecting the compassion that Bauman found lacking in Weberian modernization theories.

### **Derrida on the Gift of Time**

The influential theory of Mauss which suggests that the West could learn a thing or two from Oriental cultures is taken seriously by Derrida who argues that the exchange of gifts is no longer understandable as gifts if the giving is obligatory rather than voluntary. For instance, when a public official complains that the monarch had taken all her time and that she had no time left to spare, there is a tinge of regret in the expression and not the gladness that gift-giving is expected to inspire in those who give and those who receive gifts.

Moreover, according to Derrida, if the reciprocity in gift-giving is mandatory, then it leaves the realm of gifts and transforms into debts that are owed, obligations that must be fulfilled, failing which sanctions are imposed on the deviant giver. Derrida also wonders whether it is still a gift if a stranger gives a large sum of money to a beggar but it turns out to be counterfeit money that could land the beggar in prison.

Derrida also addresses time-consciousness in the bureaucratic red tapes that characterize the rational ideal bureaucracy of Weber. With the story of 'Before the Law' by Joseph Kafka, Derrida shows that the oppressive use of time in the justice system is not simply a fictional narrative but an issue deserving of serious philosophical debate. In that story, a poor peasant was summoned to court and he dutifully complied but had to wait all his life into his old age without ever going before the law. Derrida linked this waste of

time to the suggestion by Freud that patricide was the first homicide recorded among human beings and may have led to the incest taboos that are worldwide. Freud had wondered why Aboriginal Australians and Africans came to enforce the incest taboos more rigorously than Europeans who relax the rules to marry their cousins whereas Africans go out of the way to avoid contact with their mothers-in-law. What is evident in the discourse of time-consciousness by Derrida is what Freud relatively ignored or ridiculed: the idea that Europeans have a lot to learn from Africans, for instance.

The approach of this papyrus to the study of time-consciousness in legislation is similar to that of Jacques Derrida who approached the history of philosophy by critiquing the arrogance of Eurocentrism and opting for the privileging of the African origin of his own philosophical quests that led him to the discovery of the methodology of deconstruction. Whereas European scholars from Hegel to Claude Lévi-Strauss and Max Weber tried to find exactly what made the European different or better than others, Derrida was fond of reminding them that none of the things they identified was exclusively European. To Hegel and Lévi-Strauss, Europeans were better than others because they possessed a written culture while others possessed oral traditions but Derrida reminded them that writing was indeed found in all cultures and that it was basically invented by ancient Egyptians as a kind of medicine or pharmercon that should be used with care lest it poisons the body while seeking to cure it of diseases. Similarly, European writers are assuming that Europeans are better than others because they invented time-consciousness and Diop repeatedly demonstrated that it was indeed ancient Africans who should be credited with the discovery of time.

The danger of accepting only the European supremacist perspective and neglecting the wealth of discoveries made by Africans is that such a strategy could contribute to the stunting of the growth of scientific knowledge. For instance, when sets of fractal geometry were discovered in Europe by Cantor, they were dismissed as irrational by his peers and further research into them was delayed. Similarly, when European colonizers encountered fractal designs across Africa, they dismissed them as evidence of primitiveness and tried to replace them with Cartesian designs, according to Eglash<sup>43</sup> Yet when finally computer engineers came to study and apply the very same fractal principles that are still common in African cultures, the result was better mapping of electoral districts for more representative democracy, faster internet connectivity and more efficient oil drilling technologies, for instance. It could be the case that by studying Colored People's Time

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<sup>43</sup>Eglash, Op. Cit.

seriously, significant new contributions to knowledge could be developed in terms of time-management and increased productivity in scholarly growth by listening to the perspectives of under-represented groups of scholars for a change.

### **Conclusions**

This papyrus demonstrates what is lost in legislative jurisprudence if the discourse concentrates on Eurocentric ideas and practices while denigrating or erasing contributions from African philosophy. If legislators are willing to study and learn from African cultures, one thing that will result is that they will no longer be rigid with time and may become more relaxed with regimes that stipulate statutes of limitation or terms of time that convicts may spend behind bars, or even the lengths of time for which cases may be adjourned at the cost of justice that is denied when delayed, just like the concept of gift giving.

The flexibility of people of African descent to time needs to be studied more carefully to see if legislators give the gifts of time with a vengeance when they give the law in legislation. Technical violations of parole in which no new crime was committed but the parolee was late for an appointment with parole officers may need to be reconsidered if the time-consciousness of people of African descent is used against them in the gift of time to serve.

Professors may also need to study the concept of African Time or CPT to see how this may apply to fairness in the formulation of class policies. A rigid deadline for assignments might mean that students of African descent with remarkably relaxed attitude to time may be getting a hard time from professors. For instance, allowing students to make up some of their assessments that they may have missed through extra credits work might be a gift of time to students who struggle with the Western concept of logocentric time.

Finally, natural scientists who study time-consciousness would benefit from familiarity with the studies of this concept in the social sciences and humanities. With emphasis on time-consciousness in legislations, scholars may benefit by taking an Africa-centered approach as opposed to Eurocentrism. Given that people of African descent tend to be given the Greek gift of time to serve at a much higher ratio than other convicts, the study of time-consciousness in legislations should pay particular attention to Colored People's Time, African Time or Caribbean Time.

## ARTICLES

# **The Practice and Promise of Social Protection Policies in Nigeria**

Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, Pam Dung Sha, Bonaventure Haruna,  
Akinpelu Olanrewaju Olutayo, Emmanuel Olawale Ogunkola and Ezekiel Best

### **Abstract**

This study analyses the political economy of social protection in Nigeria, exploring the inter play of ideas, institutions and actors in social protection policy choices, the stages and strategies of implementation of the policies, the perceptions of beneficiaries and likely social protection policy uptake. It focuses on social assistance interventions that involve cash transfers that relate to children, older persons and/or persons with disability; and those that seek to increase employment. Although social protection entered the Nigerian policy agenda in 2004, there has been little enthusiasm in extending social assistance measures because of the prevailing idea of the cause of poverty. Social protection measures have remained haphazard, incoherent and incomprehensive without a national policy framework. The politics and management of intergovernmental relations are a critical aspect of the dynamics of policy adoption and diffusion in Nigeria's federal context. Donors have been the main drivers of social assistance among public officials but civil society and labour unions have focused on social insurance in spite of the provisions of the constitution and Nigeria's commitment to international covenants and conventions on social policy issues that promote social assistance. An uptake in social

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protection may occur only if the political leadership become converted and take ownership.

### **Introduction**

Recent efforts to study social protection in Nigeria have focused largely on the technical design of various aspects of social protection programmes, the extent of their coverage and the fiscal space and potentials, and their implementation challenges. They have also adopted the governance, gender and life cycle approach, transformative social protection framework, or the International Labour framework of analysing social protection. None has provided a detailed description of the political economy factors that enhance and prevent the likelihood of an uptake in social protection policy in Nigeria (Holmes and Akinrimisi 2012a, Hagen-Zanker and Holmes et al 2012). The study by Nino-Zarazua et al (2010), which addressed political issues in social protection in Africa, did not cover Nigeria in any significant extent. Even so, their study did not address the preference for growth related social protection policy that is relevant to Nigeria. They did not therefore provide a systematic political economy analysis of the factors that may hinder or promote the advancement of social protection policy uptake in Nigeria.

Given that recent studies have tended to emphasise the role that social protection policies can play in redistribution and social stability, it is curious that such policies have not reflected in the policy priorities of Nigerian governments. Furthermore, there has been an increasing research interest in the role of social protection policies in strengthening state-citizens relationship. Empirical evidence on the impact of social protection policies on political cohesion and the state-citizen contract remain limited. The question of what type of social protection policies (for instance universal vs. targeted policies) have greater positive impact on state-citizens relationship, how the character of politics and the structure of government (federal vs. non-federal) in developing countries affect the impact of such policies on state-citizen relationship continue to attract scholarly and policy attention (PASGR 2012: 29-30). Given the decentralised character of Nigeria's social assistance programme (as we shall show presently) and the increasing interest of several state governments in partnership with the federal government to execute cash transfer and other social assistance programmes it is clear that a meaningful study of Nigeria's experience with social assistance must engage the practices in systematic and detailed manner across levels of government. According to the PASGR (2012) research framework paper on social protection in Africa, there are research gaps in four areas with potentially useful policy contributions. These are stakeholder interests/coalition; the role of patron-client relationships, political

cohesion/fragility; and the role of religious and traditional value systems.

Given Nigeria's poverty level, which is put at over 67% (as at 2010), inequality level (Gini coefficient at 48.83) and its consistent record of economic growth (put at 6-7% over 2005-2012) (National Bureau of Statistics 2012), it is curious that its adoption and implementation of social protection policies has been slow and sluggish. This slow and sluggish embrace of social protection is all the more surprising because evidence from some countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia show that social protection schemes are playing positive roles in poverty reduction, and given that Nigeria was a part of the 2008 African Union (AU) regional consensus on the importance of social protection schemes for development.

There is therefore a need to investigate the political, economic, social, historical and institutional factors that drive or hinder the achievement of sustainable social protection policies in Nigeria. Such a focus will contribute to the evident need to reduce poverty levels by means of social protection policies, determine potential sources of finance and address the limited performance and reach of such policies within the context of the Livingstone process, and Nigeria's commitment to inclusive growth. It will contribute to efforts at getting both the technical design and the politics of social protection right (Nino-Narazua et al 2010).

This research seeks to understand the drivers of social policy reform in relation to broader development and welfare regimes in Nigeria. It analyses the political economy of social protection in Nigeria, exploring the origins and determinants of social protection policy choices, the stages and strategies of implementation of the policies, the impact and likely social protection policy uptake. It focuses on three broad intervention areas of government social protection programmes. These include intervention that relates to children, the intervention to uplift the conditions of the older persons and/or persons with disability; and interventions that seek to increase employment. The focus is on government programmes: both federal government and state government programmes.

### **The Wave of Social Protection Policies**

The idea of social protection arises from the very nature of the human beings as susceptible to diminishing capability to work or to complete inability to work. Children cannot cater for themselves and have to depend on their parents or other adults. Individuals may take ill or may be victims of fire or other disasters. The need for protection may also arise from the pitfalls of human organisations, especially at it relates to production. Capabilities may not be used to their fullest because of low demand or unemployment. These may lead to low income because of low demand and inability by some

individuals to meet livelihood needs without hardship. Being social animals, human beings depend on one another and have created means through which a member can have access to resources for consumption at difficult situations when they are most needed (Soderstrom 2008). These means have been usually organised in the form of resources pool, taking place within the family.

In the modern world with more sophisticated human organisations, urbanisation and global reach of capitalism, poverty rather than withering away has remained a major challenge. The recurrent crisis of the capitalist model has ensured that the issue of social protection for the vulnerable and poor remained a permanent social policy issue. Europe provides a rich source of experience in this regard with its welfare states that came to a golden era in the post-world war II period (see Sergura-Ubiergo 2007, Anne Gray 2004, Esping-Anderson 1990, Guillén and Alvarez 2002).

The welfare state has however faced serious fiscal challenges that have led to a movement towards more neo-liberal types of regime worldwide. Such that as Gray (2004) puts it, “workfare is becoming the typical form of adjustment of labour market policy in the face of global pressures to reduce labour costs and ‘flexibilise’ the labour market”(p.18).

In Developing countries, welfare provisioning have been less developed before the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s that provoked the rolling back of the state with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. As Serguna-Ubiergo (2007) noted in the case of Latin America, the level of provisioning varies from country to country depending on their levels of economic development. Beginning from a deliberate effort to bolster the status and loyalty of state elites, it was extended to the liberal professions and workers in the best organized and strategically located sectors of the middle and working classes. In the main, self-employed and those working in the informal sector either remained formally excluded from the social-insurance system by lack of legal coverage or were excluded de facto by their lack of effective contributions to the social security system.

Most of these initiatives were top-down social policies as mechanism to co-opt, control and demobilise increasingly mobilized labour movements and urban middle classes. Some were developed by paternalistic elites trying to defuse labour agitation, in response to some specific demands or part of a larger effort to adopt social-policy programs more in line with what was then the latest in international thinking regarding social insurance, sometimes as propagated by the international organisations, especially the ILO.

In Africa, the limitation of the coverage of formal sector welfare policies was very high given the fact that many of these economies were dominated by the informal sector. According to Taylor (2009), “the vast majority of Africa's

economically active population do not have the means to contribute to social insurance. With limited and less developed welfare regimes, African countries implemented food prices control and food subsidies in the 1960s and 1970s to ensure that all citizens could afford enough to eat. But the processes were riddled with bureaucratic problems, subsidies became fiscally unaffordable and were urban biased and it became cheaper to buy food from world markets than subsidize the consumption of domestic supplies.

Under the crisis and adjustment of the 1980s and 1990a, emphasis shifted from social security to notions of 'safety nets' designed to protect vulnerable citizens who faced higher risks associated with liberalized markets in the attempt to grapple with increasing poverty. Besides, some segments of society even when living standards are rising confront seasonal or unexpected food deficits, and it was believe a programme to target such groups should be provided.

Since then, African governments have committed to expanding social protection programmes of the social/cash transfer type as a response to poverty, vulnerability and as a means to ensure sustainable development. There has been a growing policy and research interests in social protection in Africa. Donors have promoted current policy practices of social protection in some countries, while in others local political economy considerations have dictated not only the introduction but also the form of social protection policies adopted. Indeed, Nino-Zarazua et al (2010) identifies two models of social protection practices emerging in Africa. The first which they identify as the southern African model is driven by the politics of equity, especially the need to redress historic inequality and has evolved around categorical grants for older persons, and more recently to children, largely delivered by public agencies and enshrined in legislation. They associated this model with countries with higher levels of economic development, revenue collection capacity and service delivery capacity by public agencies (South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). The countries involved have interlocking economies and large scale labour migrations.

The second, identified with 'middle' Africa, is varied across countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, Kenya and Ghana. The thread running through the variants of this second model is that they aim to integrate service provision and utilisation, combining transfers with conditionalities on health and schooling, characterised by a shorter time horizon and a strong donor influence in the formulation, finance and delivery of the social protection programmes. Nigeria seems to belong to this category. Although there hitherto have been a series of poverty intervention programmes, it is only in

recent years that the Federal Government of Nigeria, in collaboration with development partners, has sought to develop social protection instruments (Holmes et al (2012). Even so, it is yet to develop an overarching national social protection policy. The Nigerian Federal Government has worked with donor agencies, such as UNICEF and DFID to carry out pilot programmes in social protection. Slowly, but increasingly, several state governments have joined in implementing social protection programmes in their states.

There are currently three dominant perspectives on social protection (Munro 2008). The first views social protection as consisting of 'public intervention to assist individuals, households and communities in better managing income risks' due to exposure to shocks and effects of shocks (Holzman and Jorgensen (1999: 1008). Social risk management would involve social assistance, social investment and development funds, labour market interventions as well as pensions and other insurance-type programmes. The second emphasises social protection as social security; measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive health care. Social protection is seen as a basic human right that must be extended to all citizens (Sepulveda and Nyst 2012). The ILO views it as efforts to 'secure decent work for women and men everywhere' moving social protection from a policy option to an obligation for states and international governance structures (ILO 2013). The third perspective is closely related to the second. Both may be regarded as the two sides of the same coin. It places emphasis on social protection as a basic need. It is often traced to the United Nations reference to 'a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work; to provide assistance to families with children as well as provide people with basic health care and housing' (United Nations 2004: 4, cited in Barrientos and Hulme 2009: 442).

In general, there is a debate about whether social protection is an end in itself in terms of poverty reduction or an instrument in achieving sustainable development and growth. This debate has pitched two strands of social protection advocates against each other. The first interlocutors are the instrumentalists who argue that social protection measures should be used to address lacuna in development agendas. In this regard, for effective development to be achieved, these advocates argue, societies would have to put in place risk management mechanisms that will compensate for missing or incomplete insurance until such a time when poverty reduction and market deepening would make social protection measures unnecessary thus allowing private insurance to play a greater role (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004, 1). On the other side of the debate are the activists who argue

that the persistence of poverty, inequality and vulnerability speak to problems of social injustice and social inequality, they campaign for social protection as inviolable right of citizenship. For this people who see 'social protection as social justice', it is not enough to transfer cash or food even though this acts of humanitarianism are a necessary first step. They argue for a universal social minimum where entitlement is based on citizenship and not on philanthropy (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2008).

To an extent, the contending definitions are underlined by ideological differences. Devereux and McGregor (2014) argue that the way poverty and vulnerability are conceptualised determines the types of social protection measures prescribed. Those who emphasise personal characteristics and circumstances of individuals and households as the root of poverty, prescribe targeted social assistance and social insurance schemes, the most coherent elaboration of this perspective being the Social protection floor of the ILO.

Those who emphasise social structures, institutions, and power relations, especially questions of social justice, prescribe a transformative approach to social protection. Indeed, Hickey (2014, 323) argues that liberal theories of social justice result in “a bias towards more ameliorative and less transformative approaches to social protection which are likely to leave underlying causes of injustice in place”.

Nonetheless, Munro (2008) has argued that the differences among these perspectives are not as profound as they looked, if we depart from an engagement with chronic poverty, that there could be a meeting point. According to him, the three perspectives taken together emphasise that (i) development is about people and not commodities; (ii) both rights and needs involves social relations, and that there is a strong moral dimension to rights and needs. Taylor (2009, 47) refers to these elements in the context of the Africa as representing various values that underline social protection at the Livingstone conference which drew on the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The African Union's notion of social protection is expressed in its Social Policy Framework (AU-SPF). According to the AU-SPF (2008), the interventions falling under a social protection framework include social security measures furthering income security, job creation, equitable and accessible health and other services, social welfare, quality education and so on. These reflects the ILO's minimum guarantee “over the life cycle, {that}all in need have access to essential healthcare and to basic income security which together secure effective access to goods and services defined as necessary at the national level” (ILO Recommendation 202,2012). The

AU calls on member states to extend existing social insurance schemes (with subsidies for those unable to contribute); build up community based or occupation based insurance schemes on a voluntary basis, social welfare services, employment guarantee schemes; and introduce or extend public financed, non-contributory cash transfers. It states further that a minimum package of essential social protection should cover: essential health care, and benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older persons and persons with disabilities. Thus, like the ILO's recommendations, the AU SPF embeds social protection in a wider context of general social, economic and human welfare.

### **Research Design and Empirical Strategy**

The study design involves a review of existing literature complemented by the use of qualitative and quantitative strategies within a political economy framework to explore the emergence and trajectory of social protection policies in Nigeria. Primary data are derived from field interviews and a survey of beneficiaries. The interviews were conducted among government officials at state and federal government levels, political party officials, community leaders, civil society organizations, donor agencies, and beneficiaries. The survey was conducted among beneficiaries in six states (Jigawa, Gombe, Plateau, Ekiti, Anambra and Delta States) selected from the six geopolitical zones in the country. It covers beneficiaries of social assistance programmes involving cash transfers in the six states, including income support for children, social cash transfer for the poor/unemployed and income support for the older persons or persons with disability. Copies of a questionnaire were administered for the beneficiaries' survey in each state implementing the In Care of the People (COPE) programme and 64% of the copies returned were analysed using descriptive statistics.

### **Social Protection Policies and Programmes in Nigeria**

The first official social protection legislation in Nigeria was the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1942 for both public and private sectors. This was followed by the first official public sector pension legislation enacted in 1951 with retroactive effect from January 1, 1946. After several amendments, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) enacted the Pension Decree No. 102 of 1979 for federal civil servants and the Armed Forces Pension Decree No. 103 of 1979 for the military. The two decrees led to the establishment of the non-contributory defined benefit (DB) pension schemes based on final salary.

A private sector pension scheme for employees was initiated in 1954 when the Nigerian Breweries introduced the first DB pension and gratuity

scheme for its employees. The United Africa Company (UAC) followed this in 1957. In 1961, the National Provident Fund (NPF) was inaugurated as a social protection program for private sector employees – it was mainly a savings scheme based on equal contributions from both employee and employer. By Decree No. 73 of 1993, the federal government introduced the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) to replace the NPF. The provisions in the NSITF include retirement, disability, funeral and survivor benefits. In 2002, it was amended to introduce a minimum pension benefit.

On June 25, 2004, the Pension Reform Act (PRA) 2004 was enacted to establish a standardized defined contribution (DC) pension plan for both public and private sectors. The new pension scheme is contributory, fully funded, based on individual accounts that are privately managed by Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) with the pension funds' assets held by Pension Fund Custodians. Under this system, the employees contribute a minimum of 7.5 per cent of their Basic Salary, Housing and Transport Allowances while employers contribute 7.5 per cent. Employers and employees in the private sector are required to contribute a minimum of 7.5 per cent each. The programme is managed under rules and regulations provided by the National Pension Commission (PenCom). Decree 35 of 1999 introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which was introduced as a social security system that guarantees the provision of health services to persons on the payment of token contributions at regular intervals. These programmes cover the formal sectors of the economy and address only the social insurance aspect of social security based on a defined benefit plan of employee and employer contributions. As such, it does not necessarily cover other vulnerable persons.

In the 1990s, public uprising in challenging of biting neoliberal policies heralded the series of social programmes instituted to alleviate poverty. At first government responded with palliatives, a Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) was established to provide basic infrastructure for rural communities. Small holding farmers and small-scale enterprises and several women's cooperatives were also promoted to access soft loans from the People's Bank or under the Better Life for Rural Women Programme (BLRW) or the Family Advancement Programme (FEAP), which later replaced the BLRW. In 2001 National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP) was established to address the problem of absolute poverty in Nigeria. A National Health Insurance Scheme was established by Decree 35 of 1999, followed by Community-based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHIS) aims to protect the informal sector and marginalized groups. A variety of Cash Transfer programme constitute the latest in the government effort to address poverty (Umukoro 2013).

The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was established in 2001 under President Olusegun Obasanjo to monitor all government poverty eradication programmes. It is to provide technical expertise and limited financial support of states and local governments in the implementation of the social assistance programme. The conditional cash transfer programme was first implemented under NAPEP in 2007. During that first experiment, paymasters were used to pay the funds to beneficiaries, with attendant corruption and inconsistencies. There were cases of none or short payment and delay in payment. The programme implementation strategy was reviewed in 2009 and OSSAP-MDGs began the implementation of the scheme under its Conditional Grants Scheme (IDI).

### **Income Support for Children/ Basic Income Guarantee [In Care of the People (COPE)]**

The COPE scheme, which is the major income support programme for children, is a joint programme of the federal government and some state governments of Nigeria. It is aimed at stimulating economic self-reliance and growth and to eradicate poverty among beneficiaries. The criteria for selection of beneficiaries of the scheme include: that household must be extremely poor, must have children of school age and a trainable adult who will be trained in a life-sustaining venture among others.

Under the scheme benefitting households are to ensure that their children of school age attend schools regularly, pregnant women attend regular antenatal clinics and children under five years are immunized and taken to welfare clinics regularly. Majority of those selected were unemployed widowed women or single parent women. Thus, the conditional cash transfer mechanisms serves as incentives for extremely poor families to use available education and health services for children and pregnant women while increasing household consumption.

The COPE programme in Nigeria was modelled after the successful e-transfer system CCT programs in Brazil, Mexico, Kenya and South Africa. Under this scheme, the Federal Government of Nigeria provides funds and technical support, and leverages the contributions from development partners. The states' planning commissions, departments for local governments and local government service commissions provide policies, guidelines and human resources to make the initiative work smoothly. The local governments work with communities to assess needs and source local counterpart funding and are responsible for drawing up plans that align with achieving the MDGs, and state and national development strategies. All payments are done through e-mobile banking services.

In 2012, 24 states were involved, with the FGN contributing N5 billion

which the benefitting states matched up with their counterpart funding of N5 billion. A total of 56,000 households benefitted from 2012 CCT round. Each of the households received a monthly grant of N5, 000 and N100, 000 in lump sum at the end of one year to start a trade. In other words, the CCT scheme, which entails the provision of grants to targeted poor households consists of two main components of payment: the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) and the Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment (PRAI) launched in 2013 (see Umukoro 2013).

Important criteria for selection of beneficiary communities, apart from slow progress towards MDG targets, were the willingness of chairpersons and communities to fully back local efforts to achieve the MDGs, the ability to properly account for funds and the likelihood that grants will make a significant difference in speeding progress. Although the scheme covers only 113 local governments, the plan is to reach all 774 local government areas (LGAs) in 2015.

### **Income support for the older people and persons with disabilities**

Few state governments independently of both the Federal Government and of each other carry out the income support for older people and persons with disabilities. Two of these states included in our study sample have programmes for older people. These are Ekiti and Anambra States. The federal government has no income support for older people. A bill for social assistance for older people passed second reading in the National Assembly in 2013 but has not progressed since then.

The scheme for older persons in Ekiti state is known as Social Security Scheme for Senior Citizens and aims at taking care of older persons; particularly those who do not have children that fend for them in the twilight of their years. The scheme formally took off in Ise-Ekiti, the headquarters of Ise/Orun Local Government Area on October 25, 2011. The programme targeted at men and women of 65 years and above. About 20,000 beneficiaries were enrolled on the programme.

In Anambra State, the programme for older persons began in 2012. The welfare scheme is for poor older persons aged above 75 years who are not pensionable. Each beneficiary is entitled to a payment of N5, 000 monthly. The government has committed to paying this welfare benefit till December 2015 by setting aside a sum of the money for that purpose.

The Jigawa State Government runs the only existing social assistance programme for persons with disabilities in Nigeria. The programme was an initiative of the State governor who wanted to uplift the standard of living of persons with disabilities. An enabling bill was signed into law on August 20th, 2007 by the state Governor. One hundred and fifty (150) persons with

disability from each of the twenty-seven (27) local governments of the state receive the sum of seven thousand naira (N7, 000) each monthly. From the record of the agency vested with the responsibility, the sum of N28, 539,000.00 has so far been paid to the beneficiaries. The programme is fully owned and run by the state government, without any donor or federal government inputs. Selection is largely based on patron-client relationship and luck, as there are no objective criteria developed for the selection process.

### **Income support for the unemployed**

There are no social assistance programmes for the unemployed in Nigeria. However, there are a variety of apprenticeship schemes involving some form of cash transfer being carried out by both the federal and state governments. Two major federal programmes are worthy of note in this regard. The first is the Youth Enterprise with Innovation Programme (YouWiN!) launched in October 2011, as an annual business plan competition that seeks to create jobs by encouraging creativity and entrepreneurship among the youth. Any Nigerian youth was eligible to participate if, he or she already owned an existing business, or had an innovative and bankable concept for a start-up business. The programme has run for three years with 1,200 promising entrepreneurs emerging each year. The government finances the businesses of the selected young entrepreneurs by a grant award, which is disbursed in four tranches subject to performance, winners receive assistance with their business registration processes from the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), training in small business management at the UK's School for Start-ups and mentoring from well-established entrepreneurs. The government claimed to have created 26, 000 jobs from the programme (Francis and Andrews 2013)

In the states a variety of programmes are on offer. But many of these are small scale. In Ekiti state, The Youth Volunteer Scheme, the Youth in Commercial Agriculture and Development (YCAD) Programme and the Young Entrepreneur Scheme (YES) are the three major employment schemes under the social protection programme. The YCAD aimed to create employment for 20,000 young school leavers. More than 1,500 young school leavers have been employed and provided with grants, seedlings and parcels of land. About 5,000 youths were also trained to function in different sectors of the economy through YES, under which young entrepreneurs are given financial grants and assisted to set up and run their businesses. In Anambra State the Youth Reorientation and Empowerment Programme (ANSYREP), is a similar programme for youth employment.

### **Push and Pull of Social Protection Policies & Programmes**

As we have noted earlier social protection got into the policy agenda in 2004 when the National Planning commission drafted a social protection policy at the behest of the international community. A review of official government documents shows that social assistance has emerged only as one of the tools of poverty alleviation, a tool of fulfilling part of the pro-poor investment commitment in the Debt Relief Grant (DRG) negotiated with the Paris club and the World Bank. It is yet to be adopted as a preferred tool of poverty alleviation. The dominant ideas of the government concerning the causes of poverty and the sustainable way to address it seem to account for sluggish adoption of social assistance policies. For instance the NEEDS document (FGN 2004: 30), which was the main poverty reduction strategy of the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, particularly his second term in office (2003-2007) declared that "inadequate growth is the main cause of poverty in Nigeria". Other factors, such as weak governance, social conflict and seasonal flow of productive income and employment opportunities in the rural sector merely amplify poverty. Thus, promoting growth will go a long way in reducing poverty. The document identifies the private sector as the engine of growth while the government is to enable the private sector to flourish. Although, it recognised the need to address weaknesses in existing poverty alleviation programmes, such as poor coordination, absence of a comprehensive policy framework, ineffective targeting, excessive political interference, unwieldy scope of programmes leading overlapping functions and institutional rivalry, absence of sustainability in programmes and projects, and lack of involvement of beneficiaries in project design implementation, monitoring and evaluation; it did not specify any new strategy of social assistance or cash transfer. It however, emphasises the need to for "actions to facilitate individual economic empowerment, particularly among the poor and vulnerable groups".

Similarly the Vision 20:2020 document that came after the NEEDS document focused on national competitiveness as a means to "optimise human and natural resources to achieve rapid economic growth, and translate that growth into equitable social development for all citizens". Chapter 2 of the document, which is devoted to guaranteeing the well-being and productivity of Nigerians, privileges the achievement of the MDGs and their targets as the basis of pro-poor intervention. It however talks about "special implementation of policies to target the very poor states, which will have greater effect on poverty reduction across the country". From these official government documents, poverty alleviation has been defined in terms of the achievement of the MDGs. The current government social assistance programmes are therefore one of the many residual tools available to be used

for poverty alleviation. From the analysis of the policy documents, the trust of government policy is the promotion of growth, which is the main means of driving development, improving living conditions and addressing poverty.

However, social assistance programmes also draw inspiration from the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy Section 17(3g&h) stipulates that government policy shall ensure “children; young persons and the aged are protected against any exploitation whatsoever, and against moral or material neglect”; “provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other condition of need”. These provisions are consistent with the AU-SPF. They are however not justiciable, that is, no one can take the state to the court for failing to provide these services or to demand for such services as of right. Successive governments have argued that there is not sufficient fund to enforce them. Although there are some civil society organisations, especially labour unions that have tried to mobilise for their enforcement, they have not succeeded.

### **Institutional Framework**

Social policy is on the concurrent list in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. As such, social assistance policies from the federal government have to be negotiated with the states, while the states can introduce their own programmes regardless of what the federal government is doing. The politics and management of intergovernmental relations therefore straddle policy adoption and diffusion in Nigeria. The initial poor response from the states slowed the policy uptake. Many state governments were not interested in the projects, unless they have a say in its design and implementation plan (IDI). States under control of opposition parties did not want the federal government run by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) since 1999 to gain popularity at their expense by taking credit for such programmes at the local level. The federal government had to change tactics from by passing the states to working as partners with them, cultivating the interest state governors. This partnership approach resulted in greater states buy-in, increased funding for the programme through the payment of matching grants by the states and enhanced prospects for sustenance of the scheme. It has also enabled the states to modify the programme conditionalities according to the particular goals of the MDGs they want to advance within the scheme. The number of participating states rose to 24 of 36. By the last quarter of 2014, there was evidence that CCTs are gradually emerging as a policy issue in partisan politics.

At the state level, governors have begun to advertise the implementation of such policies as mark of their commitment to the poor. The then governor

of Ekiti, Dr Kayode Fayemi, for instance, celebrated his 48th birthday with beneficiaries of the non-conditional cash transfer for older people in the state. This has helped popularise the practice in the media. The All progressives Congress (APC), in the electioneering period committed to extending the CCT programme to 20 million Nigerians if given the people's mandate at the 2015 election (APC 2014).

### **Non-State Actors**

Social assistance in the form of CT either for children or the unemployed has not been the focus of labour unions in Nigeria. Traditionally, labour concentrate on measures to improve working conditions and social insurance for their members in the formal sector. Labour unions have focused on former sector employees and have not been active in the area of social assistance for the poorest. A meeting to engage labour unions from West Africa (including Nigeria) on the ILO social protection floor was organised in Cotonou in 2012 by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. After several days of deliberation, the unions committed to take ownership of the ILO's recommendations on social protection floor and fight for their implementation by their countries; encourage countries to ratify the ILO Convention No. 102 and submit to the International Labour Office (ILO) periodic status report on social protection. They also committed to ensure a wide dissemination of the recommendation on social protection floors for social justice and fair globalisation; make the ILO document an evaluation and advocacy tool; and forge strategic alliances and develop synergies of action with other sections of society to ensure the effectiveness of SPFs (Friedrich Ebert 2014). However, in Nigeria labour unions have continued to focus on social security issues and less on social protection more broadly. In his 2014 May Day address, the president of the NLC declared, "that the effective implementation of social protection floors as agreed by State parties of the International Labour Organizations is one of the effective ways to tackle hunger, want and hardship" (Omar 2014). At no point did he and his colleagues engage the issue of social assistance as currently practiced in Nigeria. Comrade Lakemfa, noted that the various social security schemes are new, and unions have been slow in engaging them. "Unions are more visible in holding workshops in collaboration with the institutions running the schemes as part of capacity building and popularizing the schemes" (cited in Mustapha and Uyot, 2012, 218). Although the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) with other civil society organisations began a campaign in 2010 for the inclusion in the constitution of legally enforceable rights to housing, healthcare, shelter and so on, this has not been transformed into a systematic call for social assistance in any programmatic sense (IDI).

### **The Role of Donors**

The initial venture into CCTs has been largely influenced by the donor community's interest in social assistance. The pioneer social protection policies and programmes were carried out in conjunction with donor agencies that helped with design and background activities. Existing poverty alleviation programmes were shored up and new ideas were canvassed as the Obasanjo government (1999-2007) government sought to invest the Debt Relief Grant (DRG) funds in pro-poor programmes in order to accelerate the achievement of the MDGs targets. Resources from the fund were therefore allocated to social assistance programmes, which had gained popularity amongst the donor community.

The donor community have also been central to the introduction of pilot programmes in the states. The DFID, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, and USAID have been active across the country. With support from the World Bank the initial CCT in Kano, Bauchi and Katsina states began in 2011 and ran for three years to reduce girls' school drop out as a result of early marriage. UNFPA's potential interest in social protection includes a strong focus on gender and health. UNICEF and WHO provides technical support to social protection mechanisms that facilitate access to health services. The World Bank also assisted in the development of the draft Social Protection Strategy and continues to support the National Planning Commission (NPC) to put a social protection strategy in place. DFID and UNICEF have also provided technical assistance to COPE. In spite of these support, limited institutional capacity at the federal level have adversely affected the speed of policy development, guidance and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to support state-specific CCTs; limited institutional capacity at the state level undermines the ability of the state's policymakers to choose appropriate cash transfer programmes and deliver and monitor existing CCTs. These result in poor inter-sectoral institutional coordination (Holmes et al 2012a).

International Donors/Organisations have acted as catalysts for social assistance programmes in Nigeria. However, the country is a vast territory of over 36 states and 774 local governments in a federal system for them to advance social assistance programme in Nigeria, they would have to promote a policy network community around social protection that would involve government and non-governmental actors across all levels of government in the Nigerian federation. They have to support consistent and meaningful evaluation of the existing programmes in order to make citizens and policy stakeholders appreciate social assistance as an effective instrument of social assistance in a predominantly informal economy like Nigeria.

### Beneficiaries

Most of the programmes examined are still in the pilot stages as seen from the coverage and level of funding. Economic analysis of the national coverage and breakdown of beneficiaries is limited by the unavailability of data and inherent gaps. Holmes et al (2012) in the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) paper: 'Social Protection in Nigeria: Mapping programmes and their effectiveness' did the closest analysis. They summarized the coverage into the table below:

**Table 1: Coverage of Some Social Assistance Programmes as at 2012.**

Programme	Projected coverage: number of households/% of poor	Actual coverage: number of households/% of poor
In Care of the Poor Programme (COPE)		22000 households/ less than 0.001% of poor household nationally (NAPEP, NPC and ICF Macro)
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) for girls' education	Kano- scaling up to all eligible girls in LGAs where CCT is implemented	12000 girls, Kano/0.002% of poor people in Kano (9.2 million population; poverty incidence approx. 60%) 7000 girls, Katsina/ 0.001% of poor people in Katsina (6 million population; poverty incidence approx. 70%)
Maternal and Child Health (MCH)		851,198 women and girls June 2010 (Phase 1: 615,101, Phase 2: 236,097)/ less than 0.01% of the poor (assumption 75 million poor; poverty rate 54%)
Community Based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHIS)	100% informal sector workers (when fully rolled out, expected to cover 112 million Nigerians in informal sector (PATHS2, 2010)	Unavailable

Source: Holmes et al (2012)

In general, the coverage of these programmes has been very limited and do not cover the full range of vulnerability. Nigeria spends less on social protection than many African countries and two thirds of spending on social protection is allocated to civil servants' pension and benefits schemes (see

Hagen–Zanker and Holmes 2012). An evaluation of the national maternal and child health fee waiver programme in 2010 has shown it may have saved 470 women's and 1,070 children's lives – small numbers given that there were 4.2 million pregnant women at any given time that year and 25.3 million children under five. Several states in both the northern and southern parts of the country have introduced social protection policies, but they have remained largely pilot programmes (Gavrilovic et al 2011).

Government officials (OSSAP-MDGs) maintain that funding has not been enough to scale-up across the country. Some states are unable to join the programme because they are unable to raise the counterpart fund. In addition, because of previous failed promises, citizens tend to be sceptical about the genuine intention of government interventions, hence ownership and buy-in is hampered.

In conflict areas in Delta State, harassment by community youths over financial gratifications before projects can be sited in the communities as well as peculiar challenges of the terrain in the State, a riverine area, creates entry challenges. Poor commitment by the beneficiaries to acquiring skills and sustainability of the trade engaged in remains another challenge.

In terms of beneficiary's assessment of the COPE programme, our survey shows that 57% of beneficiaries believe that social assistance programmes have helped improve their economic and social conditions and that of dependants a lot, while 32% are of the view that they have had only a little bit of improvement. Although 36% of respondents did not tell whether the programmes have raised the tempo of economic activities in their communities, 76% of those who indicated strongly agree or agree that the programmes have raised the tempo of economic activities in their communities. Similarly, 86% of respondents who indicated that the programmes contributed to poverty reduction in their communities strongly agreed or agreed that the programmes contributed to poverty reduction in their communities (See table below).

**Table 2: Perceived impact of programmes on Human Capital Development and Poverty Reduction**

Responses	The social assistance programme Has helped to improve the economic and social conditions of myself and dependents	Responses	Programme has raised the tempo of economic activities in my community	Programme has contributed to poverty reduction in my community
A lot	55.7 (214)	Strongly agree	21.9 (84)	22.7 (87)
A little bit	32.0 (123)	Agree	27.1 (104)	26.8 (103)
Somewhat	3.9 (15)	Disagree	7.6 (29)	6.5 (25)
Not at all	8.3 (32)	Strongly disagree	7.3 (28)	7.6 (29)
Non response	Nil	No response	36.2 (139)	36.5 (140)
Total	100 (384)	Total	100.0 (384)	100.0 (384)

Sources: Authors' Field survey (2014)

Some respondents complained that the sum of money given monthly is too small. Less than half the number of respondents (38.8%) affirmed that the programme has enabled them to acquire new assets. While only 16.9% disagree with the view that the procedure for receiving the grant is easy, 88.8% confirmed that there is a place to make a complaint when they have problems about the programme. In-depth interviews show that there are a few cases of money going to the wrong persons, and cases of moneys not being paid regularly.

This study shows that social assistance can contribute to poverty alleviation. However, the utility of the training and skill development component can only be determined by investigating how those who have exited the programme have fared after the gestation period.

### **Conclusion**

Social protection entered the Nigeria policy agenda in 2004. But Nigeria's investment in social assistance has been quite meagre, put at 0.001 of GDP. Cash transfer programmes have remained largely at the pilot stage. Constitutional provisions and Nigeria's commitment to international

covenants and conventions on social policy issues that promote social assistance have not translated into enthusiasm for social assistance measures. This is because the dominant view in public policy is that poverty is caused by lack of growth. Secondly, the national vision of the economy sees the private sector as the engine of growth (NEEDS). Thus, entrepreneurship development has permeated efforts at poverty alleviation. The dominant practice of social assistance has been from the viewpoint of risk management and vulnerability and cash transfers are viewed as one of the many of tools of poverty alleviation.

In Nigeria social protection measures have remained haphazard, incoherent and incomprehensive. It will remain so until the national Policy, which is still in the drawing board, is implemented to provide a national framework. The initiatives at the sub-national level will depend on the vision and disposition of state governors. The central government has had to negotiate and partner with the states to extend pilot social assistance programme across the country. The politics and management of intergovernmental relations are therefore a critical aspect of the dynamics of policy adoption and diffusion in Nigeria's federal context.

Social assistance as political good has begun to feature in the partisan policy arena promising an uptake. However, civil society and the labour unions have not advanced social assistance as an instrument of social justice. Labour unions emphasise social insurance, with limited knowledge about social assistance programmes. Donors have been the main driver of the social assistance ideas, in particular, DFID, UNICEF, and USAID. They have not only partly funded pilot programmes in the North with the highest rates of poverty; they have encouraged the development and implementation of the policy at the national level as well. They have provided technical and financial support for policy development and programme design. However, Nigerian governments have failed to take ownership of the programmes and failed to transform them into a major national social programme. An uptake in social protection may occur only if the political leadership is converted and take ownership.

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# **Wealth-Flow Theory and the Gender Hazards of Female Trafficking: Insights from Benin City, Nigeria**

Franca Attoh

## **Abstract**

The movement of peoples across national and international boundaries is an enduring component of human history. Selective male migration and increasing female autonomous migration are manifestations of migration as survival strategies (Adepoju, 2000). A significant number of young women migrate independently to fulfill their economic needs due to the feminization of poverty. The dwindling economic fortunes in Nigeria have impacted negatively on the family. The corollary is the erosion of family values resulting in many young women being impelled to embark on desperate ventures to seek better means of livelihood in Europe. Using data collected from a field survey in Benin City, Nigeria, the paper argues that young women embark and/or are lured into trafficking situations for the purposes of economic benefits. This journey is made possible through the cooperation and connivance of family members and trafficking syndicates. Anchoring the analysis on Caldwell's wealth flow theory and Merton's theory of Anomie, the paper concludes that the desire to achieve material success, albeit illicitly, impels young Nigerian women into being trafficked. The implication is that this category of young women becomes vulnerable to numerous abuses, violence and discriminatory

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policies from destination countries and this translates into enduring gender violence in their lives.

### **Introduction**

Human trafficking remains an intractable problem in Nigeria and West Africa. It is believed to be modern-day slavery occasioned by greed, poverty and poor legislation, with the victims being predominantly children, girls and women. Indeed the severity of the illegal sale and trade in persons particularly children and females in Nigeria, and the West African sub-region, prompted governments to seek new strategies to combat the heinous crime (Ojukwu, 2006) cited in (Attoh and Makanju, 2016). Nigeria is a source, transit, and destination country for women and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Within Nigeria, women and girls are trafficked primarily for domestic servitude and commercial sexual exploitation. Boys are trafficked for forced labor in street vending, agriculture, mining, stone quarries, and as domestic servants. Religious teachers in the North also traffic boys, called almajiri, for forced begging. Women, girls, and boys are trafficked from Nigeria to other West and Central African countries, primarily Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, and The Gambia. Benin Republic is a primary source country for boys and girls trafficked for forced labor in Nigeria's granite quarries. Nigerian women and girls are trafficked through Libya, Morocco, and Algeria to Europe, primarily for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation, and to the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, for forced prostitution and forced labor (Attoh and Makanju, 2016). While Italy is the primary European destination country for Nigerian young women, other common destinations are Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, France, and Greece. Children from Nigeria and other African countries are trafficked from Lagos to the UK's urban centers for domestic servitude and forced labor in restaurants and shops (U.S. State Department of State, 2014b).

Most young women being trafficked to Italy begin their journey from the Republic of Benin and this is not considered as a crime as those on both sides of the border willingly connive to facilitate such journey. For (Asiwaju, et al 2006) this situation holds true as border communities are facilitators of crime arising from unusual permissiveness resulting from the fact that what is forbidden in one side of the border may be allowed in the other side of the border. These activities are based on purely economic decisions as border communities benefit immensely from smugglers and human traffickers. It could be said that the economies of such communities are largely dependent on trans-border crimes.

The term trafficking refers to a set of interrelated activities that encompass migration, commercial sexual exploitation as well as acts that violate human and children's rights. The term is synonymous with illicit trade in human beings across international borders or within the same country (Attoh, 2013b). However, trafficking of children is often discussed together with the trafficking of women. The main reasons being that (i) available data on trafficking of women is often not disaggregated by age and (ii) there is considerable debate regarding the age at which a child should be considered an adult. For example, the majority of women coerced into commercial sexual exploitation are between 16-24 years of age (International Labour Organization 2002). Human trafficking tends to be systematic in its occurrence especially that its span increases as the globalization process intensifies. Though previously in existence in forms such as white prostitution, child labour and domestic servitude, today, contemporary human trafficking is an organized business just as the transatlantic slave trade was with various linkages spread across the globe. Not only children and women are trafficked; young boys seeking greener pastures abroad also fall prey to traffickers. It can safely be argued that in this age of jet-planes, cellular phones, and the Internet, there are faster means of dealing in human commodities than hitherto. There is little doubt that globalization has created inequalities and inequities resulting in the migration of the poor to the rich regions of the world (Attoh, 2013a). Hand in hand with this came the commercialization of humanity, which is akin to modern day slavery (CNN, 2016). In times past, slavery and slave trade existed in various forms: people became slaves as war captives; criminals were punished with enslavement, and in some cases individuals in impoverished circumstances sold their relatives. However, in whatever form it took, it was quickly realized by most civilizations that the practice was the basest of crimes against humanity. One would have thought that, with the immense improvements in the understanding of human nature and the environment, any form of exploitation that looks like slavery would be abhorred automatically. This is not the case, as human beings are today, prized as commodities and exchanged for money like any other article in the market. The business of trafficking in humans is today organized loosely by groups that are also involved in weapons and narcotics, colluding with government officials in dozens of countries. There is very little doubt, that it is a lucrative business and may be one of the most difficult to combat. Its corrupting effects on governments and institutions are barely perceptible because they are less visible than those caused by gunrunning and drug trafficking. Exploiting the poverty and the low status of women in the developing world, middlemen are able to bring together the supply and demand for cheap labour and sex in

ways that would have simply been unthinkable not long ago. Evidently, globalization has not only stimulated the movement of capital, goods, and technology but also the movement of all categories of peoples from one end of the world to the other. This global development brought in its wake the loosening up of protective barriers and political boundaries which organized criminal gangs have capitalized on to perpetrate many heinous acts including human trafficking. Though the fact of human trafficking is not difficult to understand on its own, its dimensions and categorization continue to multiply by the day. Broadly conceptualized, human trafficking include forced and/or commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, illegal and bonded labour, servile marriage, false adoption, sex tourism and entertainment, pornography, organized begging, organ harvesting, sale of babies and other criminal activities (Corbin, 2001) cited in (Attoh and Mekanju, 2016). Organ harvesting, sometimes referred to as organ laundering, involves the trafficking of humans for the purpose of selling their organs for money.

In Benin City, young women are lured out of the country with promises of good jobs and better well-being. For instance in April 2004, 25 trafficked young women were deported from the transit camps in the Republic of Benin, 23 of them were Bini from Edo State, Nigeria (UNESCO, 2004). Towards the end of 2003, no fewer than 13,000 Nigerian young women were trapped in transit camps along the West African trafficking routes en route to Europe.

Their ages were put at between 14 and 28 years (Onyeonoru, 2004). These young women are mainly trafficked to Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands (Omorodion, 1999, Otoide, 2000, Okonofua, 2002, Attoh, 2009, Attoh, 2013a). Evidence from the literature shows that 60 percent of those prostituting in Italy came from Nigeria (Ralston, Murphy and Mouldon, 1998; Orhants, 2002). Scholars such as (Okojie et al, 2003) have argued that the desire to escape poverty is a major reason why people avail themselves of trafficking situations. However, poverty in this context can be said to be feminized as many young women are excluded from inheriting movable and immovable property from their family of orientation due to the principle of primogeniture (Usuanlele, 1998). In addition, young women may be compelled to drop out of schools to get married or follow traffickers to enable their male siblings complete their education. Onyeonoru (2004) and Attoh (2009) argue that in addition to social deprivation and high youth unemployment, family disorganization, wider value distortion in the Nigerian society and gender based inequities located in the cultural practice of primogeniture in Benin City, Edo State, are responsible for the exacerbation of trafficking in young women. In the context of Benin City, trafficking in young women has positively impacted on the local economy to the extent that remittances are invested in transportation business, clothes

lines, grains milling and real estate. Successful madams and traffickees own choice buildings in elite neighbourhoods and are referred to as “Italo Girls” a corruption of the word Italy. This discourse seeks to provide answers to the following research questions :- (a) what is the effect of poverty on trafficking in young women? (b) Does unemployment impel the trafficking in young women? (c) How does undue parental expectation contribute to the trafficking in young women especially in the context of Benin City, Nigeria? (d) And does trafficking in women constitute gender violence? This paper is divided into five sections. Section one which includes the introduction discusses the concept of trafficking as well as x-ray the impetus for the phenomenon in the context of Benin City. Section two interrogates the wealth flow theory of Caldwell as well as Merton's theory of Anomie as epistemological anchorage. Section three discusses the method which was used to generate the data while section four is the analysis of the findings. Section five provides the conclusions and recommendations.

### **Theoretical underpinnings**

Caldwell starts from the premise that people are rational beings and that reproductive behaviour is economically rational within bounds of biology and psychology. He avers that there exist two types of society- (i) the stable high fertility where there is no economic gain to be accrued by having fewer children. (ii) The lower fertility society where economic factors imply the undesirability of having many children. In the first society, children over their lifetime provide their parents with more economic resources than they receive. When this economic flow changes direction to the regime that favours the children instead of the parents, parents lose the incentive to have children and fertility falls to a low level. In societies where wealth flows from parents to children, the flow is downward whereas in societies where wealth flows from children to parents the flow is upward. The imperative is that pronatalism is favoured in agrarian societies where polygyny is practiced. Children provide cheap labour on their parents' farms and are instruments for acquisition of wealth by their parents. The Benin social milieu favours polygyny and it is widely practiced. Children are regarded as assets by their parents, in Benin City, even though male children are valued more than female children but the female child is also desired. She is expected to bring wealth and good fortune to the family. In traditional Benin society the female child is expected to marry and give birth to many children. Since children are regarded as assets, a childless woman has no social standing (Usuanlele, 1998). However, modernization has brought some changes to Benin cultural values. Even though the male child is still cherished but the female child is equally desired. She is looked upon to wipe off poverty from her family by

traveling to Italy to prostitute and amass wealth. Parents prefer to send daughters abroad because they could be relied upon to assist the family and girls were more willing to sacrifice themselves for their families (UNICRI, 2004) cited in (Attoh, 2009 & Attoh, 2013b). The proceeds from such ventures are invested in family businesses such as transportation or milling of grains and even real estate. This theory is useful in explaining the phenomenon of trafficking in young women in Benin City given that trafficking continues to thrive in Benin City especially in polygynous families with many daughters. It equally explains situations where young women from monogamous families and even female-headed households are encouraged by their parents to travel to Italy to prostitute and change the family fortune through remittances.

The term anomie was first used by Durkheim to explain the transition from early mechanical to industrial societies. His postulation was borne out of the social upheaval that characterized Europe at that time. His concern was how to achieve social order. His paradigm was based on how to achieve social order within two kinds of solidarities namely mechanical and organic solidarities. He posited that in mechanical solidarity which is akin to traditional society that there exists collective consciousness. The collective consciousness is principally instrumental to making social order possible. The main components of this collective consciousness include commonality of values, belief system and cultural norms. These allow for cohesion in society due to the solidarity of similarities. The existence of collective consciousness inhibits the possibilities of members engaging in illicit activities or deviant acts such as trafficking in persons or partaking in trafficking situation. In contrast organic solidarity which is akin to industrial society is devoid of commonality of values. Rather there exist dissimilarities in beliefs, values and normative structures. In addition, there exist dissimilarities along occupational and professional lines within the exigencies of division of labour. The fact that members in such societies are associated through structural interdependence ought to result in cohesion.

However, the existence of structural inequalities vis-à-vis the dominant norm in society makes social order impossible. The dominant societal norm suggests conformity of a cultural expectation of material success. The approved societal method of achieving this material success is by getting a good job. This presupposes a certain level of educational attainment or acquisition of relevant skills. However, the existence of structural inequalities makes it impossible for every member of society to attain material success using the culturally approved means. Those members of the society precluded from attaining material success using legitimate means that are not morally inhibited, may innovate by indulging in deviant acts to

attain success. The result is normlessness what Durkheim referred to as anomie. Durkheim saw anomie as a condition resulting from social change in society. Expanding on Durkheim's postulation on anomie Merton argued that appetites were culturally induced. For him, anomie results from the strain of cultural demands and applies to only the socially disadvantaged members of society. Merton defined culture as "that organized set of normative values that govern the behaviour of members of society and social structure as organized set of social relationships in which members of a society are variously implicated" (Merton, 1968). His postulation is that anomie occurs when there is an acute disjuncture between cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of a society to act in accord with them (Merton, 1968:216). According to Merton, (a) everyone is encouraged to strive to be successful, (b) however, due to social conditions and economic realities not everyone or group possesses the required means to succeed hence anomie and crime. He posited that the dominant theme of American culture was emphasis on material success but this puts a lot of strain on individuals differentially located in the social structure. The American dream is all about material success and the possibility of social ascent for all members but the social structure allows this image to be a reality for just a few. Individuals and groups experience strain differentially depending on their location in the social structure and these pressures engender various outcomes. The key term used was anomie: "Anomie is ... conceived as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjuncture between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capabilities of members of a group to act in accord with them. In this conception, cultural values may help to produce behaviour which is at odds with the mandates of the value themselves. On this view the social structure strains the cultural values, making action to accord with them readily possible for those occupying certain statuses within the society and difficult or impossible for others. The social structure acts either as a barrier, or as an open door for the acting out of cultural mandates. When the cultural and social structure are mal-integrated, the first calling for behaviour and attitudes which the second precludes, there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms, towards "normlessness" (Merton, 1968). Merton designed a typology of adaptation open to such members of society. These five modes of adaptation are namely conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. This is shown in table 1 below.

**Table 1: Modes of Adaptation**

<b>Mode of Adaptation</b>	<b>Culture Goals</b>	<b>Institutional Means</b>
1. Conformity	+	+
2. Innovation	+	-
3. Ritualism	-	+
4. Retreatism	-	-
5. Rebellion	+/-	+/-

Source: Merton, 1968

Those members of society with access to the legitimate means of attaining success goals conform to society's norms and values and are law abiding. Those denied access to the legitimate means of attaining success goals, feel alienated and innovate by seeking unorthodox means to achieve success. The last four are regarded as deviant adaptations. Most of the actions labeled as crime emanate from the innovation response. Using the American society as an analogy, Merton argued that the American Culture placed undue emphasis on material success but the social structure does not provide legitimate means to all members of the society to achieve this. As a result individuals feel strain and resort to illegitimate means, which is crime. Those who cannot achieve the cultural goals but have been sufficiently socialized into following legitimate methods cling to this in a ritualistic way and sublimate their desires, adopt the response of ritualism. Merton called this a lower middle class adaptation and was the result of a coincidence of strict socialization and opportunities. This is the perspective of the frightened employee, the zealously conformist bureaucrat in the teller's cage of the private banking enterprise. Retreatism is the rejection of both goals and means– withdrawal from the social race. The retreatist lives in the society but is not of the society. He has internalized the legitimacy of means to such an extent that he finds it impossible to innovate but being unable to use legitimate means he avoids a moral conflict by repudiating both the goals and means. In this group are to be found psychotics, auroists, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, drunks, and drug addicts. Rebellion is a positive attempt to replace both the goals and means with another believed to be morally superior. To be found in this category are rebels, revolutionaries, non – conformist, heretics, or renegades. Evidence on school and crime suggest that dropping out of school leads to increased rather than decreased levels of anti social behaviour (see

Shavit and Rathner, 1988, Thornbery, Moore and Christenson, 1985) cited in (Lemert, 1964) and (Merton, 1968).

In the Nigerian context material success is highly valued but many people are unable to attain material success because of their position within the social structure. Those who belong to a lower socio-economic class with little or no education and lack skills find it impossible to attain material success through legitimate means. In this context, deviance takes the form of alternative and illegitimate means of attaining material success. In Nigeria, this structural imbalance within society engenders criminogenic behaviour. In essence the quest for success exerts pressures towards crime by encouraging an anomic situation, an environment in which people adopt “anything goes mentality” to achieve success goals. In the context of Benin City, as a result of structural inequities engendered by the principle of primogeniture the girl child can neither inherit from her family of orientation nor from her marital family except indirectly through her sons. The implication is that even those young women desirous of farming cannot access land except through the benevolence of fathers/brothers or husbands/sons. This has exposed contemporary Bini young women to strive to achieve material success through self effort and for those unable to acquire a college education the alternative is to innovate by taking advantage of opportunities provided by trafficking syndicates to travel to Europe to make money.

## **Methods**

### **The Ethnography of Benin Kingdom**

The old Benin kingdom is regarded as being coterminous with present-day Benin City which is the capital of Edo State. The Edos of this area represent the core of the old Benin Empire and have owed allegiance to the Oba of Benin for over four hundred and fifty years (450). The area is bounded by other ethnic groups classified as Edos such as the Urhobos, Isokos, Itsekiris and the Igbo speaking peoples on the eastern borders of the kingdom. Benin City is called Edo by its inhabitants and in certain contexts individuals will refer to themselves as Oviedo (child of Edo) or ovioba (Oba's subject). There is a marked uniformity in culture, social organization and language over the whole kingdom (Bradbury, 1957).

### **Historical Origin and Influence**

Edo mythology has it that Benin Kingdom was founded by the youngest of the children of Osanobua (the high god). Together with his senior brothers who included the first kings of Ife and “the first king of the Europeans” he

was sent to live in the world (ogbo). The rulers of the first dynasty were known as Ogiso (ruler of the sky). The rule of the Ogiso ended by a revolt and for a long period of time the Edo people had no royal rulers. After a while, the chiefs sent an emissary to the Oni of Ife asking him to provide one of his sons to rule over them. He sent Oranmiyan who after staying with the people concluded that only a native could rule over them. He then impregnated the daughter of the Onogie of Eyo village (A village close to Benin) who bore him a son. This son eventually became the Oba of Benin and was known as Eweka I. Successive Benin Obas including the present Oba of Benin trace their descent to Eweka I.

The Benin kingdom reached its zenith between the 15th and 16th centuries. A Portuguese named D'Aveiro who visited Benin in 1485 to establish a trading post went back to Portugal with one of the Oba's chiefs as ambassador. Thereafter, a trading post was established at ugwuto (Bradbury, 1957). By the 16th century, the Portuguese had established Catholic missions in Benin. Churches were built and in August 1516, the Oba ordered his son and two of his greatest noblemen to become Christians. This early contact with Europe explains the migratory pattern of modern Bini people.

### **Present-Day Benin City**

Benin City is the capital of Edo State. Edo State was carved out of the defunct Bendel State, which was created from the mid-western region in Nigeria. Bendel State was split into Edo and Delta states. Edo State has 18 Local Government areas with a population of 3218332 million people (2006 Census). Benin City, which consists of three local government areas namely Oredo, Egor, and Ikpoba-Okha, is regarded as the base of the ancient Benin kingdom. Benin City as alluded to earlier has had a long pre-colonial contact with Mediterranean Europe especially Portugal, Southern Italy and Spain. This historical contact explains the migratory pattern of modern Bini. Benin City, has a preponderance of Edo speaking people (Bini, Esan, and Afemai), there is also a large concentration of other ethnic groups such as the Igbo, the Yoruba and Hausa due its present status as a state capital. Benin City had a population of 1085676 persons (2006, census). Of this number women account for 543122 which is over 50 per cent of the population. According to (Okonofua, et al, 2004) young people (10-25 years old) account for 40 percent of the population. The city is poorly industrialized and lacks income-generating opportunities. The inhabitants are mainly farmers and civil servants due to its status as a state capital. Even though the state has the highest rates of school enrolment in the country, it also has the highest rates of school drop-outs and youth unemployment in the country (Okonofua, et al, 2004).

### **The Bini Family System**

In Benin villages, households vary in size from a single (usually impotent) man to a joint family of some twenty (20) persons. The following types of family are in existence:

- (1) The nuclear or compound family consisting of a man and his wife/wives and their children who may occupy their own houses or be housed in the family house.
- (2) The joint family consisting of an elderly man with his wives and unmarried children, together with one or more married sons with their wives and children and in some cases younger married brothers. Most married men prefer to move out of the family house after the death of their father. Of recent, married younger brothers may decide to stay under the authority of their elder brother who inherits the family wealth.
- (3) The extended family occupying several neighbouring houses made up of a man with his married brothers and sons with their wives and children. To any of this grouping may be added divorced and widowed mothers, sisters and daughters of the male and other categories of kin (Bradbury, 1957). The Bini are patrilineal and residence is virilocal. The father is the head of the family (erha) and he exercises control over his household (UNICRI, 2004). The father as the head of the family is honoured and revered. He has the authority to apply physical sanctions against those under him though he would not beat his adult sons or brothers. The rights and obligations consequent upon membership of family groups are conceived of in terms of a master/servant relationship (Bradbury, 1957). In relation to the family head all his dependants are servants. Both children and wives are regarded as servants of their father. A man is the sole owner of his wife/wives and he exercises absolute power and authority over his home stead (Usuanlele, 1998).

### **The Benin Economy**

The Bini are predominantly farmers. The soil is rich in nutrients and favours the cultivation of many crops. In order to farm satisfactorily a man requires the assistance of one or more women since they plant and care for subsidiary crops (Bradbury, 1957). In addition, the people are dexterous in the art of carvings and bronze works. Women depend on the generosity of the male members of their family to engage in farming. A wife could be given a plot of land by the husband to plant subsidiary crops. A widow or divorcee may enter into an arrangement with her brother for this purpose. Yam (the king of crops) is the basis of its subsistence economy. Men plant and own yams with other

income generating crops such as kola nuts, rubber and cocoa which was introduced by the colonial masters while the women are allowed to plant subsidiary crops such as corn, coco-yams and vegetables.

However, the discovery of crude oil and gas in commercial quantity in Edo State catapulted the state into the category of oil producing states with Benin City as the state capital. These two factors accentuated the transformation of Benin City from a predominantly agricultural town to a civil service town. Unfortunately, its status as an oil producing state did not translate into the industrial transformation of the state. Its cosmopolitan nature has engendered an influx of migrants both from other states and the rural areas of Edo State. Agriculture and crafts which hitherto were the main economic activities were neglected in pursuit of nonexistent white collar jobs. UNICRI (2004) in its study of Edo State concludes that Edo State is referred to as a civil service state due to the near absence of manufacturing industries. This absence of well paying jobs and the undue emphasis on material success accounts for the high incidence of young people leaving the state for foreign countries in search of better well-being.

### **Property Rights/Inheritance**

Male children are valued than female children because it is a patrilineal society. And property rights and inheritance is by the principle of primogeniture. Male children are considered more important than female children because they ensure continuity of the lineage (Usuanlele, 1998). Women are discriminated against in property sharing since they will marry out. According to, (UNICRI, 2004:44) “the rule of primogeniture is entrenched in Bini traditional culture, both with regards to crown and inherited property”. At death, a man's property both movable and immovable including titles passes to his eldest son. Wives and women cannot inherit their husbands' or fathers' property. The Bini tradition regards a woman as a stranger in her father's house because she would marry out (Ebohon, 1996).

### **Research Design**

The nature of the phenomenon under study called for an eclectic methodological approach. The study combined four key methods of investigation: cross-sectional survey method, Individual In-depth interviews (IDIs), Key informant interviews (KIIs), and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

For this study the population comprises all young women aged 15-25 years old residing in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. The reason for limiting vulnerability to 15-25 years was informed by evidence from literature which shows that the global sex industry prefers young women in their prime

(UNICRI, 2004, Wijers & Lapchew, 1999). From this population a sample size of 1235 young women made up of the following- 1000 never trafficked young women randomly selected and 235 trafficked but deported young women who were purposively selected were administered the research instrument which was designed to provide answers to the research questions. For the purpose of this paper only the data generated from the 235 young women who were trafficked but deported would be used.

### Analysis and Discussion of Generated Data

Table 2: Age distribution of Respondents

Age Distribution in years	Ever Trafficked
15 - 19	23 (9.8)
20 - 24	79 (33.6)
25+	133 (56.6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>235 (100)</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>21.93 years</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>22 years</b>

Table 2 above is the age distribution of those trafficked but deported. The figures show that majority of the respondents that is 56.6 % were aged 25 years and above. Those aged 20-24 years were 33.6 % whereas 9.8 % of the respondents were aged 15-19 years. Their median age was 22 years. The large percentage of those found in the age category 25 years and above is not unconnected with the fact that most of the deported respondents had spent many years in their countries of destination before they were deported. For a fact, some of them had become madams but suffered deportation as a result of having some differences with the syndicate that offer them protection. This is buttressed by the narrative of CB who spent 10 years in Italy before she was deported:

I was about 15 years old when I traveled to Italy with my auntie. I served her for four years and got my freedom. I started my own business and even recruited three girls that work for me. But I had problems with the syndicate. They were always demanding protection money. At a time I decided to call their bluff and they set me up with the police.

Table 3: Respondents Employment status prior to Trafficking

<b>Were you Employed?</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	39	16.6
No	196	83.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>100</b>

The information in Table 3 shows that 83.4 % of the respondents had no jobs prior to been trafficked; only 16.6 % said they were employed before they were trafficked. And even for those employed, they were mainly in the informal sector of the economy with its attendant low wages and lack of job security. Most of the respondents said that they were working as either stylists or sales girls before they traveled to Europe. Many scholars view the inability of many of these young women to secure jobs in the formal sector as a form of unemployment what the ILO refers to as disguised unemployment. The finding of (UNICRI, 2004) in Benin City buttresses the above assertion. They argued that many young people could not secure jobs on the completion of their secondary education. Rather, they eked out a living through trading, fashion designing and hair dressing. The implication is that most of those unable to secure remunerative employment remain poor and live below the poverty line and being unable to farm due to structural inequity poverty in this context remains feminized. This category of youths is usually vulnerable to trafficking situations.

Table 4: Financial remittances to the Family

<b>Were you sending money home while abroad?</b>	<b>Frequency (%)</b>
Yes	178 (75.7)
No	57 (24.3)
<b>Total</b>	<b>235 (100)</b>

Table 4 shows that 75.5 % of the ever trafficked respondents were sending money home whereas 24.3 % said they were not sending money home. The high percentage of those sending money home shows the impact on the family economy and corroborates Caldwell (1982) postulation of wealth flowing from children to parents in societies that favour pronatalism. It equally explains why Western Union Money Transfer has a high volume of

business in Benin City necessitating using a whole building (The Western Union Building on Akpakpava Street). The belief is that the quantum of foreign currency transaction informed this decision. This was buttressed by one of the fathers group that stated:

Why are you worried about this trafficking? How many companies are here in Benin City? This is our only way of surviving. When our children send us dollars we change the money and start a small project such as transport business or grinding of grains and pepper. It is our own democracy dividend.

The above statement buttresses the fact that trafficking is not an individual decision but rather a decision by family heads as represented by the fathers. In addition, the fact that the families of both the trafficker and the “trafficee” enter into contractual agreement that involves the signing of papers and oath taking at Ayelela shrine shows that it is a family decision.

According to one of the native doctors involved in administering oaths, family members must be involved to guard against the “trafficee” betraying her madam. The elders know the implication of swearing before Ayelela. This will ensure that both parties respect the agreement. He added that apart from the administering of oath, that the agreement is documented by a lawyer for both parties to sign. This includes the amount of money the “trafficee” will return to the madam. Upon returning the full amount she is deemed to be free. This freedom is akin to the type of freedom given to apprentices. It involves throwing a party by the madam while the “trafficee” presents her madam with a piece of Dutch wax and a big bottle of gin. The madam on her part blesses the young woman and prays for her to succeed in her own business.

According to one of the “trafficees” a good madam can start you off by allowing you to work in her territory until you have your own territory. However, she said that some wicked madams never allow their wards to complete the payment. As soon as they are left with a couple of thousands to complete the payment they arrange with the syndicate to have them deported by the law enforcement agents. This way instead of celebrating freedom they are deported back to Nigeria. Such madams never want to share their territory. They continue to recruit new young women to replace the deported ones.

### **Conclusions/Recommendations**

The commodification and marginalization of women have been a global phenomenon. It seems that each advancement in technology rather than abate gender disparity and reduce social marginalization of women actually accentuates it. Within the Benin social milieu poverty, unemployment and undue parental pressure have contributed to the phenomenon of trafficking in

women. These factors determine the position of the female child/woman within the social structure of the society. In a bid to conform to the structural stigmatization of inferiority, the female child accepts to be trafficked in order to improve the well being of her family. She is expected to contribute to the education of her male siblings and help improve the economic fortunes of her family. The same society expects her to get married at a certain age and raise a family. These societal expectations conflict with the traditional concept of marriage and motherhood. To fulfill these societal expectations she jettisons the traditional values of marriage and chastity and embraces the western values of freedom which conflicts with the traditional values to enable her conform to family pressures and expectations.

Underneath this issue of societal expectation is the issue of gender relations. The fact that men occupy decision making positions both at home and at the societal level and they exercise this power over women even when their interests are jeopardized are imperatives. The gender relations of power/prestige expose many young women into trafficking situations thus exposing them to economic exploitation and discrimination including violence in the destination countries. These women are simply victims of societal inequity both in their countries of origin and destination and thus victims of gender violence. To ameliorate the situation the following recommendations are imperative:

- Since trafficking in human persons crosscuts many issues, the search for solution must be eclectic. To this end Sociologists, Psychologists, Lawyers, the Police, the Immigration as well as priests and the religious in both source and destination countries should be involved in seeking a solution to the problem.
- Anti-trafficking laws should focus on the real guilty party, namely the trafficker, the pimp, the procurer, the brothel owners and even the clients instead of focusing on the traffickees who are actually victims of their society.
- Multilateral institutions, the United Nations as well as source and destination countries should work together to commission researches in source countries to unravel the dynamics of the trade.
- Finally , since trafficking in persons is a global problem that cross cuts various countries, its eradication should equally be global especially in the reduction of the income gap between the core North which are the destination countries and the peripheral South which supply the human commodities.

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# **Conflict Entrepreneurs, Informal Economies and Structural Reforms in the Niger Delta**

Goodnews Osah, Aaron Ola Ogundiwin and Chinedu Eti

## **Abstract**

The Niger Delta is endowed with oil and gas resources on which Nigeria's economy has rested for over five decades. This same geopolitical zone has been a centre of increasingly violent agitation. Conflict in the Niger Delta is not only hydra-headed but also is complicated by underground economies of conflict entrepreneurs. This article adopts the 'resource curse', 'greed and grievance' and the 'predatory state' theories to explain the sustained armed conflict and informal economies thriving in the Niger Delta region. The article relied mainly on secondary data. The central argument is that structural reforms are sine qua non to sustainable development in the Niger Delta region. The article recommended that the Nigerian state should focus on providing youth employment as a more enduring solution to the Niger Delta challenge; institutions that enforce and interpret laws and policies should be strengthened and made more vibrant to reflect the present realities of a modern state; and that a massive socio-economic reconstruction of the Niger Delta region should be embarked upon urgently by all stakeholders implicated in the Niger Delta challenge.

## **Introduction: An Overview of the Niger Delta Region**

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is one of the most studied regions of the

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world after the Middle East which has a long history of crisis. The region designated as the Niger Delta in Nigerian political parlance is comprised of nine out of thirty-six states in the federation namely- Abia and Imo (Southeast zone); Ondo (Southwest zone); Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers (Southsouth zone), which are oil producing (NDDC, 2000). This enclave is inhabited by over 40 ethnic nationalities that are very heterogeneous and speak more than 250 dialects. The demographic indicators by the National Population Commission (2006) project the population of the region at 41.5 million in 2015 with a youth population of 62%.

The region is blessed with very substantial oil deposits. Nigeria is ranked 6th in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and stands as the 12th largest producer of oil worldwide with a daily average production of 2.6 million barrel per day. Due to the rich oil and gas reserve, the region is strategic to the international community as well as the multinational oil companies who engage in oil and gas explorations. The income from crude oil and gas and other associated products account for about 80% of Nigerian government's revenue and 90% of foreign earnings. But there is a huge discount between the resource endowment and development (Ukiwo, 2010). It is for this reason that the people are bound together by a sense of grievance about the despoliation of their environment, neglect, politics of exclusion and a long history for self determination (Francis, LaPin & Rossiaco, 2011).

### **Environmental and Ecological Scarcities: Theoretical Considerations**

The literature about the link between rising environmental and ecological scarcities is pretty extensive. Universally, natural resources such as water, timber, gold, diamond, coal, and oil have become major sources of conflict.

The works of Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner (2009) and Kaplan (1995) reveal a preponderance of conflicts associated with natural resources. Homer-Dixon (2009) being one of the leading scholars in this field is careful to point out that the effects of environmental scarcity are indirect and act in combination with other social, political, and economic stresses. He also acknowledges that the violent consequences of scarcity should not be underestimated especially when about half of the world's population depends directly on local renewables for their day-to-day well-being. Karl (1997) and Rothschild (1997) particularly focused on the environmental degradation as source of conflict. The conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Zaire (DRC), Liberia, China, Colombia, Mexico and many more are linked to natural resources.

Olsson (2007); Ross (2004); Collier (2000); Sachs (2005) are among

scholars who adopt the 'resource curse', 'greed and grievance' including the 'predatory state' theories in their explanations of armed conflict. Resource curse proponents explain the connecting paradox of resource abundance, low economic growth and high incidence of conflict (Keen, 2012). Conflicts and wars all over the world subsist as a result of underground activities of politicians and individuals that seek to increase their own power and wealth through participation in conflict by violent means. Obi & Rustad (2011); Mahler (2010); Watts (2010) applied the resource curse hypothesis as stimulating the Niger Delta conflict. Similarly, Obi (2009) avers that oil is central to the spiralling violence in the Niger Delta which has gone beyond an ethnic minority conflict, but has assumed much wider national and global ramifications.

The greed theory and a universal grievance theory both predict that the risk of rebellion is increasing in the opportunities for rebel finance. The greed for economic gains is primary drive for resistance and war (Murshed, & Tadjoeeddin, 2009; Mair, 2003). In most cases greed over rides grievance in causation of conflicts deployed to accumulate in the circumstances of economic crisis and decline and an opportunity to loot and illegally trade in primary commodities and minerals (Collier, 2000). Unaccountable governments with large revenue streams at their disposal have multiple opportunities to divert funds for illegal purposes. Ikelegbe (2005) in his thesis on the economy of conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria opines that violence and war in resource rich regions have involved a profiting by rulers, warlords and traders, rebels, insurgents, dissidents and militias. And that violence can become a form of business rather an instrument for furthering any coherent ideological or even ethnic interest.

The predatory state is a system where entire sectors have been built up to feast upon public systems built originally for public purposes (Galbraith, 2008) because economic power naturally translates into political power. Government control of important resources and the revenues that flow from those resources goes hand-in-hand with endemic corruption, a culture of impunity, weak rule of law, and inequitable distribution of public resources (Ganesan, & Vines, 2004; Chapman, & Reinhardt, 2009). Control over resources gives such governments a strong incentive to maintain power, even at the expense of public welfare and the rights of the population. In many resource-rich countries, governments are abusive, unaccountable, and corrupt, and they grossly mismanage the economy. Unfortunately money derived from the often illicit resource exploitation have secured ample supply of arms to various armed formations and enriched several persons including warlords, corrupt government officials and unscrupulous corporate leaders. Nigeria's colonial masters had created a political

leadership that plundered the nation and coerced the people into submission.

The United African Company (UAC) and British Petroleum were among others agencies empowered to siphon resources from Nigeria. The characteristic predatory manner that came to stay was rooted in the colonial regime. Rather than representing the citizenry, the government exhibited the predatory tendencies which were hangovers, committing abuses to maintain power and controlling the resources of the state for the benefit of a few. Several scholars view the lack of development of the Niger Delta region as evidence of a state failure and the predatory characteristics manifested by authoritarianism, inequity, opacity, insecurity, accumulation by terror, militarization and willful degradation of the Delta region (Omoweh, 2014). No review of the literature on the Niger Delta conflict will be complete without these initial theoretical insights.

### **Evolution of the Niger Delta Crisis**

The Niger Delta is generally restive. The extant literature hinges the region's conflict on resistance politics which dates back to the era of slave trade in the 16th century. Several youths from the region were exported to Europe as slaves. The trade slowed down the region's political and socio-economic advancement. Prominent monarchs of the region including King William Dappa Pepple of Bonny, King Jaja of Opobo, Prince Nana of Itsekiri, King Ibanichuka of Okirika, Overnarama, and King Koko of Brass opposed the capitalist ideologies of the Europeans in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, from the 19th century the Europeans bought agricultural products at minimal prices, refined them, and exported the finished products at very exorbitant costs back to the region (Alagoa, 2005; Dike, 1956).

For a very long along time, the Niger Delta people desired to have a self-governing entity of their own under the central government of Nigeria, but the odds against them were almost insurmountable. From the time when Nigeria was under colonial government to the period of self-rule, and divided up into three or four strong regional governments, controlled by majority groups under a weak federal centre by the 1946 Richards' constitution, the people had decried the developmental deficiencies in the region. Instead of separate entity, the region was divided into two parts, with one part under the control of Western region (Mid-west state) and the other part to the Eastern region. The struggle for self-determination started to bear fruits, with delegations of the delta people to the 1957 Constitutional Conference in London. This resulted in setting up of the Henry Willinks Commission appointed to inquire into the fears of the minorities and the means of allaying them in 1958. The Commission discovered that the region was poor, backward and neglected. The outcome was setting up of the Niger Delta

Special Area and the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) (Ukiwo, 2010; Willink, 1958).

The Nigeria Independence Constitution of 1960 (Section 133) and Republican Constitution of 1963 (Section 140:1-5) particularly provided for 50% derivation from mining royalty and rents in respect of the proceeds received. The federal government was in turn to make available 30% of the amount received in respect of all royalties and rents to the Distributable Pool Account for sharing amongst the three regions namely Northern, Western and Eastern. In reality only 20% remained with the Federal Government. The essence of this was to allow the regions to develop at their own pace. By the time oil had come to be the main stay of the Nigerian economy, the situation was reversed by several obnoxious legislations enacted to dismantle this fiscal structure. Such legislations include: the Petroleum Control Degrees of 1967; the Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968; Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations Law No 45 of 1968; Petroleum Act of 1968; Oil Terminal Dues of 1969; Land Use Act of 1978; Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1978; Land Title Vesting Decree of 1993 and the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree of 1997 and many others which had vested the entire ownership and control of all population in, under or upon any lands on the Nigerian state. The situation was worsened by the reduction of the derivation formula to nearly 1% in the 1980s, until the Olusegun Obasanjo's administration increased it to 13% in 1999. Gradually the region was alienated from the management of the oil resources. The people of the region are still denied allocation of Oil Prospecting Licenses. But too often the government control of resources and revenues that flow from these resources goes hand-in-hand with endemic corruption, culture of impunity, weak rule of law, and inequitable distribution of public resources as witnessed in Nigeria (Nna-Ntete, 2001; Sogwe, 1997).

These government's actions compounded by frustration, alienation and poverty culminated into violent attempts to forcibly assert regional autonomy for the Niger Delta region and by February 23, 1966, Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, an ethnic minority Ijaw militant leader and his 59 man Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) engaged the Nigerian state in a Twelve Day Revolution in attempt to secede and establish a Niger Delta Republic with an eleven-point declaration of independence. The motive been to use the agitation to declare a state of emergency in Eastern Nigeria, and carve out that oil rich enclave and set it up as a new self-governing unit within the federation. Boro thought that the resources from the region would be utilized for the well being of the people with their destiny in their own hands (Akinwale, 2010; Osaghae, 2008; Boro, 1982).

All these combined, motivated popular resistance movements that

emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s to call for redress of the concerns of the region. In the 1990s Ken Saro-Wiwa chiefly sought to bring to the local and international community the suffering and deprivation of the Ogoni people in particular and the Niger Delta region in general, but was extrajudiciously executed by the junta in November 1995. The crisis had become very alarming by the activities of several ethnic minority groups particularly those of the Ogonis, Ijaws, Urhobos, Ogbas and Itshekiris. The various ethnic nationalities through their advocacy wings promoted those pitiful and collective situations enunciated earlier. They utilized the mass media, organized rallies, petitions, seminars, conferences, position papers, including lobbying as their strategies. The groups drafted documents including the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990); Charter of Demands of the Ogbia People (1992); Kaiama Declaration (1998); Akalaka Declaration (1999); Warri Accord (1999); Ikwerre Rescue Charter (1999); Oron Bill of Rights (1999) and Niger Delta Peoples' Compact (2008) to drive home their agitations (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, Okhominia, 2011; Francis, LaPin & Rossiaco, 2011).

The Government's response was to deploy thousands of heavily armed soldiers, naval troops and anti-riot policemen to protect oil facilities. Most of the reports by the New York-based Human Rights Watch related to Nigeria after the late 1990s documented the many human rights abuses and violations that accompanied the increasing use of military force (Ojatorotu, & Whetho, 2008; ICC, 2006). Since the late 1990s, there has been a very substantial escalation of violence across the oil fields. A variety of militia groups consequently got equipped with small and light weapons (SALW) to fight the government forces and the multinational oil companies operating in the region. With these weapons they acquired, they disrupted and destroyed oil installations, and vowed to crash oil production to zero level if their grievances were not met. They desired to end further exploration, exploitation and marginalization and to get compensation from the federal government and multinational oil companies for their losses occasioned by oil spillage, gas flaring, acid rain, and other forms of environmental degradation and pollution (Ibeanu & Momoh, 2008; Owugah, 2010; Ojatorotu & Gilbert, 2010; Asuni, 2009).

Successive military regimes ignored socio-economic development in the region; building castles in other major cities while those of the oil producing communities were left in deplorable conditions. The lack of good health care services, roads, portable water and electricity speak of the neglect. Severe environmental degradation has driven self-serving, economic opportunists, political adventurers and conflict entrepreneurs to informal economic means of livelihood for survival in the harsh environment created in the oil milieu.

The situation even more complicated by essentially economic indices-unemployment, poverty, hunger and general underdevelopment of the region; however the government's materialist interests have further driven struggles of self-determination and liberation. What all these amounted to was an environment that was ready to explode (Naanen & Nyiayaana, 2013; Ako, 2011; Ikelegbe, 2005).

### **Informal Economies and Conflict Entrepreneurs in the Niger Delta**

Conflict and war regions have level of informal economies (Reno, 2003). Informal networks, black markets, underground economic activities and a growing general criminalization of economic life are quite extensive in conflict environments both as a form of resistance and as part of the dynamics of conflicts (Allen 1999). Meanwhile, Ikelegbe (2005) opines that the struggle by rulers, counter elites and merchants for access to such resources for accumulation and political consolidation through patrimonialism, has meant increasing appropriation and privatisation through exclusive contracts with foreign firms, corruption, external and indigenous commercial networks, emergent challenges from the excluded and ensuing conflicts and violence. The emerging greed, corruption and distributive conflicts underpin numerous incidents of community disturbances and criminal violence.

As the conflict persisted, more people got recruited and benefited from the emergent underground business activities growing up around the war effort. The economy resting on the conflict that emerged was synonymous with violent and bloody struggle for the oil resources. A major portion of the business activities centred on illegal oil bunkering in which an increasing large number of people both high and low, from both sides of the conflict whether government or dissidents, civilian or military, were benefitting (Osah, 2014). A couple of senior high ranking officers of the Nigeria Navy previously deployed for action in the area had been implicated in the illegal business, court marshalled, and dismissed. Two celebrated cases in mind were those of Admirals Francis Agbati and Babatunde Kolawole elsewhere reported in Adekanye (2005). There were also activities related to the smuggling of sophisticated arms and weapons, their illegal trafficking and cross-border sale and distribution that had become big business for many of the leaders of the various armed formations. Henry Okah, a Nigerian national had been a South Africa-based arms dealer, was said to be running much of the illegal arms business supplying weapons to the Niger Delta militants. There could be more documented examples (Ibaba, 2011; Ikelegbe, 2005).

What all these added up to, was an emergent underground economy with a lot of powerful and vested interests.

Not surprisingly, the breeding informal economy formed in this region

was tolerated by locals and corporate organisations including the state governments of the Niger Delta that engaged the services of the conflict entrepreneurs for providing security and protection services to personnel and oil installations. According to a report by Premium Time of September 19, 2013, Nigeria spends N15bn annually to secure Niger Delta oil facilities. The challenges created has also fuelled a deadly struggle among ethnic and community leaders, the elites, businessmen and politicians, youths, women and various other groups in the region seeking for relevance. The militant leaders earned huge sum of income through illegal refining and sell of crude oil, hostage taking and kidnapping for ransom, piracy, armed robbery, extortions, drug trafficking and donations by sympathizers (Aaron & George, 2010; Asuni, 2009).

Judging from the writings of authors such as Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, Okhomina (2011); Campbell (2010); Nwajiaku-Dahou (2010); Ibeanu & Momoh (2008), the list of the variety of armed formations in the Niger Delta could be endless. Obviously, not all the armed groups involved in the conflict can be considered. The most prominent and politically relevant groups were the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC); Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF); Niger Delta Vigilantes Services (NDVS); People's Liberation Force (PLF); and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). These groups adopted diverse strategies including attacks on military locations, pipeline vandalization, sabotage, bombings, attacks on oil pipelines and installations.

### **Strong Economy, Weak Development**

Nigeria is a classic example of the paradox of plenty (Basedau, & Lacher, 2006; Karl, 1997; Obadan, 2001). Primarily state officials have largely predated collective wealth from the mono-economy over the past five decades mainly through weak state institutions. The oil revenues flowing into weak institutions and a charged, volatile federal system have produced an undisciplined, corrupt and flabby oil-led development that was to fragment, pulverize, disintegrate and discredit the state and its forms of governance. It produced conditions which challenged and undermined the very tenets of modern state (Watts, 2010).

The gap between large state budgets and the limited development is also increasingly clear and contributes significantly to the conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta (Hazan & Horner, 2007). The huge income the Nigeria government has earned and the growing poverty indicate disconnect on which several entrepreneurs have benefitted from. The extant report of the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index of

2006 says:

Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed methodically into the international economic system, in exchange for massive revenues that carry the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the delta itself. In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict (UNDP, 2006:9).

Asekunowo and Olaiya (2012) suggests that the reason Nigeria (a resource-rich country but with no development) may be lagging behind the countries of Botswana, Chile and Norway (which are resource-rich countries but with development) developmentally, may be associated with institutional difficulties, voracity effect, excessive spending, excessive borrowing and fractionalisation causes of resource curse.

To date, Nigeria ranks above many OPEC states in terms of crude oil production. Table below shows fuel pump prices compared to the minimum wages of other OPEC countries. This reveals that Nigerians are actually worst-off with the lowest minimum wage of N18,000.00 and a fuel pump price of N97.00 whereas Venezuela's minimum wage is N95,639 and fuel pump price is N3.61

**Table 1: Prices of Fuel in OPEC Countries**

OPEC Member	PMS Price/Litre in Naira	Minimum wage in Naira	Population	Production '000 bpd (2007)
Venezuela	3.61	95,639	29,105, 632	2,340
Kuwait	34.54	161,461	3,566,437	2,340
Saudi Arabia	25.12	99,237	27,136,977	9,800
Iran	102.05	86,585	75,330,000	3,700
Qatar	34.54	101,250	1,696,563	810
UAE	78.18		8,264,070	2,500
Algeria	63.55	55,957	36,423,000	1,360
Libya	26.69	23,813	5,670,688	1,650
Iraq	59.66	25,813	30,399,572	1,481
Nigeria	97.00	18,000	167 million	2,250

Source: Tell, May 18, 2015.

Oil wealth of over US \$400 billion since independence in 1960 has either

been out rightly stolen or mismanaged (Ogundele & Unachukwu, 2012).

Corruption and poor governance culture which have become the Nigerian norm are major problems of the State. These are also major weakening forces of the economy and the very reasons responsible for neglect and poverty in the region. These still are the issues at the root of the struggle. More so, the reasons the informal economies have continued to flourish at the expense of the collective development of the masses. Between June 1999 and may 2007 it is reported that the nine Niger Delta States received a total of N3.186 trillion, while the Niger Delta Development Commission received N3.8 trillion. These huge incomes have disappeared as there is nothing to show for it (Kogbara, 2012, Watts 2010).

More worrisome is that crude oil is stolen in large quantities by a few persons. Davis (2009) estimated the figure at over 50,869,300 and 264,322,734 barrels in 2000 and 2001 with greater proportion either sold overseas for cash payment or exchanged for arms. Though, the figures vary, Asuni (2009) opines that between 2003 and 2008 the value of oil theft was over \$100 billion. Similarly, Anucha (2012) says Nigeria lost about 160 million barrels of crude oil valued at \$13.7 billion to theft from 2009 to 2012. Wilson (2014) states that oil theft is carried out at several level namely, the small-scale level for the local markets involving only the local entrepreneurs.

The larger-scale level involving international marketers; and excess lifting of the crude oil level beyond the licensed amount. The oil theft leads to loss of resources, insecurity, fall in oil revenue, poor financing of development projects etc, thereby affecting Nigerian development programmes. The Joint Military Task Force (JTF) though has arrested hundreds of pirates and destroyed several illegal refineries in the Niger Delta but this is yet to reflect the doggedness of the Nigerian State to squash the menace.

### **The Need for Structural Reform**

The Nigerian State has been ruled by military regimes for most of its post-colonial periods. It is believed that these periods witnessed unprecedented increase in governance recklessness, which planted seeds of various forms of violence and mischief; with each military regime introducing programmes and policies that ran in opposite direction of the wishes and aspiration of people for their private gains. Each regime was not sure of its survival in office because of the incessant coup d'tats that characterized the military system. At transition to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria subscribed to democracy as a system of governance thereby pledging to imbibe democratic principles and social justice. Democracy provided positive front for a stable polity but it also produced a number of challenges for government, thus

providing openings for political, religious and communal tensions – a fall out of bad leadership orientation, weak institutional structures and misapplication of policy directions.

Kemp, Parto and Gibson (2005), argue that authoritative control of social relations within a system has increasingly been exercised through quasi and non-governmental entities, rather than through formal government and government institutions. Citizens have become more powerful in the conduct of social relations which they exercise (through rights of information and co-determination) and with respect to how business is conducted (through the creation of informal economies). However, government remains a powerful actor with a major role in discourses of governance. Its effective presence and strong will within a system enhances legitimacy and consistency of policy, helps to reduce conflicts and fragmentations in the economy, offers useful ideas and information and creates an atmosphere of interaction between government, citizens and stakeholders.

Government must assert its relevance and competence in governance through a robust and rigorous structural reform of all sectors of the economy, to squash every element that has taken over the control of the State. Structural reforms are necessary in all major economies. They help to improve economic growth, ensure political stability, preserve ecological endowments and guarantee sustainable development. Intense efforts and fresh perspectives need to be injected into the porous, weak and worn-out governance system to correct the excessive governance deficit. Conflict entrepreneurs will continue to benefit from the informal economies created by conflict situations, if there is no intentional act on the part of government to arrest the situations and bring sustainable solutions to them.

Policies and laws must be designed, implemented and monitored in a way that reflects the present realities of a modern State. The Nigerian government under Goodluck Jonathan through the 7th National Assembly had to withdraw the local vigilante groups that once provided security to the nation's oil pipe lines and return it back to the Nigerian military, because the local vigilante groups aided in the sabotage, theft and sale of crude oil. Such laws should not only be directed towards the oil facilities but to other regions of the nation that accommodates its natural resources. This will ensure sustainability. The federal government of Nigeria should abrogate those obnoxious legislations the military regimes enacted which alienated the region from ownership and access to oil derived benefits with people friendly policies.

Institutions that enforce and interpret laws and policies – judiciary, the Nigerian Police Force should be strengthened and made more vibrant and relevant. Needless say, that the independence of the judiciary and proper

police training has become intrinsic to sustaining governance. Protection of the nation's water way by the Nigerian Navy is crucial in averting pirate and oil bunkering activities from penetrating into the nation with illegal arms. Again, suffice it to say that the training capacity of the Nigerian Navy needs to be expanded to eradicate such activities on the water ways. Government must embark on robust economic intervention programmes to absorb all self-economic intervention programmes that have disarticulated and distorted the nation's economic programmes. Structural reforms bring economic prosperity (Arestis & Sawyer 2013). However, such economic prosperity should be wholesome to emphasize all aspects of the human endeavour – political, social, and cultural and opportunity to make choices and have those choices respected.

The government should focus on providing youth employment as a more enduring solution to the Niger Delta challenge. The Multinational oil companies should also on their part respond to environmental damages and pollution with urgency. More so, massive socio-economic reconstruction of the Niger Delta region should be embarked upon with immediacy by all stakeholders implicated in the Niger Delta challenge.

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# **ECOWAS and the 'New Scramble' for Africa: Interrogating the Francophone/ Anglophone Dynamics**

Felix Chidozie and Eugenia Abiodun-Eniayekan

## **Abstract**

The study interrogates the content and context of the new realities that characterise the relations between the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Indeed, this contemporary form of relations has been popularized as the “new scramble” for Africa in view of the previous scrambles that have been copiously documented in literature – slavery and colonialism. However, the kernel of this study is to situate this new form of relations in the West African sub-region within the complexities of the age-long rivalry in Francophone/Anglophone narratives. It does so through an examination of the political economy of languages in determining the mode of production. In view of this, the study engages underdevelopment and dependency theory (UDT), as a mainstream development theory which views global relations as historical and dialectical processes that necessarily engender contradictions in the political economy of nations. Based on textual analysis and review, the study unearths the distortions inherent in the political economy of the Francophone/Anglophone West African countries in this “new struggle”. Findings suggest that while the French influence in West Africa is still dominant, the forces of globalization are fast contesting that supremacy.

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More so, the aggressive drive by the emerging economies, especially Brazil, India and China (BIC) for competitive share of the African market and resources makes this new scramble very precarious. The study concludes that the contradictions embedded in globalization will outstrip French influence in the nearest future, while recommending a more robust and inclusive engagement of all countries in the ECOWAS sub-region to maximize the gains of globalization.

### **Introduction**

To understand the exact content and context of the “New Scramble for Africa” without a prior reference to the historical event that took place in the 19th century from which the terminology is derived will be an exercise in futility (Eze, 2010:5; Kwanashie, 2010:28; Nwoke, 2010:61). The event was the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 at which the continent of Africa was divided among the European powers having France and Britain as the chief culprits (Ogwu, 2010:11).

The conference was facilitated by the quest to exploit Africa's wealth in human and natural resources and fundamentally so, an exercise in the conflict-free division and demarcation of territories and spheres of influence in Africa (Obasanjo, 2010:7). Apart from facilitating the penetration and exploitation of Africa, the territorial divisions occasioned by the Berlin Conference effectively determined the state system that exists in Africa today as well as its complex forms of political and economic relations. To be sure, the origins of the scramble occasioned by the Berlin Conference had deeper roots in the sixteenth century (Jinadu, 2010:16).

However, the current reference to a new scramble connotes a slightly different focus. While the old scramble focused upon the acquisition and demarcation of territory, the new scramble is not interested in redefining national borders but rather in defining access to the continent's vast natural resources (Hadland, 2012: 467). Furthermore, in addition to the principal European colonial powers, notably France, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Portugal, who have maintained their presence on the continent through continued neo-colonial ties, and the activities of various multinational and transnational firms, other emerging economies, notably China and India have joined the 'new scramble' for Africa's resources (Anyu and Ifedi, 2008; Ofodile, 2008; Cheru and Obi, 2011; Langmia, 2011; Narlikar, 2013; Vickers, 2013:673; Folarin et al, 2014:2).

Among these emerging powers, China and India are two of Asia's largest economies with populations of over a billion each and rapidly industrializing and developing economies – the economies that are in desperate need of

resources to maintain their rapid pace of industrialization (Ariyo, 2010; Oche, 2010; Folarin et al, 2014:10). For instance, China is currently number two oil consumer after the United States and accounts for about 40% of the growth of global energy demand for oil in the last ten years (Alli, 2010:107).

Furthermore, China gets about 25% of its domestic energy needs from Africa, mostly from Sudan, Chad, Angola, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Algeria – the need which is already rising by 9% annually in the last couple of years and will continue to rise astronomically as the Chinese economy continues to prosper (Alli, 2010:107).

Incidentally, it is not surprising why Africa is increasingly being wooed and ravaged by external interests in the current scramble for natural resources. The continent is endowed with enormous human and natural resources capable of making it the most developed continent in the world (Chidozie, 2014:3). It possesses substantial reserves of some of the world's most important minerals, including bauxite, oil, diamond, chromium, cobalt, copper, gold, manganese, phosphate rock, platinum, titanium, and uranium (Klare, 2010 cited in Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012:384).

Furthermore, Africa alone holds about 90 percent of platinum, 90 percent of cobalt, 50 percent of gold and 98 percent of chromium in the world. In addition, it houses one-third of the world's available uranium, and has been estimated to hold 40 percent of the world's potential hydro-electric power (Chambers, 2008:1). In 2008, it was estimated that Africa had proven oil reserves of 117.481 billion barrels at the end of 2007 or 9.49 percent of the world's reserves. The continent contributes more than 10 million barrels per day (bpd) to the world's supply of over 90 million bpd, and about 185.02 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas, which is about 70 percent of global production (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012:1).

Fundamentally, in this 'new scramble' for Africa's resources, the new international economic architecture will propel and indeed, impel the forces and factors that will shape the outcome. In other words, since it has become public knowledge that the economies of the traditional imperial powers in Africa, notably France and Great Britain are under serious pressure (CNN.com, 2014), the likely dominance of the emerging powers in this new scramble is without further contest. Holslag (2007) captures the unfolding drama vividly:

These developments in Africa have clearly confirmed the way globalization is entering a new stage; the West, as the world's main industrial power-house is outsourcing more and more of its resource-intensive activities to Asia. At the same time, Asia's growth is strengthening the position of the world's large oil and gas producers, so this development of a

polycentric world economy is in turn stimulating the emergence of a multipolar political structure and it is this reconfiguration of power that is starting to have such a profound impact on Africa – the region is one of the epicentres where these drifting spheres of influence are interacting...It is this development that now erodes the long-standing Euro-African relationship of the 20th century...and even if Europe still remains the main partner in terms of trade, aid and investment, its relative influence is shrinking (Holslag, 2007:23).

It is against this backdrop that the paper interrogates the 'new scramble' for Africa within the orbit of the current international division of labour, using the Francophone/Anglophone influences in the ECOWAS sub-region as a point of reference. More so, the political economy of languages among the old and new gladiators will become apparent as the vital force that may determine the direction of this new scramble. In view of this, the paper is structured into five parts. Following the introduction, key concepts are discoursed. The third section provides a brief background to the formation of the ECOWAS. The fourth segment contextualizes the dynamics of the Francophone/Anglophone relations in West Africa. The final section concludes the work and proffers relevant recommendations.

### **Conceptual Discourses**

The key concepts in the work are identified and their meanings clarified in this section. This is necessary to avoid ambiguities and confusion in the main text.

### **New Scramble for Africa**

The expression “New Scramble for Africa” is now sometimes used to characterize current realities in the relations of the outside world with Africa. According to Jinadu (2010:15), the two key words, “new”, and “scramble” suggest a continuity or similarity between the past and the present manifestations of the scramble in the underlying structural character, if not the substantive content, of those relations, which current realities reflect. He stressed that the expression has generally been used to denote a new form of imperialism which is defined by the transnationalization of capital and of the diffusion and homogenization of the dominant ideas of cultural, economic, political organizations, which underline and propel it to other societies from the most advanced societies. He submitted that the fundamental stake in the new scramble was the combined pursuit of national power and influence.

For Kwanashie (2010:28), the current scramble for African resources is but a phase in the continuous scramble for Africa which started in the nineteenth century. According to him, with the penetration of mercantilist capital into various parts of Africa, a relationship was established which was later reinforced by the partition of the continent. He opined that a significant point in the “new imperialism” was the emergence of several empires in competition and the predominance of finance capital over mercantilist capital. He concluded that the new scramble is therefore, best understood as part of a broader European imperialist expansion to other parts of the world, much of which is now described as “the Third World”, or “the developing world”.

Furthermore, Nwoke (2010) argued that the new scramble for Africa is nothing but the inter-imperialist rivalries to dominate and control the pillaging of the continent, and the exploitation of its peoples and resources. According to him, the “first scramble for Africa” which culminated in the 1884-85 Berlin Conference was a very brutal and violent affair, but the current scramble is far more penetrating and damaging. He lamented that no matter how much capacity Africa may have built up since flag independence, if the international power structure of inequality and dependence, which determines the pattern of the distribution of global wealth, is not radically changed, Africa will continue to lose out in the scheme of things. He posited that the critical question should rather be how Africa would take her destiny in her own hands and own, control and defend all her resources as if her life depended on them.

Flowing from the above, if the primary aim of neo-colonialism is the maintenance of the former colony as a dependency, as a controlled source of raw materials, as well as markets for investment and the sale of goods manufactured in the metropolitan countries, then Nkrumah's (1965) thesis that neo-colonialism is the last stage of imperialism becomes pertinent. In other words, since scholars have described the “new scramble for Africa”, as a continuation of the old scramble, it becomes revealing that the concept of new scramble can be tied to neo-colonialism. According to Nkrumah:

...A state in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny...Neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony, those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their

opponents. With neo-colonialism, neither is the case (Nkrumah, 1965:1).

### **Political Economy**

In traditional usage, 'political economy' was used as synonymous with the general word 'economics'; thus, the study of political economy was the analysis of the economy of a nation-state (A New Dictionary of Economics, 1966). In this sense, political economy was conceived as the older name for economics.

However, early scholars of political economy focused much on the political presuppositions and consequences of the economy. The perspective on economic transactions was that of the political body-the state- and the basic problem concerned the understanding of how economic wealth in a society could be enhanced by the state belonging to that society. Among this group of scholars, the work of Adams Smith becomes pertinent in understanding this perspective to political economy. He suggested that:

Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign (Smith, 1776:138).

In a more contemporary usage, Frederick Engels defined political economy, in the widest sense, as “the science of the laws governing the production and exchange of the material means of subsistence in human society (Engels, 1977). By this, we understand the subject matter of political economy to mean the social relations between people taking shape in the process of the production of material values, and the laws governing the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material values at different stages in the society's development.

In a similar vein, and with specific reference to this study, the subject of 'political economy' studies the economic laws governing the development of society, which reflect the most fundamental aspects of the relations of production and their interconnection with the productive forces, or (the same thing) the laws of production, exchange, distribution and consumption of material goods at different stages in the development of human society (Buzuev, 1986).

In essence, political economy studies the “organic unity of the social

relations of production and the productive forces, which together constitute the economic system, alternatively referred to as the mode of production” (Ake, 1981:13). The relations of production here connotes 'the relations which people enter into with each other in the course of production' and the forces of production describe the combination of three components of the labour process- labour power (comprises the physical, psychological and intellectual capabilities of man, the worker); objects of labour (these are the things to which labour power is applied); and means of labour (these are the instruments with which man labours) which combine to define in explicit term, the subject of political economy (Ake, 1981:11).

It is important to state that in the study of political economy, the relations of production and the productive forces are indissolubly tied in with each other, that changes in the productive forces entail changes in the relations of production, and that the latter exert a reciprocal influence on the development of the former, accelerating or slowing down their advance.

Political economy examines the laws of the formation, development, and downfall of different modes of production (history has known five consecutive modes of production: primitive-communal, slaveholding, feudal, capitalist and communist-with socialism as its first phase) and, consequently, of different social classes, thus affecting the vital interests of all classes. That is why it is a class, partisan science, which means that it serves the interests of a definite class (Kulikov, 1986).

To this end, there is a distinction in the subject matter of political economy in contemporary literature. There is bourgeois political economy, which expresses the interests of the bourgeoisie. It seeks to camouflage the exploitative nature of capitalism, to shift the blame for the misfortunes of millions of working people from the capitalist mode of production to the laws of nature, to technical progress or the individual's economic mentality. It avoids an analysis of objective processes in the development of capitalism and its contradictions. Bourgeoisie economists are not interested in bringing out the objective laws of the capitalist mode of production and by camouflaging the true essence of capitalist exploitation, bourgeoisie political economy serves the interests of the capitalist class (Kulikov, 1986).

In contrast to bourgeois political economy, proletarian, Marxist-Leninist political economy openly proclaims its class character, emphasising the interests of the working class. It gives a truly scientific explanation of the society's development uniformities and provides a theoretical basis for the proletariat's revolutionary struggle to restructure the society at root on socialist principles. Marx and Engels proved that the only way to end the exploitation of the working people was to eliminate capitalist property in the means of production, and that a revolutionary replacement of capitalism by

socialism was historically inevitable (Lenin, 1933; Marx, 1970).

In summation, as political economy studies the relations of production in their dialectical interplay with the productive forces (the combination of which is the substructure) and the superstructure (the political system, the legal system, the ideological system, etc.- the non-economic aspects of social life that are dependent on the economic system), it makes it possible to elaborate effective measures to improve the forms and methods of economic activity, raise production efficiency, and accelerate socio-economic development.

### **Dependence and Dependency**

The term “dependence” is used frequently in discussions of contemporary international and transnational relations. This popularity is, in part, a result of a widespread acceptance and adoption of theories of contemporary capitalist imperialism, of which the term is a common element. Indeed, an important part of imperialism theory is denoted by the term, that is, *dependencia*, or dependency, theory, which is attributable primarily to Third World scholars critical of some of the alleged consequences of global domination by developed capitalist metropolises.

Although the concept “dependence” is very popular among scholars of Third World origin, the popularity of the term is not limited to scholarship critical of developed capitalism; for it is often used, as well, in the language of social scientists who are part and parcel of the capitalist center. This development is due somewhat to an effort by these latter scholars to come to grips with theories of imperialism, but more generally, it is due to “an increasing awareness of problems of the First World such as dependence on petroleum produced abroad and a monetary interdependence among the major capitalist economies” (Duvall, 1978; Lalude, 2006).

Indeed, it is agreed that, there is already a huge literature on “dependence” in international relations, but it is also true that many fundamental conceptual issues remain unresolved. For instance, is the pattern of dependence of advanced industrial states on one another different in kind or only in degree from the dependence of peripheral capitalist societies on other members of the global system? Conversely, what about the nature of dependence of advanced industrial states on the peripheral states and or the character of dependence of peripheral states on one another? In essence, what are the essential components of dependence that one must identify before constructing an adequate measure of it?

Since the answer to the first question is that the two patterns of dependence differ in kind, and the answer to the second question addresses the unresolved dilemma of dependence in development studies, the first

order of business must be to provide the grounds for this distinction. Perhaps, in an attempt to draw this important characterisation, James Caporaso defined dependence as “the pattern of external reliance of well-integrated nation-states on one another”, while dependency, which is closer to the dependencia tradition, involves a “more complex set of relations centering on the incorporation of less developed, less homogeneous societies into the global division of labour”(Caporaso, 1978:8).

It is evident from the above distinctions that the conceptual components of dependence are the size of one's reliance on one another, the importance attached to the goods involved, and the availability of these goods (or substitutes) from different sources. The components of dependency are the magnitude of foreign supply of important factors of production (technology, capital), limited developmental choices, and domestic distortion measures. Finally, the concept of dependence is most easily integrated into bargaining analyses, while dependency is more fruitfully applied to analyses of the structure of relations among societies.

In specific application to this study, the dependencia school implies that “dependence” is meant to describe certain characteristics (economics, as well as social and political) of the economy as a whole and is intended to trace certain processes which are causally linked to its underdevelopment and which are expected to adversely affect its development in the future. Thus, “dependency” then means that, the development alternatives open to the dependent nation are defined and limited by its integration into and functions within the world market. This limitation of alternatives differs from limitations in the dominant nations in so far as the functioning of the basic decisions in the world market are determined by the dominant nations. Hence, the dependent nations must make choices in a situation in which they do not set the terms or parameters of choice (Offiong, 1981).

### **Underdevelopment**

It is important to understand underdevelopment, from the perspective of this study, not as absence of development, because every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment is rather conceptualised as a means of comparing levels of development. It is very much tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a strictly economic view-point some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming more wealthy (Rodney, 1972).

At all times therefore, one of the ideas behind underdevelopment is a comparative one. It is possible to compare a country with another and determine whether or not it had developed; and more importantly, it is possible to compare the economies of any two countries or sets of countries at

any given period in time.

Another component of modern underdevelopment as applied to this study is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another. According to Rodney (1972:33), “all the countries named as underdeveloped in the world are exploited by others”, and “the underdevelopment with which the world is now pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation”.

In effect, the study sees development and underdevelopment as both comparable terms as well as having a dialectical relationship. By this, it is meant that, the interaction of both produces each other. For instance, in the interaction between Europe and Africa, the former was the master while the latter was the slave and the result was the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe. This relationship has resulted in a great imbalance or disequilibrium which has remained the fundamental problem in African underdevelopment.

Following from the above, underdevelopment can refer to the state of an economy of a 'satellite' economy characterised by under-employment of human and material resources; such an economy is characterised by low real income per capita in comparison with those of North America and Western Europe; it is characterised by illiteracy, poverty, overpopulation, and diseases (Offiong, 1981). Thus, it can be conjectured that the implication of the nature of underdevelopment is that, until underdeveloped countries can make a break from the old aristocratic order and the colonial or neo-colonial system they will never break out of their underdevelopment.

Similarly, Charles Anderson (1976:253) gives a graphic illustration of the nature of underdevelopment thus:

The condition of underdevelopment simply deepens the longer a country remains as a backward cog in the world capitalist system. The elite-mass cleavage widens. Rural-urban inequalities increase. City slums grow. Un-employment increases. Illiteracy abounds. Agricultural production stagnates. Malnutrition spreads. Diseases debilitate millions. Birth rates remain high. Death rates begin to rise in some areas. Imported luxuries drain foreign exchange. Foreign debt and balance of payments deficits mount. Inflation runs rampant. Military spending for army and police repression increases. Foreign corporations drain huge amounts of raw materials and profits from the country. Such are some of the hallmarks of an underdeveloped society. Economic growth in the underdeveloped society means unbalanced growth which neglects the most urgent social needs of the people while catering to the consumption whims of the national

bourgeoisie and the tax and profit concerns of foreign investors (Anderson, 1976:253 cf Offiong, 1981).

It becomes apparent that regardless of the initial roots, the impetus behind underdevelopment is the growth drive of the developed economies, their systematic pursuit of economic gain through control of raw materials, cheap labour, export markets, tax concessions, prices and a variety of financial gains, hence resulting in miserable material condition under which Third World people live.

### **Globalization**

The concept of globalization is perhaps today the most recurrent term employed by scholars and world leaders alike to rationalize the development and underdevelopment of the various parts of the world. As a result of this, it has assumed the status of an essentially contested concept and put on the toga of a recurring decimal in the North/South dialogue (Ogbonnaya, 2012:251). Indeed, it is a concept that means different things to different people and different things to the same people across time and space (Ogbonnaya, 2012:252), thus, justifying its elusive nature and character (Conversi, 2010:36; Movius, 2010:7; Omotola, 2010:106). It is therefore, safe to say that globalization is one of the most challenging developments in world history (Eze, 2010:93).

Generally, globalization is used to describe the integration of national economies, expansion of linkages, and deepening of partnerships and interdependence through trade, finance, investment, and technology transfer on a world scale (Edoho, 2012:103). According to Ojo, (2004 cited in Ogbonnaya, 2012:252), globalization encompasses the increasing interaction among persons and institutions across the globe. It refers to the growing interactions in world trade, national and foreign investment, capital markets and the ascribed role of government in national economics.

Similarly, Obadan (2004) views globalization as the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among the world's regions, nations, governments, business, institutions, communities, families and individuals.

However, the most applicable understanding of globalization to this essay is that which sees it as an epochal event movement of history of imperialism (Tandon, 1998:2; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999). Viewed from this prism, it is a phenomenon that is as old as history, depicting the final conquest of capital over the rest of the world (Toyo, 2000 cited in Eze, 2010:93). Indeed, a number of Afrocentric scholars view contemporary globalization, without formal empire, as a continuation of the historical and structural process of capitalist and imperialist domination on a world scale,

and of the global diffusion or replication of its economic substructures and cultural and political superstructures. For them, this globalization has not only led to the marginalization of Africa but also denied it the possibility and prospect of auto-centred development, by regarding African countries as follower-societies in the image of the globalizing and hegemonizing West (Amin, 1976; Fanon, 1968; Rodney, 1972).

Accordingly, Jinadu (2010:19) warns that it is important to go beyond Eurocentric or “west-centred” perspectives on globalization, in their emphasis on “time-space compression”, “shrinking world”, “integrated markets”, “global interdependence” to problematize globalization in terms of “the inequality, unevenness and injustice embodied in the New World Order... and the social, economic, political and gender implications and consequences of the global restructuring of capital through Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Eze (2010:92) supports this later claim by affirming that globalization, in its contemporary form, is a bogus ideological project characterized by economism, economic reductionism, technological determinism and political cynicism.

In summary, this contemporary globalization, which has transformed the old globalization, which the “Scramble” exemplified, with new centers, emerging centers, and new peripheries, is, like the old globalization, characterized by structural differentiation and unequal functional integration or interdependence and exchange between metropolitan and dependent or satellite nations, peoples and markets (Jinadu, 2010:20). In short, whereas, a major benefit of globalization is said to be the reduction in global poverty, evidence suggests otherwise as globalization is exacerbating inequality and worsening the conditions of the poor by eroding their incomes, increasing their vulnerability and adding to their disempowerment – leading to the disintegration of African economies (World Bank, 2000).

### **A Brief Background on the Formation of ECOWAS**

After the end of the First and the Second World Wars, some leaders of West African countries decided to form a common organization in order to avert such ordeal from repeating itself. Such interest led them into coming together to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as it was then called, now the African Union (AU) in 1963 in Addis Ababa. An injury to one country is an injury to other countries. That same spirit formed the ECOWAS in Togo in order to engender unity and cooperation among West African countries especially in terms of trade as the name suggests – free movement of citizens, free trade, among others. It was the late President William Tubman of Liberia that made the initial call in 1964. Then General Yakubu Gowon formerly launched it in 1972. The latter with the late Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo

expressed their desire to create an economic community between two states: Nigeria and Togo (Nwoke, 2005:115; Alli, 2006:88; Akindele, 2012:2).

A summit of West African leaders was then convened to discuss proposed community and a treaty was signed by fifteen West African countries at Lagos on 28th May 1975. The fifteen member states involved are: Benin, Burkina-Faso (joined as Upper Volta), Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (suspended after the 2008 coup d'état), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (that withdrew in 2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union), Niger (suspended after the 2009 coup d'état), Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde, being the 16th country joined in 1977. The ECOWAS treaty was for the integration of economic policy and improvement on the political cooperation among its member states. The three principal languages used in this Institution are English, French and Portuguese (Ajulo, 2007:11; Meagher, 2008:160; Nwokoma, 2009:226).

The impetus behind the creation of this organization is a strong desire by some West African leaders to develop economic cooperation and integration scheme within the West African Sub-region with the aim of promoting economic unity and raising the living standard of its citizenry. Put differently, the goal is to maintain and increase economic integration and stability, strengthen relations among the member states and contribute to the progress and development of Africa as a whole (Adetula, 2009:17). According to Internet sources ([africanhistory.about.com/od/glossarye/9/ECOWAS.htm](http://africanhistory.about.com/od/glossarye/9/ECOWAS.htm), retrieved on September 10, 2014), the goals of the Organization are to have a common economic market, a single currency to be used by all the member states, to create a West African Parliament, economic and social councils and a Court of Justice for settling regional conflicts on the Treaty members, among others.

Initially, conflict prevention and resolution cum fight against intertribal/inter-ethnic conflicts, civil wars and terrorism were not among the preoccupations of ECOWAS; the Commission's preoccupation was rather economic, social and political integration, collaboration and development of the Sub-Region (Golwa, 2009:279). To corroborate this, Oyebanjo-Odofin (2007:22-23) has this to say,

The founding fathers of ECOWAS, like their counterparts who founded the OAU did not initially envisage the significance of a defence agreement for regional security. They were preoccupied with the desire for economic growth and development, political stability and social cohesion.

But then, when the Liberian civil war erupted in 1990, the Commission deployed its ceasefire monitoring group, the ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group) to stop the war and maintain peace in the country. ECOMOG was established as a multinational observer and ceasefire group

in West African Sub-region. It is a peace-keeping and peace enforcement force, initially a response to the Liberian and Sierra Leonian crises. It is in the light of this that Osagie (2005:6) also observes that, as part of the ECOWAS' achievements,

It is ... not surprising that in view of the formidable obstacles, even policy and literal road blocks to the construction of concrete economic integration, ECOWAS has taken the easier route of promoting sub-regional cooperation through ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and threatened to intervene militarily in post-Eyadema Togo.

In general terms, ECOWAS could be seen in terms of functioning as a concept or its historical, cultural or social implications. It may still not be easy to dissociate the concept (instrument for forging sub-regional cooperation and solidarity) from the functioning. The novels of Ahmadou Kourouma, right from *Les soleils des indépendances* (The Suns of Independence) to *Allah n'est pas obligé* (Allah Is Not Obligated) and Sembène Ousmane's *Les bouts de bois de Dieu* (God's Bits of Wood), among others, do raise the issue of inter-ethnic and inter-national conflicts. In Kourouma's *Allah n'est pas obligé*, to be specific, we could see the spate of violence in Liberia and how the Nigerian military intervened under the auspices of ECOMOG.

In event, the fundamental suggestion is for future researchers to investigate whether ECOWAS has actually delivered on its set goals. If not, what agenda do we lay for it in the evolving global politics and economic development in the West African Sub-Region? Furthermore, are the member states living up to expectation in the areas of payment of dues, cooperation in the emerging problems like trans-border crimes, terrorism among others?

### **Francophone/Anglophone Relations in West Africa: A Discourse**

West African countries were colonized by both the French and British colonial masters. The French are known for their policy of assimilation while the British are exploitative. The Francophone and Anglophone countries came together for economic reasons since no country can be an island in the international system. The world, being a global village, collaboration and cooperation amongst the Francophone and Anglophone colonies became imperative. It is important to mention that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), formed in 1963 which brought together many African countries wasn't initially the idea of the colonial masters (Adetula, 2005:158).

The West African Sub-region organization, the ECOWAS that came into being in 1975 is the corollary of the African Union. These organizations aim at forging unity of purpose in West African sub-region in particular and in Africa in general in the areas of trade, commerce, security and development

amongst the member States for the well-being of the citizens. But according to Joannidis ([ref.allafrica.com/stories/200207030765.html](http://ref.allafrica.com/stories/200207030765.html), retrieved on 15th September 2014), “Francophone and Anglophone countries have often differed and sometimes battled on the political field, especially within the Organisation of African Unity”.

It cannot be ruled out that there could be some mutual suspicions amongst these nation states, be it francophone against francophone, francophone against Anglophone or Anglophone against Anglophone. But it is still in their own interest to come together to forge a common purpose. There are some skirmishes among these Francophone and Anglophone countries, especially demonstrated in the usual killings in the Francophone/Anglophone countries especially between Nigeria and Cameroon at their frontiers, on land and in the sea by Cameroonian gendarmes. The latter killed some Nigerians during Shehu Shagari's regime that nearly called for a diplomatic brawl. According to Internet sources ([www.refworld.org/docid/3f51eaad4.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f51eaad4.html), retrieved on 12th September 2014),

For more than a decade, the Cameroon government of President Paul Biya has responded with repression and human rights violations to attempts by Anglophone political parties and other groups to ameliorate the situation of Anglophones within Cameroon, according to reports of human rights groups, international organizations, and media sources.

In reference to Chad, a francophone country, its army invaded some parts of Nigeria also during Shagari's regime. The Nigerian army retaliated and pursued the Chadian army deep into their own territory. According to Schraeder ([refbooks.google.com.ng/books?isbn=1555879667](http://refbooks.google.com.ng/books?isbn=1555879667), retrieved on September 12th 2014), and particularly on West African foreign policies,

The evolving commitment of its elites to three foreign policy principles – la francophonie, regional integration, and conflict resolution suggests the beginning of the bridging of the historic gap between Francophone and Anglophone West Africa. Nigeria's attendance at the Franco-African summit, increased cooperation between the UEMOA and ECOWAS, and the settlement of the Liberian civil war are examples of enhanced cooperation within greater West Africa.

N.B.: UEMOA stands for L'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (The West African Economic and Monetary Union).

Schraeder (2014) is of the opinion that there is growing Francophone-Anglophone rapprochement among West African elites as against the backdrop of rising Francophone-Anglophone tensions at the continental level, such as in the OAU and within the international system, as witnessed by growing tensions between Washington and Paris.

It is not as if there are no skirmishes amongst Anglophone countries in

West Africa; for instance, Nigerians were sent packing from Ghana in the early 1960s. In 1969, the Nigerian Government retaliated by repatriating Ghanaian nationals. Again, during Shehu Shagari's regime in the second republic, there was a 'Ghana must go' drama that played out in the country. This was just to say that there are usual mutual suspicions amongst West African and African States, be they Francophone or Anglophone. More so, the Nigerian size and seeming 'prosperity' makes her vulnerable to attract envy from some other countries in West Africa.

Consequently, it has been observed that there are mutual suspicions and attendant lack of trust that mars the relationship between the Francophone and Anglophone countries of West Africa. And, Jooji (2011:vi) rightly observes that,

Most West African countries share a common historical and political experience, even though there appear to be the Luxo-phone, Franco-phone and Anglo-phone divides;

Similarly, Jooji (2011:8) rightly asserts, that "ECOWAS was founded to achieve 'collective self-sufficiency for member States by means of Economic and Monetary Union, thus creating a single trade bloc". Osagie (2005) proposes a higher level of integration which requires members to surrender national sovereignty over sensitive financial matters, monetary integration where a new currency replaces national currencies. N'zué (2011:8) opines that:

Avec l'interconnexion des économies entre elles (la nouvelle économie mondiale), ces problèmes de la zone Euro impacteront sans nul doute toutes les économies et en particulier les économies des pays de la CEDEAO [Translation: With the interconnection of the economies amongst themselves (the new world economy), these Euro zone problems will impact without any doubt all the economies and in particular the economies of ECOWAS countries].

The Francophone members of the ECOWAS have a monetary union called Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) (West African Monetary Union) (WAMU) which is rather closely tied to France, their colonial masters, and is not concerned with the ECOWAS monetary arrangements. Faujas (2014) notes with dismay that,

The common currency among French-speaking countries in both West and central Africa, the CFA franc has also, seemingly, been a burden, despite the fact that it is more protected from inflation than currencies that are not aligned to the euro.

In terms of relationship and cooperation, it is worthy of mention that

Nigeria, an Anglophone country, has always been at the receiving end of military incursions by its smaller neighbouring francophone countries. In the spirit of 'Big Brother', Nigeria has always been derided by these small francophone West African countries. Invariably, these countries have always seen the need to come together because there are benefits that can be derived from peaceful coexistence among the nation states. N'Zué (2012:xxiv) points out that case studies of selected ECOWAS countries are carried out to address the issue of how Africa can design schemes to enhance its own domestic resource mobilization capacity with the aim of pushing the ECOWAS regional integration Agenda.

It is worthy of mention to note that the ECOWAS has gone beyond its frontiers and is now collaborating with the Economic Community of Central African States to combat piracy and maritime crimes.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The task of this paper was to critically appraise the contours of the relationship between the ECOWAS countries within the precinct of the "New Scramble for Africa". In doing this, it zeroed-in on the Francophone/Anglophone countries within the ECOWAS sub-region, arguing that the umbrella regional economic organization has not sufficiently succeeded in eliminating the mutual suspicions and rancour that have characterized their relations. Furthermore, it became evident that the recent mistrust among the Francophone and Anglophone countries is not only fuelled by the quest for continual relevance by these traditional powers (notably France and Britain) in West Africa, but has fundamentally been heightened by the emergence of, indeed aggressive drive by the emerging and developing economies, notably Brazil, China and India for their competitive share of the African resources.

In view of the above, the paper conjectures that the interaction of these forces and the contradictions that inevitably arise from these complexities will result in diversification of markets and dissolution of age-old order accentuated by language proximity and historical propinquity. Therefore, the paper recommends, among others that since the main objective of the union is to establish a regional integration in the areas of economy, trade and politics, there is need, at the ECOWAS platform, to foster a cordial multilateral relationship amongst all the member States, be it Francophone or Anglophone.

There is also the need to expand intra-West African market. To easily achieve this, the Francophone businessmen and women should, as a matter of urgency, endeavour to learn English while the Anglophone businessmen and women should learn French. By extension, teaching of both English and

French at primary and secondary school levels should be made compulsory in all member countries to facilitate easy communication amongst ECOWAS citizens generally; hence there is a saying, “One more language, one more friend”. Another saying goes this way: “One more language, one more means of organizing the universe”. And when we are able to understand one another, a better means of organization of the universe is promoted. Closely linked to this is the need to expedite action to get a common currency for all ECOWAS member States.

In conclusion, we note that all West Africans, Central Africans, and indeed all well-meaning Africans as a whole, must ensure that all hands are on deck under the platforms of ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union (AU) to rebuild the Sub-Region and of course the continent. Africa must jointly strive to combat, not only piracy and maritime crimes but also poverty, disease, illiteracy, political upheaval, inter-tribal conflicts and civil wars, security challenges, trans-border crimes among others. As such, we can all live peaceably in a united Africa promoting the African renaissance.

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# **Unfinished Revolution: The Arab Spring at the Crossroads**

Osaretin Idahosa

## **Abstract**

Currently, the Arab world is going through a critical phase of its collective existence as the entire region is under the grip of a revolutionary fervour. The consequences have both political and economic ramifications. Hitherto, totalitarian and dictatorial regimes in the region had not only tightly controlled the levers of power through political threats and manipulations but had also exploited whatever economic benefits which were available therein. This was accentuated by poor economic performance, unemployment, corruption and inequality that acted as catalysts for a general revolt. This gave birth to what is presently dubbed the "Arab Spring". Within months of the self immolation of Mohammed Buazizi, Tunisian President, Zine Al-Abidin Ben Ali who had ruled the country for 23years, fled the country. Also in Egypt, the wave of protests swept off President Hosni Mubarak after 29years in office. Despite the regime change in both countries; the political institutions that supported the old order were left intact. As such, the benefactors of the Arab Spring were not the masses but the members of the elites that were either supportive of the toppled regimes or their antagonists who used it to secure the much needed elusive political powers. This study is a survey of the countries where the authoritarian regimes have been replaced as a result of the Arab revolts,

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specifically; Egypt and Tunisia are the case studies. The emphasis is on how unmet expectations and unrealized goals have tended to derail the realization of the initial dreams of the citizenry in these countries.

### **Introduction**

A lot has happened in and to North Africa and the Middle East since the self-immolation of Muhammad Buazizi in Tunisia on December 10 2010. The wave of popular protests that convulsed this sub-region of the world, overthrowing long-ruling dictators, have added to its already complex, variegated and complicated politics. While it is true that the Arab Spring was unexpected in some quarters the mass protests that spread across the entire Arab world had their origins not in January of the same year but over decades earlier. When the uprising started the anger fueling it was not new. It had a prolonged period of incubation, exploding at times, but never before in such widespread and sustained fury. To this effect, the grievances against the leadership of these countries were driven by economic, social, historical, political and personal factors. Poverty, youth mass unemployment, social exclusion and political alienation combined to create the objective conditions for the revolts.

However, with the collapse of long-lived dictator in Tunisia and Egypt (Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak) in early 2011, it is imperative to investigate the level of success of what is characteristically dubbed Arab spring. The question to ask therefore is: who were the beneficiaries of the revolution? To a number of academics, one common answer has been both the constitutional referendum in the aftermath of regime change in Tunisia and the military transition in Egypt excluded the prime movers of the revolutions (Hess, 2013). Also, there has been repeated reincarnation of protests throughout the entire sub-region. While it is true that what took place in 2011 was undisputedly a spectacular act of civil disobedience against long-standing autocrats, the revolution were not decisive as the strides towards freedom, democracy and pluralism is still far from realized. The Arab uprising tended to have removed one layer of the complex challenge confronting the Arab world, but the fundamental issue remained insulated. The social drivers of the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt were: high level of youth unemployment, widening socio-economic inequality, endemic official corruption and of course, resilience of authoritarian regimes. It was the collective desire of the people to redress these imbalances that led them to take their common destiny in their hands. Today, there are mounting fears that this mission has been derailed. The next sets of questions to ask are: what were the causal factors of the Arab Spring? Where these factors sufficiently addressed by the

outcome of the revolution? Were there other intervening variables that were unseen by the prosecutors of the revolution? Could there have been different results if otherwise? This paper intends to provide answers to these questions and establish their relevance to the assessment of the Arab Spring.

### **Establishing causality**

At the glance, the Arab spring appeared diffuse in term of inertia and momentum. A closer look however, would reveal that bottom-up factors drove the Middle Eastern discontent. Perhaps, what triggered –off the social eruptions had its roots in long –standing deprivations of the citizenry by the leadership. This was manifested in terms of socio-economic inequality, official corruption, high rate of youth unemployment and the diffusion of modern communication technologies. In every society, the primacy of economic performances is vested with endless possibilities. A vibrant economy engenders not only growth and development but also internal cohesion. In the absence of this prerequisite, poverty and mass unemployment (especially amongst the youth) create the objective conditions for revolts. In Egypt at as well as Tunisia, poverty and unemployment remain important problems. Over the past three decades, the economies of the two states have grown at a relatively sluggish rate with Egypt (5.10%) and Tunisia (4.52%) respectively (World Bank, 2010). Over the years, there had been in both countries a deepening public anger over political and economic grievances Growing popular frustration led to what is commonly known as Black Thursday disturbances in Tunisia in 1978 and was later re-enacted as widespread public riot in late 1983 and early 1984 (Entelis and Tessler, 1986)

While it is true that economic factors were among the social drivers of the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, the characters of the regimes in the two countries played a significant role. In autocracies where legitimacy is far-fetched, the maintenance of internal cohesion is dependent not only on economic performances but also on the general support for the regime. The political culture in Egypt and Tunisia since the 1970s tended to have legitimized the personal rule of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively

However, in the wake of a severe economic crises as evident in the global financial meltdown in 2008, internal discontent was consummated in these two countries. Thus, complicated economic fortunes accentuated by dire socio-political crises helped terminate the regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia. In terms of demographics, the dilemma in both countries is population. The population density in Egypt is one of the highest in the world. Tunisia had a population growth rate of about 3% a year as far back as the twilight of the twentieth century (Long and Reich, 2008). Poor

socio-economic conditions in the countryside drive hundreds of thousands of people (mostly youths) into urban slums in Egypt and Tunisia. Also, high fertility rates have produced substantial youth bulges of about 62.7% in Egypt and 56.1% in Tunisia in the first decades of the twenty-first century (Hess, 2013). Complimenting the above is a large, educated youth cohort who was frustrated with the prevailing conditions at home. The official unemployment rates in Egypt and Tunisia in 2005 were averaged at 11.2% and 14.25%. As a result of these huge rates of unemployment, many youths frustrated with the prevailing political and economic conditions took solace in plotting and organizing anti-regime collective actions.

Even before the turn of the last century, there had been series of contestation around the distribution of available resource in Egypt and Tunisia. The gap between the rich and poor, though not as large as in some development countries, has increased considerably over the years. The situation on ground approximates a two-class system; a very rich upper class and very lower class, with the latter vastly larger than the former. Even among the poor, poverty seemed to have grown with an increase divided between regular employed workers who are protected by trade unions and social legislation and those who work on an intermittent or seasonal bases, in the informal sector, or perhaps not at all (Long and Rich, 2008) in turns of followership, the strike and disturbance of 2011 saw members of the former group, whose material conditions were deteriorating, feel powerless as the nations' economic burden was not distributed equitably. This frustrated mass formed the bulk of the drivers of the Arab Spring. The situation described above bespeaks of a widening socio-economic inequality that helped to drive the protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Knickmeyer, 2011). Accordingly, the material conditions of the poor and alienated working class contrasted with the privileges enjoyed by those connected with the regimes in both countries. This motivated them to join ranks with educated youths to demand for regime change. Prior to the Arab Spring, popular uprising in both countries were centered on the regimes inability to curtail rising food prices or provide other basic grievances (Ottway and Hamzawy, 2011). Accordingly:

In Egypt more than 1000 protest actions took place from 1998 to 2004. After the implementation of economic liberalization policies, this cut social services and government spending as well as increased protests by 200 percent, amounting to 250 in 2004 alone. In April 2005, as many as half –million Egyptians participated in more than 400 actions, including a general strike centering in al-mahalla Al-Kubra and involving tens of thousands of state workers, youth activists and professionals. Meanwhile in Tunisia, materially aggrieved

citizens organized collective actions against a mining company in 2008, which soon came to involve protesters demonstrating against rising inflation and unemployment in order parts of the country (Ottaway and Hamzaway, 2011: 2-6).

Since the beginning of the new millennium data on socio-economic inequality suggest that the gap between the rich and poor in both countries has widened even further. According to Hess (2013), in 2001, Egypt's Gini Index for the distribution of family inequality was reported at 34.4 (70th most unequal of 136 countries), Whereas Tunisia's was estimated at 40.0 (61st most unequal) in 2005. Thus, frustration over extreme inequality which has percolated upward from the lowest range in both societies into the middle class contributed immensely to the crises.

To analysts and observers alike, officially corruption is at the heart of the Arab Spring. According to Levey (2011), officially corruption is "Key grievances driving protest throughout the Arab world". This reality is further reinforced by the trials of Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali and their cronies whose practices ranged from money laundering to drug trafficking while in office in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2010, Egypt and Tunisia were scored at 3.1 and 4.3, respectively. This placed them at the ranks of 78th and 59th overall (Transparency International 2011). There is indeed a mutual inclusiveness between the impact of corruption on both economies and the "anger-venting" mass incidents that have revealed the groundswell of frustration against corrupt and abusive government officials in Egypt and Tunisia. This, of course presupposes the pre-existence of structural weakness of the regimes which the drivers of the rebellion exploited. The regimes in Egypt and Tunisia were slowly ebbed off by chronic and pervasive corruption (predominately at the official level) and the lack of effective institutional mechanism for maintaining long term internal cohesion.

### **On Revolution**

In different academic cycles, there has been a lot of contestations on whether the Arab Spring was really a revolution or not. Despite been essentially marked by regime change, the mass protests that engulfed the Middle East did not produce the much anticipated transformation of society by the protagonists. If indeed, we conceded that it had a semblance of a revolution, was it social or political? For it is to be accepted as social revolution, it should have produced attitudinal change at least. However, the ideological divide between the secularists and Islamists on the other hand and their perceptions on how to build on the initial gains of the revolt is at the heart of the

problematic; especially in Egypt. This tends to undermine the concerns of the common people expressed as social rights namely: education, employment and health care. Thus, there are mounting fears about a potential religious take over following the Iranian model. The extent to which sharia laws can govern public life in the new regimes in Egypt and Tunisia will surely be the litmus test of the unfolding events in these countries. Nonetheless, a truly secular regime total absolved from the influence of religion will do more harm than good in the ensuring context. In the aftermath of the spring, to envisage Egypt and Tunisia governed unyieldingly by the principles of Sharia without the effort of contextualization and interpretation would result in a religious orthodoxy. After all, history has taught us that the citizens abhor all forms of coercion, be it religious or ideological. Perhaps what is urgently needed is to build a synergy between religion and politics in an atmosphere of social justice.

In a political revolution, not only is the regime replaced but also its institutions. Depending on its density, the old property relations could be overturned or not. Indeed a revolution is not carried out at the behest of the political elites, but rather by ordinary people when especially, they are dissatisfied with the old order. Within Marxist theory, Karl Max and Friedrich Engels in about 1850 established the use of the term Permanent Revolution which has since become mostly associated with Leon Trotsky. Although the use of the term by different theorists is not identical, Marx used it to describe the strategy of a revolution of any class. The call was on the revolutionary class to continue to pursue its class interest independently and without compromise; regardless of the overtures or allures of political alliances and despite the political dominance of opposition section of society (Engels, 1845).

Trotsky evolved the concept of 'Permanent Revolution' to explain how socialist revolutions could occur in a society that has not achieved advance capitalism. the central argument here rests on two pillars : (a) that the bourgeoisie in late developing capitalist countries are not capable to develop productive forces as did the advance capitalist societies with full – blown industrial proletariat (b) that the proletariat in collaboration with the peasantry can and most seize social, economy and political power(Trotsky, 1931). The thrust of Trotsky's theory was that in Russia, the bourgeoisie would not be able to see through a thorough revolution that would guarantee political democracy and solve the land question. He therefore argued that future revolution must be proletariat driven in order to surpass the bourgeoisie democratic revolution. In this sense, the revolution will be permanent.

**The Mis-Step**

In the Arab context, the term revolution should be used with relative caution. Not only were the prime makers (the masses) of the revolt denied access to power, but the new regimes that were subsequently inaugurated reflected sectional or sectarian interests. The elections in Tunisia in October 2011, opened the flood gate for the right – wing bloc which includes; Al – Nahda – Renaissance Party (Brotherhood) and those who claim to be followers of Bourguiba (the fist Tunisian president). The responsibility to produce a new constitution for the country rested on this coalition. Although President Marzouki, a former leftist was oppose to the depose Ben Ali Regime, it would require a trade-off between his administration and the brotherhood for the country to move forward. This is particularly instructive given the fact that the revolutionary movement in Tunisia was not met to challenge the dependant pattern of development of the Ben Ali era. Rather the major criticism was leveled against the repressive police state structure and the opposition of the “royalties” on all economic activities which were under the direct control of the president's family. So far, the new ruling coalition has not modified fundamentally the pattern of development put in place by President Bourguiba. Instead, attempts have been made to infuse it with increased religious doses meant to placate alleged Islamic particularism.

In Egypt, following a presidential run-off, former President Mohammed Morsi was sworn into office on Jun 30th 2012 as the country's first democratic head of state. The Muslim brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 335 seats in the people assemble by fielding candidates for individual seats. The victory of the brotherhood raised the fear in the general public of the rise of political Islam that was deeply rooted in the echo of the slogan “Islamisation of society” Much of what happened in President Morsi's one year administration was a deliberate attempt by the president to grant himself sweeping powers, including the provision that all constitutional declarations, laws and decrees issued by him since he took office were “final and unchangeable”. The fall of Morsi changed the mood from possibilities to inevitability. One notable exception to this, however, was in the brotherhood. The images of bloodshed and people dying (especially in the Tahrir square) across the country stood in stark contrast to the relatively lack of violence in the rebellion that ousted Mubarak from office. This contrast played a large role in building the broad support needed for military intervention. Timing was also a contributing factor, as the military took advantage of the waning popularity of the Morsi administration. Despite these examples, Morsi had his support based mostly with the brotherhood. This was, nonetheless, canceled out by the opposition of the National Salvation Front.

**At Issue**

Egypt is a heavy weight in the Middle East and it is often the fulcrum on which currents in the region turn. The fortunes of the Morsi Administration were squeezed between a public that was apprehensive of rigid application of the principle of Sharia and the political aspirations of the Muslim brotherhood (Morsi support base), who saw it as a veritable opportunity to right the wrongs that have been meted out to it for decades. Even the liberals and secular activists, who had earlier on split their votes between Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafik during the run-off elections, despaired at finding themselves caught between the military and religious conservatives.

The transition to democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring has been anything but smooth. Though the level of crisis in Tunisia has been less than that of Egypt, both countries have lurched from crisis to crisis. In the first two years after the spring, Egypt seems to break repeatedly into three camps: the military and other supporters of the Mubarak regime, the Muslim brotherhood (the Islamic party that has been officially banned but had nonetheless been the country's largest political force) and the young liberal, secular activists who set off the uprising. By the end of 2012, it appeared that the brotherhood had come out on top, as it won control of parliament, and then the presidency, with Mohammed Morsi the leader of the group's political wing. Morsi then outmaneuvered the military to the sidelines and pushed through a constitution that was bitterly opposed both by the liberal groups and supporters of Mubarak regime.

At the close of the Morsi Administration, violent protests against the government were joined by chaos and street battles sparked initially by the handlings of death sentence from an earlier soccer riot. The administration imposed a state of emergency and the military warned against the "collapse of the state" (BBC, 2013). The situation in the country was not only complicated by the consummate protest against the activities of the president but also by the increasing economic woes of the masses that initially yearned for a change. The slim majority of Islamists hold on by the result of the last presidential elections run-off coupled with the vestiges of the old regime who still wield significant economic populist capital, had commensurate impact on the crisis.

**A Mismanaged Course**

Through the years, events in Egypt and Tunisia have influenced one another to a considerable extent. Aside from the fact that early nationalist movements in Egypt inspired Tunisians with a greater nationalist consciousness, the Arab Spring which was ignited in Tunisia had serious ramifications in Egypt. As

with most newly independent nations in the 1950s, de-politicization of the society was a populist approach to the management of politics in the Arab world. Even existing socialist regime (like Nasser's) who took this approach, at least after the revolutionary phase, used it to consolidate their rules.

However, the Nasser's regime was an amendment that adopted an elitist approach that excluded the popular classes from actively being involved in the management of society. Thus, the demand for a level playing field became the mantra of the alienated and a distinguishing feature of the behavior and attitude of the average Egyptian. The Egyptian state remained under aristocratic leadership until the ouster Mubarak (Amin, 2012).

No doubt, the Arab Spring was a product of indigent socio-economic conditions of a greater percentage of the population in the countries so affected. The momentous outburst of emotions that fueled the spring was symptomatic of state failure. Egypt and Tunisian are two states who could be conceived as candidates for accession to the group of emerging states, who, sadly enough, are not. Given the turf alluded to above; the stage was ripe for a revolution. Unfortunately, no sooner had the revolutionary process started than the seeds from the elements that eventually hijacked the process sown.

According to Trotsky (1931), in theory of Permanent Revolution, under developed countries must pass through two distinct revolutions: (a) the bourgeoisie democratic revolution (which socialist will assist) and (b) the socialist revolution (with an evolutionary period of capitalist development).

This is often referred to as the Theory of Stages (the Two Stages Theory or Stagism). Also, Lenin ( cited by Trotsky, 1983), in 1917 argued that the (Russian) bourgeoisie will not be able to carry through the task of the bourgeoisie of democratic revolution and therefore the proletariat had to take not only state power but also economic power. Lenin taught that a "A democratic dictatorship" of the workers and peasants would complete the task of the bourgeoisie. Trotsky, on the other hand, generalize his theory of Permanent Revolution by arguing that the proletariat needed to take power in a process of uninterrupted and Permanent Revolution in order to carry out the task of the bourgeoisie democratic revolution.

In the Arab Spring, there was neither a bourgeoisie democratic revolution nor a socialist revolution. What happened were general revolts borne out of a growing popular frustration akin to what happened in 1978, 1983 and 1984 in Tunisia and Egyptian mass strikes of 2007 / 2008. There might have been variations in terms of intensity, but they were nowhere near the revolutions that took place in France in the 19th Century, the Great October revolution in Russia in 1917, the 1949 Chinese Revolution and the 1959 Cuban Revolution respectively. Perhaps, the absence of a central figure to direct the course of the revolt partly exposes the fundamental flaws in the process. The fact the

whole project was sporadic explained a major defect. To Marx, Permanent Revolution involves a revolutionary class which continued to push for, and achieve its interest despite the political dominance of actor with opposing interest (Marx, 1849). He also warned of attempts to “bribe the workers (masses) with a more or less disgusted forms of alms and to break their revolutionary strength by temporary rendering their situation tolerable” (Marx, 1850). Marx therefore recommended that the workers (masses):

They must contribute most to their final victory, by informing themselves of their own class interests, by taking up their independent political position as soon as possible, by not allowing themselves to be misled by the hypocritical phrases of democratic petty bourgeoisie into doubting for one minute the necessity of an independently organized party of the proletariat. Their battle – cry must be: The Permanent Revolution (Marx, 1850: 9–I).

In a revolution, not only do the old brigades give way to a new one, the old institutions crumble and are subsequently replaced by new ones which are reflective of a new ideology. Instructively, the masses participate in the transformation of society to ensure that human values replace the values of the old elites. This process of deconstruction is also creation to the extent that the methods and passions used to pull down the ruins determines what kind of world arises from rubble. The struggles in the Middle East would not be complete by simply delivering concentrated political powers into the hands of new elites, who are more or less reflective of the old order, but by dispersing it. The changes effected by the Arab Spring should be representational and made to reflect new social and economic conditions.

This will ultimately change the way people live and think in the Arab world.

### **Conclusion**

The findings of this study suggest that the Arab Spring is an unfinished revolution. Premised on the fact that those who led the popular protests against authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia were not the beneficiaries. The goals of the social movement that fueled the upheavals in which governments in both country were replaced were not fully realized. In the two cases discussed in this paper, the social drivers of the process were: poor economic performance, unemployment (especially among uneducated youths), corruption and inequality. These are factors that could presage a revolutionary movement; an assessment that has since proven right with the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt respectively.

Although, fragmented outburst of social unrests were transformed into protests coordinated and sustained at the national front in Tunisia and Egypt, the coordinators of this movement did not use their autonomous organizations to push through a political programme which would require the dismantling of old institutions. Rather, the expectations of the revolutionary mass were hijacked by members of the elites who were either loyalties of the old order or those who used the opportunities to gain national prominence.

The divergence nature of this outcome is such that, what would have ordinarily passed for a social revolution degenerated into what Trotsky called “Bourgeoisie democratic revolution”. History is replete with the fact that the bourgeoisie class has not successfully carry out a social revolution against itself. That will amount to a class suicide. Therefore what was needed was for the masses to see through not only a political revolution but a social revolution that would guarantee the use of state power to take over economic power. This is the tangent of the never ending cycle of what is popularly known as Arab Spring.

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# **Religion, Politics and Electoral Outcomes in Nigeria: The 2015 Presidential Election in Perspective**

Moshood Olayinka Salahu

## **Abstract**

Religion is one of the major determinants of electoral behavior in most democracies despite attempts and claims by many states at running secular regimes. This paper examines the roles played by the two major religions, Islam and Christianity, with respect to the outcome of the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. Although, this study employed secondary data as sourced from the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, it however adopts a combination of both the quantitative and qualitative techniques in analyzing the outcomes of the election. Engaging a critical analysis of the presidential election results, with respect to the strongholds of the candidates of the two leading political parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and the All Progressives Congress (APC), vis-à-vis the strongholds of the two major religions in the country, a strong nexus is drawn between religion, politics and electoral outcome in Nigeria. Following from this, it was revealed that the two major religions, Christianity and Islam played major and critical roles in the determination of electoral outcomes in the 2015 presidential election. This paper therefore posits that more than any other factor, and more than ever before, religion plays a critical role in determining electoral outcomes in Nigeria; and further suggests that for the nation

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to witness any meaningful development, Nigerians as a people must allow democracy grow far above religion, amongst other diversities plaguing Nigeria as a state.

### **Introduction**

There are several narratives concerning the separation of religion from politics. However convincing some of these narratives may appear to be, it should not be forgotten that, in fact, for most of human history, politics and religion have gone hand in hand.

In the great ancient civilizations of the world, kingship and priesthood were very closely related. At times it was not too clear whether one was dealing with a king with sacred powers, or a priest with political authority. The priest-king was a common phenomenon. Examples cut across all continents: the Egyptians in Africa, the Assyrians in the Middle East, the Greeks and Roman empires in Europe, and the Inkas in the Americas, to mention a few. Similarly, in African traditional societies, political life was shot through and through by religion. The rulers were agents of the gods of the land and custodians of the wishes of the ancestors. The people on their part accepted the political arrangements governing their lives as religious obligations (Onaiyekan, 1993).

Today, Nigeria is troubled because of internal issues such as ethnic and religious tensions, social and economic inequities, high unemployment and severe poverty. Due to its historical beginnings, particularly the divide and rule decisions made during its formative years by the British colonial ruling officials, and the effects on the competing ethnic and religious groups, Nigeria is potentially on the path of becoming a “failed state” according to a recent United States Air Force War College Study (Mac Allum et.al, 2011). Among the numerous internal issues plaguing Nigeria today, coupled with the government's inability to address them, are the two main different religious beliefs that separate the country. With their diverse Muslim and Christian communities and the growth in religious strife, the Nigerian government must take extraordinary steps if not to solve, to at least address the problems to build a future for the country (Weatherstone, 2012).

The question of the relationship of religion and politics is therefore an inevitable and important one. The strident call for a separation of politics from religion often becomes a slogan used according to the convenience of the moment. The reality is that both are tied together, by the very nature of things- and this for at least two reasons: First, there is something inherently sacred about political power. History has shown that power can only be properly exercised when handled with sacred attention. “All powers belong to God” is a maxim that religious people have adhered to for centuries.

Secondly, it is the same concrete human person who assumes both political and religious identity, and one necessarily affects the other. No wonder, even nations which make much of separation of religion and politics find many ways in practice to act against this principle (Onaiyekan, 1993).

If truly politics is all about 'authoritative allocation of values' (Easton, 1957), or "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell, 1930); if it also remains uncontroverted that politics and religion are inseparable within the Nigerian political matrix, logically, we therefore, may be tempted to accept the fact that religion could produce variation in our electoral outcomes. In light of the above, this paper raises the following fundamental research questions:

- i. To what extent has religion influenced politics in Nigeria?
- ii. How far has religion produced variation in electoral outcomes in Nigeria?
- iii. How can we remedy the situation?

This paper therefore investigates how far the two major religions have influenced electoral outcomes in Nigeria, using the 2015 presidential election as our point of analysis. It also attempts to seek lasting solutions to this divisive phenomenon in our society. The paper is divided into eight sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section explores relevant literatures with respect to the subject matter. The third section explains conceptual and theoretical framework. The fourth section explains the methods of analysis, the types and sources of data. The fifth section explores the nexus between religion, politics and electoral outcomes in Nigeria. The sixth section puts the 2015 presidential election in perspective. The seventh section discusses and analyses the data, while the last section contains the conclusion, recommendations and suggestion for further research.

### **Literature Review**

Religion has played a major role throughout Nigerian history, right from the colonial administration, right through the post-independence period, and up to the present republic. In fact the 'religious question' is only a part of the larger 'national question' about 'what Nigeria is'. Today, both Islam and Christianity are straddled across the Nigerian polity, each no longer knocking and pleading to be admitted, but seeking to take over the architectural design and construction of the Nigeria polity. In matters of religion and political competition, despite the claims to democratic procedures as spelt out in the legal and political documents, the realities belie the claim (Kukah, 1993).

Kukah (1993) equally noted that, because of the fact that all forms of political discourse and articulation at the national levels tend to rely on the English language, the larger segment of the society who are not literate in the

language continue to float outside the political process, unable to make their contributions.

It is amidst this climate that a tiny minority, through its access to the media, imposed its will on the nation. These cliques according to the clergy, claimed to be the representatives of their people, thereby facilitating their access to the 'national cake'. However, to enhance the people's participation and reduce alienation, he asserted that, these cliques result to primordial sentiments and religious ideologies as instruments of legitimizing themselves in power.

The competition for power as a means of resource allocation has meant that the ethnic elites within the Nigerian state have had to fall back on what can, and will, enhance their prospects of capturing and retaining power for their immediate constituencies. In Northern Nigeria, the hegemony of the ruling class has been prefixed on the veneer of the Islamic religion.

In response to the above claims, many Christians would seem to have come to the conclusion that since religion has been a major factor in determining the staying power of the Muslims, it has become imperative for Christians now to use religion for achieving their socio-political activities and the place of religion in the political process, are being redefined as a means of dealing with these new political realities (Kukah, 1993).

In a similar vein, Dr. Julius Adekunle, editor of the book *Religion in Politics: Secularism and National Integration in Modern Nigeria* and a Professor of African History at Monmouth University in New Jersey states that, religion is a distinct part of and plays an important role in nearly every aspect of Nigerian life, from public to social and especially in the political realm (Adekunle, 2009). This position is reinforced by a 2006 Pew Research Study that was carried out just before the 2007 presidential election in Nigeria, where it was discovered that “91 percent of Muslim and 76 percent of Christian respondents claimed that religion was the most important issue to them (Rudy and Shah, 2007). The convergence of large numbers of people practicing both the Muslim and Christian faiths, the two major religions in the country that account for well over 90% of the population, makes it “a prototypical test case in accommodating religious balance (Paden, 2008). This is a manifestation of the fact that the role of religion in Nigerian life is deeply embedded in the social fabric of the country and that the historical origins of each religion provide a glimpse as to why they are so important (Adekunle, 2009).

The last of the religious groups, also the smallest, are the Animists, those who share the indigenous beliefs of early African culture. In its earliest beginnings, the indigenous religions of Nigeria were based on worshiping gods associated with the land, rivers and the physical surroundings of the

early tribes, commonly known as African Tribal Religion (ATR) (Omotola, 2009). It was these religious beliefs that governing bodies of the early Hausa people of the north, and Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups, from the south and west, in pre-colonial Nigeria used to establish their political and legal authorities (Adekunle, 2009). These beliefs are currently held by a very small part of Nigerian society, anywhere between two and ten percent. Their lack of size in terms of population has pushed them to the margins of Nigerian politics while the leaders of Islam and Christianity have assumed key roles with the government (Omotola, 2009).

Considering religion as a means to an end, numerous authors have written about the re-introduction of Shari'a law in the northern Muslim states. The recurring theme is a lack of governance, rule of law and general lack of support by the Federal government. Shari'a was "seen by the population as a way to fight the corruption and bad government, immorality, and ostentatious wealth" that was accumulated by only those in power." (Roman, 2007). Others have proposed that the religious violence, especially in Nigeria is inevitable as Islam asserts itself within the world vis-à-vis Huntington's "clash of civilizations" debate (Sakah, 2009). As such, the re-introduction of Sharia should not be seen as an option towards achieving political ends.

In support of the above position, Kukah (1993), affirms that, for a long time, Christian activism in Nigerian politics and effort to redefine the gospel in the light of Nigerian realities, though fragmented, have been stalled owing to historical antecedents. Things have since begun to turn, from Christians protesting against discrimination and domination by Muslims, to Christians seeking to shape the direction and content of Nigerian politics.

However, some scholars believe that the only way out of these religion laden political contestations, is for Nigeria to strengthen her secular status as embedded in the constitution. While some believe that secularism is the way out of this quagmire, others, like Omotola (2009) with contrary view, argues that, the application of secularism in Nigeria is woefully inadequate due to the constant use of religion by politicians for personal gain. He also argues that the government provides funding for the construction of various religious buildings as well as sponsors pilgrimages for citizens of the two major religions but fails to appropriately recognize and fund the smaller, tribal animist religions. He concludes that the Nigerian government and its role as a secular state has been "severely compromised" and it should be redesigned without the current religious overtones and practice true secularism. This counter argument may not be the correct path to solve the current religious issues because of the central role that religion plays in Nigerian life.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

Religion, like other concepts, cannot be easily and simply defined. Definitions usually vary in accordance with the level of education and experience of the definers, that is, in relation to how they were brought up, what they have heard or read, where they have been and what they have gone through in life (Jamiu, 2012). The difficulty stems not merely from the fact that the living and the dead religions of the world present all too varying concepts, with hardly anything as common in regards to the basic functions of religion as such. What makes the matters all the more difficult is that no definition of religion, whatsoever, not even the simplest one, is able to resolve the problem at a glance (Pratt, 1947).

However, the difficulty in defining the concept should not deter us from exploring the possibility of tinkering with some and put them into use in this research work. This, in essence is the main focus under this section. This section is concerned with what religion means to people of different ideological coloration, shades of perception and interpretation, to examine the interdependence of religion and politics, if there is any, as well as the nature and roles of religion in society. For the purpose of this paper, we shall explore the following definitions:

Bilton (1977) defines religion as “a system of belief about the individual's place in the world, providing an order to that world and a reason for existence within it. In a similar vein, Durkheim (1951) conceptualizes religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden...beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community... and all those who adhere to them.”

While trying to explain the concept, some Marxist scholars of the socialist and communist background adopted the Liberation Theory. This set of Marxists see religion as the opium of the masses, a creation of the ruling and the property owning class, used to uphold an exploitative and oppressive social order favorable to that same ruling class in the society. Their views are commonly represented by Karl Marx (1918) who wrote that: “Religion is the sign of the oppressed cultures, the sentiment of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of the spiritless conditions, it is the opium of the people.”

While Durkheim, and Bilton, who are of the sociological extraction, agree on the positive role of religion, Nwolise (1988) stressed Lewis Coser's observation on religion's dysfunctional role. He is of the view that though religion can pull people, especially of one religion together, it can also disintegrate them and set them against each other. The views of Marxists, socialist and communists about religion as depicted by Karl Marx's assertion

quoted earlier sees nothing good either in religion or in its adherents. Rather, it is just an instrument of exploitation and oppression (Jamiu, 2012). This conflicting role assigned to religion by western scholars, probably prompted Nwolise (1988) to attempt to strike a balance between the two extreme views. To Nwolise, the problem is not with religion per se but with its organizers. He therefore regards religion as:

A system of beliefs and practices which if organized along the will of the Creator helps in explaining the uncertainties of human life, securing moral behavior and ensuring that people have smooth social relation on earth as prelude to having everlasting happy life with God after death; but which if run according to the dictates of evil forces brings fire and brimstone on the society whether multi-religious or mono-religious (Nwolise, 1988).

According to Jamiu (2012), Nwolise's reason for defining religion as above is not far-fetched. To him, religion is a matter of emotion rather than reason.

Since it is one of the main objectives of this research piece to establish a nexus between religion, politics and electoral outcomes, it is therefore incumbent upon us to take the pain in going through the conceptual explorations of “politics” and “electoral outcomes”. Politics is exciting because people disagree. They disagree about how they should live. Who should get what? How should power and other resources be distributed? Should society be based on cooperation or conflict? And so on. They also disagree about how such matters should be resolved. How should collective decisions be made? Who should have a say? How much influence should each person have? And so forth. For Aristotle, this made politics the 'master science': that is, nothing less than the activity through which human beings attempt to improve their lives and create the Good Society. Politics is, above all, a social activity. It is always a dialogue, and never a monologue (Baker, 1962). In their attempt to find the answer to what politics is all about, Anifowose and Enemu (1999), notes that: a search through political science textbooks confounds the student with numerous definitions, stating that “politics is the process of making and execution of governmental decisions or policies” (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Dahl, 1995); “the authoritative allocation of values” (Easton, 1957); or “who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell, 1930); “the quest for power, order and justice” (Merki, 1967); “the art of influencing, manipulating and controlling others” (Wright, 1955); “a process of resolution of conflicts in society” (Ranny, 1975), and “a struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public

issues” (Dyke, 1960).

While there has been a wide range of definitions, most of them can be classified as being one of the two types- the classicalist or the behavioralist school of thoughts. The classicalist identify politics with government or the state, while the behavioralists, revolve around the notions of 'power', 'authority' and conflict (Anifowose and Enemu, 1999). For those who believe that politics involves power and influence, politics gives an answer to the question, “who gets what, when and how? The Eastonian definition of politics as the “authoritative allocation of values for a society” is considered very useful by political scientists. It emphasizes political activity rather than institutions (Anifowose and Enemu 1999). The authoritative allocations of values, is, Easton argues, the kind of activity we should be interested in. The first assumption is that in every society, values are desired, that is people have different interests or objectives, and these must be allocated, or distributed by someone or something. In essence, it is a power and conflict situation. Every society has different political systems allocating values authoritatively. A policy is said to be authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it (Easton, 1965). According to Anifowose and Enemu (1999), Herbert Winter and Bellows suggest a definition that contains elements of the thoughts by Vernon Dyke and David Easton, that “politics is a struggle between actors pursuing conflicting desires on issues that may result in an authoritative allocation of values”(Winter and Bellows, 1981).

However, while there is no best definition of politics, as advanced by many scholars while attempting to define the concept, most political scientists agree that politics has something to do with power, influence and authority, which are the central organizing concepts of the study of politics. Incidentally, these three central organizing concepts of politics - 'power', 'influence' and 'authority' are essentially, highly, and critically explored in any contemporary religion study.

Moreover, in any democratic society, where authority requires legitimacy, through popular participation, the process of election in choosing those who represent the people becomes highly imperative. Murana, Salahu and Ibrahim (2014), while shedding light on this, support Powell's position that elections are means of selecting those to represent the people in different public positions within the polity. Election provides citizens with influence over policy making (Powell Jr., 2000). This suggests that elections could be ratificatory in the sense that they may aim at giving a sitting government some appearances of popularity and mobilize the people for popular participation in development.

Under liberal democracy, elections play wider roles such as: instruments

of accountability, mobilization of the people, promotion of legitimacy, among other functions. Competitive political elections are vital to the survival of the liberal variant of democracy. This democratic method of arriving at acceptable political leaders is well expanded in Schumpeter's (1942) articulation of this arrangement as the Institutional arrangement for arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions. It is a method by which the individual acquires the power to participate in decisions by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes. It is instructive to note that, under liberal democracy, phrases like "competitive struggle" tends to be emphasized more than the consensual approach to politics. Thus, central to the survival of this democratic method is the imperative of playing by the rule of the game. It is the conformity with this stated imperative that allows for uninterrupted transfer of power from one administration to the other.

Once a sitting government knows that it can be voted out of power within the framework of periodic election, it strives to pursue the socio-economic and political interests of the electorates who may switch allegiance to opposition parties if such government fails to meet their expectations. Thus, the legitimacy that is "the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society" is seen as central to the survival of liberal democracy (Lipset, 1963). Although electoral outcomes in some instances could include the results of an election and other consequences that follows such election, but for the purpose of this study, electoral outcomes, according to the researcher, therefore, refers solely to the results of elections.

For the purpose of analysis, literature on religion and political practices is privileged over theories of governance and politics. These theories have, among other things, negatively served dishonest leaders in their manipulation of the ignorant and gullible masses in the name of religion (Jamiu, 2012). The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria, a work by Usman (1987), explains this theory, especially, from Marxist perspective. According to Jamiu (2012), Usman gives what one could describe as a socio-economic and political analysis through a hierarchical structure of the bourgeoisie, or what he terms as "local national", meaning agents of the international bourgeoisie. He presents some hypotheses which he observed some theorists used in explaining the manifestation of the manipulation of religion in Nigeria. These include the Nigerian character.

Derived from the scholar's analysis, it is clear that either as Muslims or Christians, politicians in Nigeria have tended to use their religious tenets to deceive the electorate in the name of serving the interests of the latter (Jamiu, 2012). As argued in his book, the manipulators cannot (as intermediary bourgeoisie) claim political leadership openly on the ground that any one of

them is or wants to be an exporter-importer, a contractor, commission-agent, shareholder or rich bureaucrat. Rather they have to take cover as Muslims or Christians, take posture as a 'majority or minority, take debates on issues like Shari'ah, for or against, depending on which side their electorates will admire and see them as serving their interests, while in the real sense of it the Muslim and Christian politicians serve their own ulterior motives and goals by playing the role of 'local nationals' (Usman, 1987).

### **Methodology**

Although this study relies heavily on secondary data sourced from the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, it however adopts a combination of both the quantitative and qualitative techniques in analyzing the outcomes of the 2015 presidential election. Also, a combination of quantitative and qualitative data was used in the course of our analysis.

Quantitative data were generated from the INEC data base and analyzed using simple percentage as the statistical instrument of analysis, while qualitative data for the purpose of this study were sourced from academic journals, academic textbooks, and newspapers' reports on the 2015 presidential election. For the purpose of this study, we are chiefly interested in the results of the two main political parties, PDP and APC, since it was a contest virtually between the two parties. Note that, out of the 28,587,564 total valid votes cast during the election, 28,278,083 votes were shared between these two parties, PDP and APC, while 309,481 votes were shared among the other twelve political parties.

### **Religion, Politics and Electoral Outcomes: Exploring the Nexus**

Nigerians of different orientations hold divergent views on whether Nigeria is a religious, secular or an ecumenical state. The individual opinions are based on the perspectives through which the country is assessed. In the first assumption, it is believed that since there is hardly anything done or embarked upon in Nigeria without directly or indirectly mentioning the name of God Almighty, the country should therefore, be considered as a religious or a multi-religious state. This religious nature of Nigeria therefore, may take the form of formal or informal acknowledgement of one religion or another: Islam, Christianity or African Traditional religion.

The second assumption contends that, the fact that no one specific religion is adopted as an official state religion in Nigeria, even though the country's constitution guarantees freedom of religion for the citizens, Nigeria remains a secular state. The third assumption is more of an intellectual

conviction. It holds the view that Nigeria is neither a secular nor a theocratic state. The argument here is that a secular state is where religion is not given any role to play in its affairs. However, contrary to all arguments, this school of thought believes that religion is a big factor in Nigerian politics. To it, Nigeria is an “ecumenical state where deals are made between the state and religious institutions involving power sharing without reducing these deals into law” (The Democrat; Friday, September 6, 1994).

Although, the political development under the banner of federalism, requires that the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion, individuals, groups or even government officials perform and function within the realm of religion in force, be it paganism, atheism, Christianity or Islam.(Jamiu, 2012). This is to say that the spirit of the constitution of Nigeria favours religion of any kind. What the constitution objects to is any attempt by either the federal or state government to adopt any religion as state religion.

However, in reality, what is obtainable in some states in Nigeria today is an unofficial adoption of either Christianity or Islam as state religion, to the extent that individuals in some states are denied certain political rights, just because they belong to the 'minority' religion. The situation is such that in a predominantly Muslim state, all is against the emergence of a Christian Governor. The situation is no different in a predominantly Christian state.

With this scenario and the constitution provision in mind, it will therefore be pertinent for us to take a look at some issues which could be considered as politicization of religion in Nigeria. Although there had been few cases of politicization of religion right from the introduction of colonial rules in the country, but this development did not fully manifest in Nigeria, until the time when the debate on the Draft Constitution triggered off controversy over issues of the demand for the inclusion of Shari'ah in the constitution by the Constituent Assembly between December 1976 and June 1978.

Notably, as observed by Jamiu (2012), neither the Jama'at Nasril Islam (JNI) nor the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), before then was conscious, or ready to express its awareness of any implication of government decision on its religious principle or practices. Within this period, some events started craving the indulgence of these religious organizations to rise to their feet and safeguard the interest of their religions politically. One of such outstanding events was a meeting between the Christian leaders and the federal government which took place in February, 1976 at the instance of the latter (Jamiu, 2012).

As recorded by Rev. Kukah from Rev. Aledeino, who said that “at the meeting, one member asked that the participants at least round off with a prayer, despite the fact that the meeting had not opened with a prayer.

Brigadier Yar'adua, the host, continued the account, said that since there were various denominations, he did not know who could be called upon to lead the prayer. Consequently, the worries from such observation by the government spontaneously precipitated the formation of a more nation-widely represented Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) from the already existing Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) and Northern Christian Association (NCA) with headquarters in Oyo and Kaduna respectively (Kukah, 1993).

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was in reality the coming together of Christians from the dealings with the government, as observed by Kukah (1993). It could be observed here that the formation of CAN in 1976 was the beginning of real politicization of religion in Nigeria, because there was also a spontaneous response from the Muslim side. It included re-activation of JNIs and Da'awah activities and Muslim Students Society (MSS) literary activities towards political awareness. The formation of the CAN and the re-activation of the JNI and the MSS, which came about as a result of their adherents' re-commitment to religious call to propagate their religions, set in motion all the subsequent events, simply referred to politicization of religion. The Muslim and Christian organizations started watching jealously one another's activities with suspicion; and more often than not with fear of one attempting to dominate the other through numerical strength or by occupying strategic positions in government, both at the federal and state levels (Jamiu, 2012).

Another issue was the establishment of Muslim and Christian pilgrim welfare boards at the state and federal levels for the followers of the two religions. The establishment of the Muslim Pilgrims Welfare Board dates as far as 1958 and 1959 when Western Region and the Northern Region established their own boards respectively. In response to that, the Christians in Nigeria demanded for what was termed "equal treatment and right" for the establishment of the pilgrims welfare boards for both Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The request was granted by the government and the Boards were established for both Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.

During the formation of political parties in the Second Republic, two major factors were paramount in deciding the nature of party officials' nation-wide; ethnic affiliation, geographical spread and religious inclination.

These factors were represented in who occupy which position in the party offices. In the light of this, when a Muslim presidential candidate comes from the North for a party, his Vice-President running-mate should be a Christian from the south. The same thing was applicable to the office of the Chairman and the Secretary of the five registered political parties in 1978, except in the UPN whose presidential candidate and party chairman was one and the same

person- Chief Obafemi Awolowo. His running-mate also a Christian came from the south, Anambra state, in person of Mr. Philip Umeadi. This strategy might not be unconnected with the failure of the UPN in the 1979 General Elections (Jamiu, 2012).

It should be noted that the situation is not different from what was obtainable during the just concluded 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria, with APC fielding General Muhamadu Buhari, a northern Muslim and Professor Yemi Osinbajo, a southern Christian as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates respectively. The same could be said of the PDP's presidential flag-bearers- Former President Goodluck Jonathan and Vice-president Namadi Sambo, who also rode on a "Christian-Muslim ticket".

It is worthy to note that the "Muslim-Christian ticket" or the "Christian-Muslim ticket" has always been the 'Electoral- talisman', when it comes to winning elections in Nigeria. As such, this type of political development does confirm the fact that the impact of religion on Nigerian politics, and by extension, on the outcomes of elections in the country appears and remains unquestionable.

### **The 2015 Presidential Election in Perspective**

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999 till 2015, the Peoples Democratic Party, (PDP), had always enjoyed overwhelming victories in elections, both at the state and national levels. Most of these victories were attributable to its membership size in relation to the other parties, national spread and the fact that the opposition parties had always been very weak in the arts of opposition politics.

The 2015 elections presented a serious challenge to the PDPs political hegemony over other political parties. This was partly due to the merger secured by the Action Congress of Nigeria, (ACN), led by Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu, the General Muhammadu Buhari-led CPC and other smaller political parties in the opposition then; and the crisis within the PDP, which eventually led to five PDP governors joining the party that was formed as a result of the above merger, the All Progressive Congress, APC.

Undoubtedly, the emergence of General Muhammadu Buhari as the winner of the APC presidential primary election sent a negative signal to the PDP's camp; and threw up rays of revolutionary hope, as witnessed in the ways and manners in which an average commoner in the country associated with the change mantra on which the APC eventually rode to power. In fact, with regards to the emergence of the APC presidential flag-bearer, The Nation Newspaper on Sunday, December 14th, 2014, in one of its columns had the following as its opener:

Given his landslide victory at the just concluded APC

presidential primary, General Muhammadu Buhari seems to be on the cusp of history once again. It is history steeped in and dripping with paradox. It has been said that thunder does not strike twice. But if the loud rumblings for change across the country and the sudden tectonic shift in favour of a sanitizing presidency are anything to go by, the Daura-born general has another rendezvous with history' (Alamu,2014, p.3).

The battle for Nigeria's presidency therefore became a two-man contest between the then incumbent, President Goodluck Jonathan, and his main rival, Muhammadu Buhari. It was indeed the closest election since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Nigeria's Presidential and National Assembly elections took place on 28 March. The election was postponed from the original date of 14 February to allow the military to launch an operation against the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of the country. Notwithstanding rumours of another last-minute postponement or challenges to the legality of General Buhari's eligibility, the election was a test of the use of new technology by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In an attempt to combat the fraud that had plagued previous elections in the country, INEC had to produce permanent voter cards for the Nigeria's 68 million registered voters which were expected to match their personal details to a biometric register. However, there were widespread concerns that the system, though sound in theory, may fail in practice.

There were serious insinuations that the card-readers would not work and that even if the accreditation and voting processes were smooth, the process would still be vulnerable at the point of collation. Some even believed that, even in the event of a free and fair election, the period was likely to trigger some level of violence, as inflammatory language coming from supporters of the two main parties could only make the mood more toxic. It was so unfortunate, the election revealed that the political elite class in Nigeria lacks what was required in terms of political skills, hence the engagement of mindless campaign by the two main political parties, deploying every political and religious antics in running down political opponents. In relation to the mindless campaigns, there was a piece in *The Nation Newspaper* on Sunday, December 14th, 2014, p.14, which warned the political elite class that:

Citizens are more likely to want to hear from all the candidates how each of them plans to address the real issue: corruption, security, an economy that appears to have been degraded by the diminishing value of petroleum, an education

and health sector in shambles, a polity being broken into two by the diversionary tactics of Christian and Islamic fanatics besotted to political power at all cost (Sekoni, 2014, p. 14).

Also, there were serious allegation and counter-allegations, on the part of the two main parties over plots to use religion for votes hauling. There were allegations that some pastors collected six billion naira on behalf of CAN to campaign against the APC candidate, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, during church services. There was also counter- allegation that billions of naira were made available to Islamic clergies to preach in mosques against the emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the 2015 presidential election.

However, amidst all these fear and endless, mindless campaigns, INEC was able to conduct the election with a reasonable mark of success, the outcomes accepted by the political parties, the civil society, domestic and international observers, and adjudged as the best election that had ever been conducted in the country. It is important to note that there were large number of defections between the two main political parties, the PDP and APC. It is equally important to note that the new technology, the introduction of card reader reduced the rate of electoral fraud to the barest minimum. This, interestingly, placed the opposition party almost on equal pedestal with the then ruling People's Democratic Party, and by extension, the eventual victory of the opposition party, APC. The election was certainly historic, as the continent's most populous country moved from democratic transition to consolidation with a truly open contest that ushered in a new government formed by the opposition party, APC. Indeed, it was a marked departure from what was an intra-party transition, to inter-party transition of administrations in Nigeria.

### **Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion**

To avoid analysis paralysis, it is important we present the 2015 presidential election results as released by INEC, tabulating these results according to each Geo-political zone for easy analysis. As such, each state's results shall be placed under their respective geo-political zones. It is equally important to note that, for the purpose of this study, we are chiefly interested in the results of the two main political parties, PDP and APC, since it was virtually a contest between the two parties. Although, fourteen political parties participated in the election, but it is interesting to note that out of 28,587,564 valid votes cast during the election, 28,278,083 votes were shared between these two parties, PDP and APC, while 309,481 votes were shared among the other twelve political parties. Below is a table containing the 2015

Presidential Election's results generated from the Independent National Electoral Commission's database.

**Table 1: 2015 Presidential Election Results of the Two Main Political Parties, PDP and APC**

S/ N	GEO- POLITICAL ZONE	STATE	APC	% OF VOTES CAST(A PC)	PDP	% OF VOTES CASTP DP	TOTAL VOTES CAST
1	North-West	Kano	1,903,999	88%	215,779	10%	2,172,447
2	..	Kaduna	1,127,760	68%	484,085	29%	1,650,201
3	..	Katsina	1,345,441	91%	98,937	7%	1,481,714
4	..	Kebbi	567,833	79%	100,972	14%	715,122
5	..	Jigawa	885,988	83%	142,904	13%	1,071,889
6	..	Sokoto	671,926	77%	152,199	17%	876,369
7	..	Zamfara	612,202	78%	144,833	19%	780,179
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>7,115,149</b>		<b>1,339,709</b>		<b>8,747,921</b>
8	North-East	Bauchi	931,598	90%	86,085	8%	1,039,775
9	..	Yobe	446,265	91%	25,526	5%	491,767
10	..	Gombe	361,245	76%	96,873	20%	473,444
11	..	Adamawa	374,701	57%	251,664	38%	661,210
12	..	Taraba	261,326	43%	310,800	52%	602,716
13	..	Borno	473,543	92%	25,640	5%	515,008
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>2,848,678</b>		<b>796,588</b>		<b>3,783,920</b>
14	North-Central	Benue	373,961	53%	303,737	43%	703,131
15	..	Kogi	264,851	60%	149,987	34%	439,287
16	..	Kwara	302,146	65%	132,602	29%	461,401
17	..	Niger	657,678	78%	149,222	18%	844,683
18	..	Plateau	429,140	43%	549,615	55%	1,000,692
19	..	Nasarawa	236,838	45%	273,460	51%	532,641
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>2,264,614</b>		<b>1,558,623</b>		<b>3,981,835</b>
20	South-West	Lagos	792,460	53%	632,327	42%	1,495,975
21	..	Oyo	528,620	57%	303,376	33%	928,606
22	..	Osun	383,603	58%	249,929	38%	663,373
23	..	Ondo	299,889	51%	251,368	43%	582,435
24	..	Ekiti	120,331	39%	176,466	57%	309,445
25	..	Ogun	308,290	55%	207,950	37%	559,613
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>2,433,193</b>		<b>1,821,416</b>		<b>4,539,447</b>
26	South-East	Imo	133,253	18%	559,185	76%	731,921
27	..	Enugu	14,157	2%	553,003	94%	585,632
28	..	Anambra	17,926	3%	660,762	94%	703,409
29	..	Ebonyi	19,518	5%	323,658	82%	393,337
30	..	Abia	13,394	3%	368,303	92%	401,049
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>198,248</b>		<b>2,464,911</b>		<b>2,815,348</b>

31	South-South	Akwa Ibom	58,411	6%	953,304	93%	1,028,551
32	..	Bayelsa	5,194	1%	361,209	97%	371,739
33	..	Rivers	69,238	4%	1,487,075	94%	1,584,768
34	..	Cross Rivers	28,368	6%	414,863	89%	465,906
35	..	Edo	208,469	40%	286,869	55%	522,785
36	..	Delta	48,910	4%	1,211,405	94%	1,284,848
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>418,590</b>		<b>4,714,725</b>		<b>5,258,597</b>
37	FCT	FCT	146,399	46%	157,195	50%	316,015
<b>Sub-total( votes)</b>			<b>146,399</b>		<b>157,195</b>		<b>316,015</b>
<b>Total (validvotes)</b>			<b>15,424,921</b>		<b>12,853,162</b>		<b>28,587,564</b>

Source: Generated from the INEC database by the researcher.

In addition to the above presented data, it is also critically important to run a brief description of the distribution of religion in the country with regards to the six-geopolitical zones before proceeding to the analysis of the quantitative data. Note that Nigeria is nearly equally divided between Christianity and Islam. The majority of Nigerian Muslims are concentrated in the northern area of the country, while Christians dominate in the south.

Muslims form a slight majority of the nation, comprising 50.8% of the population, while Christians make up 47.9%. According to the 2001 CIA Factbook and other sources 50% of the population is Muslim, 40% Christian and 10% follows traditional beliefs. But in some recent reports, the Christian population is now slightly larger than the Muslim population. An 18 December 2012 report on religion and public life by the Pew Research Center stated that in 2010, 49.3 percent of Nigeria's population was Christian, 48.8 percent was Muslim, and 1.9 percent were followers of indigenous and other religions, or unaffiliated (Pew, 2012).

However, whichever report we choose to adopt, one thing is clear, most of these reports agree in clear terms, on some qualitative descriptions as regards religion distribution with reference to each geo-political zone. This is represented below in table 2 as follows:

**Table 2: Religion Distribution of the Six Geo-political Zones**

S/N	GEO-POLITICAL ZONE	NUMBER OF STATE	DESCRIPTION OF RELIGION DISTRIBUTION
1	North-West	7	Predominantly Muslim (Some communities in Kaduna state have Christian majorities)
2	North-East	6	Predominantly Muslim (In Taraba state, Christians holds a slight majority)

3	North-Central	6	Almost equal mix of Christians and Muslims (none of the two predominates)
4	South-West	6	Almost equal mix of Christians and Muslims (none of the two predominates)
5	South-East	5	Predominantly Christian (Muslims are insignificantly few in this region)
6	South-South	6	Predominantly Christian (Edo has a number of communities with Muslim majorities)

Source: Derived from PEW's 2011, PRB's 2005 Survey Reports and the Researcher's field study.

\*Note that there are more Christians in the North-West and North-East than there are Muslims in the South-East and South-South geo-political zones.

From Table 1, it is clear that the 2015 Presidential election was a tight contest between APC and PDP. Out of the 29,432,083 total votes cast during the election, 28,587,564 were valid votes, while 844,519 votes were rejected. Note that out of the 28,587,564 valid votes, 28,278,083 were shared between the two political parties, leaving just 309,481 to be shared among the other 12 political parties. APC had 15,424,921, while PDP had 12,853,162 votes. Although, for every contest, there must be a winner, however this study is not really interested in which party wins or loses in the election. The main trust of our analysis is to show how each of the two candidates performs in terms of electoral outcomes in each geo-political zones, juxtaposing the outcomes with the religion distribution pattern of each of these geo-political zones.

As shown in Table 2, the North-West geo-political zone is made up of seven states, all predominantly Muslim states. Table 1 also shows that this same geo-political zone, which is predominantly a Muslim region, recorded a total of 8,747,921 votes out of the overall total valid votes cast in the country, which stands at 28,587,564. It is interesting to note that out of the 8,747,921 votes in the region, APC's candidate, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, polled a whopping 7,115,149 votes as against the PDP's candidate, former President Good luck Jonathan, a Christian, managed to poll just 1,339,709 votes across the seven states that made up the North-West geo-political zone.

The situation was not too different in the North-East with the exception of Taraba state, where PDP won with 310,800 votes as against APC's 261,326 votes. It should be noted that the slight victory had by PDP in the state could be attributed to the fact that the Christians are on a slight majority in the state.

The above presented data suggests that in the two predominantly Muslim geo-political zones in the country, the North-West and North-East, the APC's Muslim candidate polled 9,963,827 votes, 79.5% of the total vote cast in the two geo-political zones; while the PDP's candidate, a Christian managed to

poll just 2,136,297 votes, 17% of the votes from the two regions.

On the contrary, the reverse is the case, looking at the data recorded in terms of INEC results in the same election from the South-South and the South-East zones. Table 1 reveals that in all the five states that make-up the South-East, there was no state where the APC candidate, a Muslim, scored above 18% of the total votes cast in the state. In fact it was only in Imo state that the APC's candidate had 18%. In the other four states, the party polled between 2% and 5%. Going into the South-South, a predominantly Christian region, PDP's candidate, a Christian, polled an overwhelming 4,714,725 votes, 90%; while APC's candidate, a Muslim, polled 418,590 votes, 8% of a total 5,258,597 votes cast in the region. It is evidently clear from table 1 that, it is only in Edo state within this region, that APC gave a good fight. Though, PDP got 55% of the votes, APC was able to poll 40% of the votes. This could also be attributed to the fact that Edo state has a number of communities that are predominantly Muslim communities.

Data from the two geo-political zones, South-South and South-East reveals that about 56% of the PDP total votes (12,853,162) come from these two predominantly Christian regions. In a similar vein, the APC's candidate, a Muslim, got 65% of his total votes of 15,424,921 votes from the North-West and North-East, the two predominantly Muslim regions in the country. It is equally interesting to note that the battle ground in terms of contest between the two political parties were the North-Central, the South-West and the Federal Capital Territory, FCT. In all of these regions and territory, there were no landslide victories, which could be attributed to the almost equal mix of Christians and Muslims in terms of distribution, as presented in table 2. It is clear that no single religion, according to the information on the table, predominates in these two regions and the FCT, hence the slight victories witnessed by the two parties in these regions.

It is also clear from the above analysis that certain revelations were made, which seemingly appear uncontroverted. In the first instance, premised on our analysis, it becomes clearer that the Christian candidate of the PDP got 56% of his total votes from just two out of 6 geo-political zones in the country. Incidentally, these zones are the only two predominantly Christian regions in the country, South-South and South-East. The same candidate got just about 16% of his total votes from the North-West and the North-East combined.

This, we know are predominantly Muslim regions. Similarly, from our analysis, the APC candidate, a Muslim, got about 65% of his total votes from just two geo-political zones, North-West and North-East, which incidentally are the two predominantly Muslim regions in the country.

In the course of our analysis, it was noted that those geo-political zones, where there was stiff contest between the two major political parties, PDP and

APC, are those geo-political zones where we have almost an equal mix of Christians and Muslims, the South-West and North-Central.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

According to our analysis, based on the electoral outcomes as presented in our data, it is evidently clear that the 2015 Presidential election presents another case of “Religion in Politics” in Nigeria. This paper in clear terms, based on the outcome of our analysis, has been able to establish and affirms that voters in predominantly Christian regions voted more for a Christian candidate, while voters in predominantly Muslim geo-political zones voted more for a Muslim candidate. On these notes and in the final analysis, this paper therefore concludes that more than ever before and more than any other factor, religion to a large extent determines 'who gets what, when and how' and by extension varies the outcomes of elections in Nigeria.

Although, constitutionally, Nigeria remains a secular state, but in the real sense of it, Nigeria is a multi- religion state. For the nation to witness any meaningful development, this paper recommends that we need to, as a people allow our democracy, grow far above religion among other diversities plaguing Nigeria as a state. The role of Nigeria as a secular state has been severely compromised, as such; it should be redesigned without the current religious overtones and practice true secularism as entrenched in our constitution.

The paper equally recommends that there is the need for mass re-orientation of the citizen to eschew religious bigotry. There is the need for the government to strengthen the National Orientation Agency, NOA, Federal and States' Ministries of Information; and fund relevant Civil Society Organizations in other to achieve this goal. This effort can be reinforced by encouraging frequent collaborative efforts among adherents of the two prominent religions, Islam and Christianity, especially in areas of nation-building.

And finally, legal sanctions should be introduced within our legal framework against any individuals or groups that promote 'Religion in Politics'. This would serve as a deterrent to those religion bigots, who pre occupies themselves with promoting religious-laden 'hate statements' especially in critical political periods, such as in election campaign periods. In fact, this paper suggests a jail sentence, with no option of fine. These will in no small measure drive the nation close to the secular status as entrenched in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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# **The “Almajiri Syndrome”, Burden of Poverty and Human Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria**

Olatunji E. Alao

## **Abstract**

Poverty is a concept synonymous with lack and deprivation. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 47.8 per cent of the world population of the poor. The situation had been made worse since the global economic crisis began in 2008. It was projected that poverty rates would be slightly higher between 2015 and 2020 if the situation remained unabated. Against the backdrop of the living conditions of its citizens, Nigeria was rated the 13th poorest country by the UNDP in 1995. Northern Nigeria has been worst hit by poverty, giving rise to the “talakawa” or class of the poor, predominantly among the dominant Hausa-Fulani people. The talakawa has its expression in the Almajiri (social miscreants) who in order to survive their impoverished condition have turned from street-beggars to agents of perpetuating evil and constituting a security threat in the region. The paradigm of this social phenomenon could be best explained by the Marxian Theory of political economy. Having examined the Almajiri System of Education as a solution to this menace, the study concluded that far beyond this, the government needs to adopt a more pragmatic approach toward meeting the UN global goal of reducing poverty rate by half by 2020.

## **Introduction**

Poverty is defined simply as “the condition or quality of being poor;

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unproductiveness, deficiency or inadequate supply of something”.

(Nnamani, 2006:29) But considering the centrality of poverty to development and human security questions, its meaning may have a much wider meaning than the above definition. It may refer to “a state of both material and non-material deprivation”.(Olayemi,2009). Viewed from a wider dimension, poverty may go beyond the lack of basic necessities of life, it may include lack of knowledge and skill that can enable participation in different aspects of communal life. (Kalu, 2003). Poverty can also be defined as a situation when people are unable to satisfy their basic needs of food, clothing, shelter and health. (Yapa,1996). It is also “a combination of the lack of material things, knowledge, skill, dignity, sense of well-being, political voice and the social support system or family” (Kalu, 2003:428) In view of the multifaceted concept of poverty, it can be simply defined as the lack of the basic necessities of life and absence of social support from the family.

Despite the multi-dimensional approach to the concept of poverty, one common theme is the “lack of command resources to meet with essential needs”. (Fajingbesi and Uga,2009)

The perception of poverty varies from one clime to the other and according to culture, population and subgroups such as a region of residence or sector of employment. (Dike,2009) Hence, the African perception of poverty for instance, vary from that of the Europeans or North Americans.

This notion has given rise to class system in different societies. In Northern Nigeria, especially among the Hausa/Fulani ethnic infusion, the class of the poor otherwise called “talakawa” has its expression in the Almajirai (social miscreants), Kutare (lepers), Gurugu (cripples) and Mahaukata (mentally ill). Of all these groups, the most vicious is the Almajirai. This class of the impoverished or talakawa not only constitute menace but security threat in Northern Nigeria. According to Dike (2009), people in a subgroup such as the talakawa are classified as poor if their consumption expenditure is below a specific poverty line for the subgroup.

The Northern Nigeria is a geopolitical entity created in 1906 as a Protectorate after the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate and other African kingdoms by the British. These conquests had led to the convergence of over 250 ethnic groups in the region north of Rivers Niger and Benue.(Falola & Hearton, 2008) This represents nearly 60 per cent of the peoples in Nigeria. (Falola, & Hearton, 2008) The Hausa-Fulani constitutes 40 per cent of the region's ethnic composition. Among the less prominent groups are the Kanuri, Nupe, Tiv, Igala, Idoma, etc. The region consists of over 75percent of the total land area of the entire country. (Ezera, 1964) Despite the British amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of January 1, 1914, the region still maintained its distinct conservative identity.

The criteria for poverty by the World Bank standard is the ability to afford the minimum costs of food and other necessities. In 1988, the World Bank estimated the total population of the poor as 1,133million or 29.7percent of the total population in developing countries (World Bank Report,1992).

According to the estimate, 47.8 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa were poor. It is widely believed that such poverty reflects economic underdevelopment of nations whose poorly developed production forces such as land, capital, and labour have hampered economic growth. To worsen the situation, the global economic crisis that began in 2008 has accentuated the poverty line especially in the developing parts of the world. Recent updated estimates from World Bank suggest that the crisis would leave an additional 50million people in extreme poverty in 2009 and some 64million by the end of 2010 principally in sub-Saharan and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia. Moreover, the effects of the crisis are likely to persist in these regions. It is projected that poverty rates will be slightly higher in 2015 and even beyond, to 2020, than they would have been had the world economy grown steadily at its pre-crisis pace.(UN MDG, 2010:7)

The objective of this study is to (a) to analyze the causes of poverty, the role of the poor in aggravating this phenomenon, (b) evaluate human security challenges in Nigeria, (c) examine the nexus between Almajirai and human security challenges, and (d) the security implication to the region in particular and Nigeria in general.

### **Definition of key terms**

#### **Northern Nigeria**

Northern Nigeria is a term used in this study to refer to the geo-political entity that constitute the present seventeen states that shared a common political experience otherwise called “Northern Region” under the British colonial rule. They include Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Bornu, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara., The region like other geo-political regions in the country have undergone series of political restructuring from five states in 1967 to the present seventeen since 1996.

**Poverty alleviation:** Poverty alleviation refers to measures embarked upon in most cases by the government to reduce poverty through improved living standards, reduction in the level of unemployment, increased productivity and more even distribution of income. In Nigeria, poverty alleviation which is predicated on improved standard of living of its people has always been the goal of the government's economic planning since independence. (Fajingbesi and Uga, 2010) Approach to poverty alleviation is

multi-dimensional. However, generally, they can be grouped into those that focus on rapid economic growth as a strategy for alleviating poverty, those that focus more broadly on the basic needs of the poor, and those that focus on rural development as the appropriate strategy. (Olayemi,2010)

**Security:** The term national security in this study refers to ways and manners by which lives and property of the citizens of a nation or state is secured against both internal and external aggression in order to uphold human dignity. The military and other security agencies have been saddled with the responsibility to ensure that the country is secured against such internal and external aggressions. Security can also be associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values, especially the survival of individuals, groups or objects in the near future (Nwagboso, 2012). Bringing this to bear on the security of a nation, a broader perspective to the definition of security constitute both the security of the local system of a country as well as the preservation of the social web as it is, and the existence of a civil society.

**Street begging:** The term refers to the practice common among the Hausa/Fulani ethnic infusion in which the downtrodden poor/destitute or those categorized as talakawa engage in open solicitation for assistance which centred on money, food and/or clothing, from anonymous wayfarers by way of pleas, deceit, or exposure of deformities. (Adewuyi, 2007)

**Syndrome:** Syndrome in this study refers to a type of behaviour that is typical of a particular kind of problem. The Oxford dictionary meaning of syndrome may also mean medical illness which consists of a set of physical or mental problems often used in the name of illness. Considered from both perspectives, the menace of almajiri in the northern part of Nigeria has turned into an ailment that needs to be cured.

### **Theoretical Framework**

For the conceptual understanding of poverty, this study adopts the political economy approach which views political phenomena from the context of the socio-economic system in which they take place. This theory is predicated on the radical (Marxist) approach. (Onah,2010) The central theme of radical Marxist political economy is economic determinism, implying that societies are founded upon their economies otherwise called the substructure. The substructure then determines the nature of other social elements. To Marx, it is the material existence of an individual that determines his/her consciousness. In other words, Marxian argument of dialectical materialism gives premium to the material existence and production of the society,

especially the role of the economy in the study of the society (Anifowose & Enemu, 1999:44) As Onah aptly put it, politics is a function of the character of the ruling class as well as the nature of the struggle in which it is engaged with other classes. The nature of this struggle is determined by two conditions- the objective and the subjective conditions. The objective condition refers to the physical conditions of living in a state. It is usually the reflection of the capacity of the ruling class to administer the state. The subjective condition refers to the psychological disposition of the people towards their conditions of living. When the physical conditions became intolerable and the people are mentally disposed to challenge the situation of their life, then the condition is right for overthrow of the ruling class by the subjugated classes. (Onah, 2010:72)

The Marxist political economy theory can be related to the concept of poverty in Northern Nigeria. The primordial economic principles of Northern Nigeria especially among the Hausa/Fulani is capitalist oriented. This has given rise to a class system in which the society recognizes the institution of the rich and privileged class as well as the talakawa or the downtrodden masses. Thus in the Marxian theory, as long as the economy is dominated by the tiny bourgeois class who have not turned their wealth into productive purposes that can be beneficial to the generality of the people, the society is bound to produce a large class of the poor that has its expression in the talakawa. The subjective condition of the talakawa has elicited a class struggle with the almajiri at the vanguard of this struggle. That the almajirai are easily lured into criminal activities is not only for survival but as a reaction to their impoverished life.

The Marxian political economy has been criticized on different grounds. The constant class struggle between the rich and the poor is more ideal than practical. His revolutionary appeal is considered as an illusion where some cultures like that of the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria recognize and support social class system.

### **General causes of poverty**

The causes of poverty are varied and as Afonja and Ogwumike (2009) observe, it is difficult to determine which of these forces are causes and which are effects. This is because the forces that cause poverty in a certain situation may just be a manifestation of it or an aggravation of an already inherent poverty.

Factors that generate and sustain poverty are mostly economic-based, and mostly related to unemployment and underemployment. (Omale & Molem, 2009) These are within two broad groupings. (i) Those that can be attributed to the level and rate of economic growth and the distribution of

national income, and (ii) those that arise from market imperfections in all its ramifications. (Afonja & Ogwumike, 2009) Factors in the first group can be summarized as follows; low national savings and investment; subsistence based production; static technology; limited infrastructure, especially for human capital development; unchecked population growth and unequal distribution of wealth and other productive assets. Factors in the second group include; resources misallocation; factor immobility; certain cultural practices; institutional rigidities; government policies; environmental degradation; and attitudes.

Poverty can also be caused by discrimination. In multi-racial societies like the USA, racial and gender discrimination is very prevalent. In Northern Nigeria, where there is no discrimination, ethnicity and gender factors have similar effects. Certain jobs are reserved for the indigenes and women are dissuaded from doing certain jobs due to religious and cultural factors. (Omale & Molem, 2009) In a society like Nigeria where high premium is attached to certificate qualification, lack of Western education has led to underemployment where a large number of the population are engaged in petty trading businesses such as hawking with very little profit margin that can hardly sustain their livelihood.

### **The origin and practice of Almajiri System**

“Almajiri” is a Kanuri word that stands for migrant learners of the Quran. The idea of almajiri can be traced to the eleventh century under the leadership of the Kanem-Borno rulers (Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013). This system of Quranic literacy gradually spread to Hausaland after the jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century. It became generally known as Makaranta alo (Adewuyi, 2007) The system was aimed at training future scholars for the propagation of Islam and usually refers to a person who leaves the comfort of his home to other places or to seek a learned Islamic scholar in the quest for Islamic knowledge. It is a reflection of the Islamic concept of migration which is widely practiced especially when the acquisition of knowledge at home is either inconvenient or insufficient. (Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013). The idea of migrating to seek the knowledge of the Quran was likened to searching for precious stone. Imam Shafil, the chief proponent of this system of Islamic education considered it most beneficial in five different ways to the student in the sense that he acquires knowledge, good manners that relieves him from sorrow, guarantees his livelihood and friendship with the famous scholars of the day. (Danbuzu 2012 cited in Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013:74).

At the pre-colonial era, the system was such that pupils lived with their parents for moral upbringing while they acquire Islamic education from

schools located within or around their immediate environment. According to Abdulqadir (2013), these schools were maintained by the state, communities, and parents and were supplemented by teachers and pupils through farming, fishing, well construction, masonry, productive trades, tailoring, and small businesses. Since Islam encourages charity to wayfarers and to students, the communities often supported these almajirai most of whom came from faraway places to enroll in the schools. The almajirai in return offered services such as laundry, cobbling, gardening, weaving, and sewing to the community that contributed to their well-being. Almajiri teachers and their pupils were reported to have freely provided their community with Islamic education in addition to the development of Ajami (reading and writing of Hausa language using Arabic alphabets). Based on this system, which is founded upon the teaching of Quran and Hadith, the people of the pre-colonial states and kingdoms of what became Northern Nigeria were educated in a complete way of life, including governance, customs, traditional crafts, trades and even modes of dressing (Abdulqadir, cited in Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013:74).

Abdulqadir further observe that, the almajiri system was undermined by the British invasion and colonization of Northern Nigerian by 1906. The erstwhile Hausa states were conquered by the British and subjected to a new system of administration. Ironically, the advent of British colonial rule constituted a big dilemma for Northern Nigeria both in terms of Islamic system of education and the Western-style education. Because of the comparative success of the British colonial system of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria, the British colonial administrators did not want to distort the traditional political structure. Hence, they subtly defended Islam against the spread of Christianity which was also a veritable agent of Western education from the south. Dambuzu (2012) pointed out that the British were not totally disposed to Islamic system of education, hence, they withdrew state funding of almajiri schools thereby compelling the emirs to lose fundamental control of almajiri system and it collapsed. The disregard for the almajiri system in favour of western education ignited animosity and antagonism from the northern Muslim community, particularly the mallams (teachers), and the pupils. There was much fear that western education, which is of Christian-European origin, would mean graduates losing their Islamic identity and embracing anti-social behaviours that negated the values and principles of Islam. Overwhelmed with the burden of caring for the almajiri, the mallams had to send them out to beg and even charged weekly fees for the lessons the pupils received. They were thus made to fend for themselves by begging for alms. Today, they roam about dirty, tattered, barefooted, pale, with flies pecking at their cracked lips and dry faces, which are filled with

rashes or ringworm. They sleep on worn out mats in uncompleted buildings. As many as fifteen can be found sleeping in one small room where there are no windows for cross-ventilation and the walls are so cracked they look as though they might cave in (Dambuzu 2012).

Adewuyi (2007) in a special study on street-begging, alludes that the enrolment of pupils and the choice of schools are based on class considerations. A Mallam, based on his influence and personal integrity in the Muslim community is usually entrusted with the education of children especially those of the privileged class. In addition, the popularity of the mallam is dependent on his piety and vast knowledge of the Quran. Moreover, his personal relationship with parents and non-partisanship are major determinants for enrolment in his school otherwise called Makaranta Alo. Pupils of these informal Quranic schools are called Almajirai (plural of almajiri). With the exception of young girls and old women, street-begging is exclusively male affair. Because of early marriage, teenage girls and adolescents are virtually shut of public interaction. To the average Muslim, the character training of the child is better attained in Quranic school than under the Western-style education. The mallam alleged that Western education had done a lot of untold “damage to the value system of the nation” because it has “eroded the fear of God and reduced human relationships”

(Adewuyi,2007: 449). The aversion to Western education by Islamic scholars can therefore be understood against the backdrop of these allegations. Consequently, this situation has made Islamic system of education and Western-style education to stand as two contending forces in the Nigerian educational system.

The Mallams (teachers) depend on the proceeds from alms collected by their pupils, giving credence to alms-begging and appropriateness of living on alms as he evolves from childhood to adulthood.(Adewuyi, 2007:453) It is a norm because the mallam himself had played the same role as a pupil.

Adewuyi further observes that the exposure of these young and inexperienced children to free money and food as well as the harsh condition of city life presents to a child an overpowering temptation and subjects him to different societal vices. In most situations, the need for survival may compel an almajiri to run away from school and relocate to nearby town or city. Indulging in nefarious activities for survival makes almajirai to be tagged as miscreants. This development has given rise to an overbearing social problem in Northern Nigeria which goes calls for government intervention.

This may explain why environmentalists like, Gray and Moseley (2005) relate poverty with environmental degradation. They share the view of Thomas Malthus that the poor can be compelled to engage in “environmentally deleterious behaviour because they are incapable of

thinking beyond the next meal”

Once on the street, survival becomes difficult. Some have become victims of violence, while others have suffered via abduction, disease and hunger. Those who are unable to escape the street, resort to menial jobs like wheelbarrow pushing, touting and so on. They remain an untrained army available to anybody poised to forment trouble. Abdulqadir (2013) contends that there is today a conspiracy of silence between parents, authorities and society at large. For the parents, he says, this system provides an outlet for the excess of children at home. For the authorities, it is a relief to not have to budget for the education and welfare of approximately seven million almajiri scholars. Despite the ignorance or disinterest of most citizens, the Almajiri system in recent years has become a fertile ground for radicalizing children for misguided missions and hence a detriment to the country, its security and its image.

The emergence of the Almajiri system is therefore one of the effects of poverty and underdevelopment in Northern part of the country. According to Danjibo (2009), these social miscreants get involved and even perpetrate violence, including religious and sectarian, for a token. He posits that “the youths that are mostly engaged in acts of violence or serve as an army of this sectarian violence are the first victims of bad governance and acute corruption”. (Danjibo, 2009:16)

### **Concept of Poverty in Northern Nigeria**

Nigeria, a prominent state in the sub-Saharan Africa is paradoxically rich and poor. Rich in the sense that it is the tenth largest world producer of crude oil. Besides, she is endowed with human and material resources that can place her a par with the rich nations of the world. Ironically, for many factors that are addressed in this study, the country is classified among the poorest nations of the world. Comparatively, the Northern Nigeria has the highest poverty record and the least developed part of the country. This high poverty figure has elicited human security challenges in the region. The concept of poverty in Northern Nigeria has ecological, primordial and religious dimensions.

**The Ecological Dimension:** The ecosystem of the region does not favour it economically. Unlike the Southern Nigeria with ports and long coastline ideal for variety of economic activities, the north is landlocked with no means of generating income from import and export duties. Ezera (1964) projected this point as a major reason for the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914. He posits that, it was a great economic success for the south where import duties provided more than enough

revenue to cover the cost of the British colonial administration. Besides, the south is endowed with commercial and export crops such as cocoa, palm oil, rubber, etc. It also generated heavy income on tax from importation and sale of liquor. The North had no tax revenue from liquor, since the sale of the latter was forbidden because of its strong Muslim predominance. So, in all its ramifications the situation in North was entirely different from the South. The North relied solely on income derived from direct taxation which itself was not sufficient to meet administrative costs. The bottom-line is that the regional ecosystem does not favour broad-base economic activities that could create wealth for the people or generate income for the government.

**Primordial Perception:** There is also the primordial perception of predestination that gives credence to social inequality among the people, especially among the predominant Hausa-Fulani. It is believed that every individual had chosen either to be rich or poor before his creation. Having made the choice, there is nothing an individual can do to reverse it on earth. (Adewuyi, 2007) The talakawa assume or are seen as those destined to be poor. The only means of survival is to look up to the rich and the privileged for support. This perception explains the reason for the army of destitute that flood the streets of Northern Nigeria for alms. Comparatively, other ethnic groups, especially in the south, such as the Yoruba and Igbo, consider alms-begging to be degrading not only to the beggar but also to his larger family. Hence, street begging is considered as a social stigma.

**Religious Dimension:** The religious dimension has its expression in the disposition of Islam to poverty. Islam is the most popular religion among the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group. The two basic concepts that relate to poverty are the Zakat and Sadaqat. Islam makes it obligatory on every Muslim to pay a certain “tax”, called Zakat on their accumulated wealth. One of the principles of Islam is that all things belongs to Allah and that wealth is therefore held by human beings in trust. Such wealth is purified by setting aside a proportion for those in need, and like pruning of plants, this cutting back of wealth, encourages new growth in Muslim wealth. The payment of zakat is not uniform. The percentage of zakat depends on the type of wealth. Whereas agricultural products including animals attracts zakat that ranges from 5% to 10%, monetary wealth attracts 2.5%. The proceeds of the zakat is distributed honestly to the deserving or down-trodden masses. By so doing, indigent Muslims will be saved from extreme poverty and hunger as witnessed in many societies today. (Al-Islam.com) Allah said;

“so he who gives (in charity) and fears (Allah) and (in all sincerity) testifies to the best, we will indeed make smooth for

him the path to Bliss. But he who is greedy miser and thinks himself self-sufficient and gives not the best, we will indeed make smooth for him the path to misery; Nor will his wealth profit him when he falls headlong(into hell fire)” (Holy Quran, chapter 92 verses 5-11)

Recipients of zakat, depending on need, include the destitute, the poor, the indebted, the stranded travellers, to secure freedom of slaves, new Muslims, in the path of Allah, and zakat workers. Basically, the principle of the zakat is to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor or between the haves and have-nots. And by so doing, “it draws Allah's blessings; causes increase in wealth and replacement of spent wealth as promised in the Quran”(Contact Pakistan.com)

The second Islamic principle of aiding the poor is the sadaqah. Sadaqah can be defined as voluntary or charitable giving in Islam as a proof of one's eeman (faith), designed to eliminate the spiritual malady of miserliness. (uwt.org). The more the Muslim gives sadaqah the more his eeman increases and the believer should expect Allah's rewards both in this world and in the life hereafter. The principle of giving charity out of the believer's wealth does not decrease his wealth but instead Allah increases it (Ghazali, 2013) “Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity: for He loves not creatures ungrateful and sinner.” (Qur'an, 2: 276)

### **Challenges of Poverty in Northern Nigeria**

One common feature associated with poverty in Northern Nigeria, be it among the almajirai (social miscreants), gurugu (cripples), kutare (lepers), makauta (mentally ill), makafo (the blind), etc, is street begging. This development has given rise to an overbearing social problem in Northern Nigeria. This may explain why environmentalists like, Gray and Moseley (2005) relate poverty with environmental degradation. They share the view of Thomas Malthus that the poor can be expected to engage in “environmentally deleterious behaviour because they are incapable of thinking beyond the next meal”. The common mantra that, “a hungry man is an angry man” holds much substance in the growing insecurity and other social challenges in Northern Nigeria since the last few years.

**Human Security Challenges:** Human security can be defined as the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. It also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of

fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential. (African Union Summit, 2004). Viewed from the qualitative and quantitative perspectives (Thomas and Wilkin, 1999), human security is about protecting and empowering citizens to obtain vital freedom from want, fear and hunger, as well as freedom to take action on one's own behalf including, among other things, creating the building blocks of human flourishing, peace with dignity and a secure livelihood. (Salih, 2008) The almajiri system does not expose the almajirai to their full human potentials and capability other than to survive the day. Hence, the system reduces the ability to develop intellectual and skilled manpower in the region.

Hussein et al (2004:8) allude that “human security is a critical component of the global political and development agenda”. Against this backdrop, they also observe that two ideas lie at its heart: firstly, the protection of individuals is a strategic concern for national as well as international security; secondly, security conditions for people's development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence, law and order, but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues enabling a life free from risk and fear.

**Hunger and unemployment:** Hunger is a fundamental security challenge often the result of unemployment. For reasons discussed earlier, Northern Nigeria parades the largest population of the unemployed compared to anywhere else in Nigeria. Food is a major guarantee for human security. The common maxim that “a hungry man is an angry man” is relevant to the understanding that where food is lacking or grossly inadequate, human insecurity is very high.

Nigeria is identified as one of the poorest countries in the world in terms of living conditions of its citizens. The country was ranked the 13th poorest in the world in 1995. (UNDP Report, 1995) The prevalence of poverty in Nigeria makes it a paradox in spite of its rich resource endowments. (Fajingbesi, et al, 2009) For reasons earlier discussed, the almajirai and other talakawa (the poor class), constitute the largest population of the unemployed in Northern Nigeria. Through their slothfulness to work as a result of illness, deformity and such other mishaps, this group of people constitute the poorest section of the society.

**Rising profile of ethno-religious conflicts:** Another fundamental challenge posed by poverty in Northern Nigeria is the increasing wave of ethno-religious uprising. Even though ethno-religious uprising can be attributed to other factors, poverty is an underlying factor for the violent nature of such

conflicts being experienced in the region especially since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule. The almajirai have become catalysts to ventilate ethno-religious grievances that have become very prevalent in the country.

As Boer (2007) and Danjibo (2009) observe, in the bid to survive hunger and get basic necessities of life, the almajirai are often lured into all forms of conflicts, especially sectarian conflicts in the name of fighting for Allah. The almajirai, are believed to constitute a large percentage of recruits for the dreaded terrorist group, Boko Haram (meaning “No to western education”) whose activities have not only created serious security challenge but also threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. Incidentally, the almajirai are often the first victims of these conflicts.

Poverty does not always elicit security challenges. And as Salih aptly put it, “poverty in itself is not always associated with the negation of peace (i.e. conflict) and abuse of human rights”. (Salih, 2008:171). In other words, many poor societies enjoy peace, as much as poverty may undermine peace by creating situations that contribute to the abuse of human rights. Poverty can elicit human security challenge when there is inequality and inequitable distribution of resources. Salih further observe that this could be as a result of horizontal factors (such as ethnic, religious, regional, etc.) or vertical factors (such as class and elite) (Salih, 2008)

Since the last three decades, Northern Nigeria had witnessed an unprecedented orgy of ethno-religious conflicts. In most cases, the almajirai are the first culprit on the account of unemployment and underemployment. Government's estimate for the number of indigent children on the street begging for alms exceed nine and half million. (Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013).


Similarly, Danjibo (2009) alludes that the almajirai are easily co-opted into the army of perpetrators of ethno-religious violence. According to him, due to the social effect of poverty in the country the almajirai have turned themselves into social miscreants, getting involved in criminal activities and violence for a token. Danjibo is raising two vital factors, namely, bad governance and poverty, as precipitants of conflict in any human society.

Supporting the almajiri involvement in Sharia crisis of 2000 in Kaduna State, Boer (2003:65) also pointed out that almajirai, always ready for some excitement and easy prey for mischief, had taunted Christians whenever there is face-off with the Muslims. Aside the almajiri, Debki(2000: 22,23) also pointed to the involvement of the unemployed graduates of Qur'anic Schools whose duty is “selling of troubles and can be hired by anyone, including non-Muslims, once one can pay...”.

Also central to this study is the place of poverty in the rising profile of ethno-religious conflicts in the region. Indeed, ethno-religious conflict is the product of so many factors which is outside the scope of this study, but going

by the high level of poverty vis-à-vis the unprecedented orgy of violence since the last three decades, poverty has contributed in no small measure to this melee.

Figure 1



Sources: The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index by the U.N, 2010

The above chart is a comparative prevalence of poverty in each geo-political zone of Nigeria. The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index of the UN (2010) indicate that, the south-west record the lowest with 19.3%, the south-south comes second with 25.2% and south-east follows with 27.4%. The comparatively lower prevalence of poverty in the entire southern Nigeria can be attributed to its higher level of economic endowment and socio-economic development. On the contrary, the entire northern region records higher prevalence of poverty. With the exception of north-central, the other parts of the region surpass the national bar of 46%. According to the MPI Report, 46% of Nigerians lived below the national poverty line (only 28% of this ratio live in urban areas, and near 70% in the rural areas)..The north-central records the least prevalence of poverty in the region with 45.7%, north-east records 76.8% while north-west accounts for the highest percentage of 80.6%. This comparatively higher prevalence of poverty in the entire Northern Nigeria can be attributed to its relatively poor economic endowment and inadequate indices for development. If Northern Nigeria has comparatively higher poverty index in the country going by this statistics, it can be deduced that poverty is a major factor to explain the high level of

ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in the region since 1999. The table below gives a record of major ethno-religious conflicts that had taken place in the region between 2002 and 2012.

**Table 1: Major Ethno- Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, 1982-2012**

Date	Place of Conflict	Part of Northern Nigeria	Reason for conflict
1982, 1984 & 1985	Kaduna, Jimeta-Yola & Gombe	North-Central & North-East	Maitatsine Riots
1982	Kano	North-Central	Protest over the location of church in Fagge, Kano city
1987	Kafanchan	North-Central	Face-off between Christians and Muslims over subversive literature
1991	Kano	North-Central	Protest over the Reinhard Bonnke Evangelical crusade
1991	Tafawa Balewa	North-Central	Christians and Muslims clash over desecration
1991	Katsina	North-Central	Protest by Muslim fundamentalists over the blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed
1992	Zangon Kataf	North-Central	Conflict between the Kataf and Hausa/Fulani traders over control of market
1994	Tafawa Balewa	North-East	Clash between the Christian Sayawa and Muslim Fulani over political matter
1994	Potiskum	North- East	Face-off between Christians and Muslims over religious intolerance
1995	Kano	North-Central	Protest for desecration of the Qu'ran
1998	Maiduguri	North-East	Face-off between Christians and Muslims over religious intolerance
2000	Kaduna	North-Central	Clash between Christians and Muslims over Sharia implementation

2001	Kano	North-Central	Protests over America’s attack on Afghanistan
2002	Kaduna	North-Central	Riot over the planned hosting of The Miss World Beauty pageant in Kaduna
2004	Kano	North-Central	Reaction to the Yelwa/Shendam crisis in Plateau State where many Hausa/Fulani were killed
2009-2012	Maduguri and other Northeastern cities and towns	North-East	Boko Haram insurgency over westernization and entrenchment of purist Islam

Source: Table produced from the compilation of riots in Northern Nigeria, Jan H. Boer “Nigeria’s Decades of Blood”, Vol. 1, 2003 and compilations of Yinka Olomajobi, “Islam and Conflict in Northern Nigeria”, 2013. Note: The above record of conflicts exclude those that occurred in other states that fall outside the core Hausa/Fulani dominated Sokoto Sultanate.

From the above table, it can be established that no less than seventeen major ethno-religious conflicts took place in Northern Nigeria within a space of thirty years (1982-2012). The record also shows that all the conflicts took place only within the North-Central and North-Eastern parts of the region. Even though the north-central has the lowest prevalence of poverty (67%) in the region, it is clear from the record that, the trend of ethno-religious conflict gradually shifted from North Central to North East that is worst hit by poverty (72.2%) since 2004 when the last major conflict occurred in Kano in the North-Central. Base on this statistical record, poverty may not be a direct factor for most of these conflicts it is a strong underlying factor for these conflicts for instance, the on-going Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East that has threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria since 2009.

### **Challenge of religio-cultural belief**

The concepts of zakat and sadaqah fundamental to Islamic principle of alleviating poverty. Ironically, this principle rather than alleviate poverty among the Muslim believers of Northern Nigeria, it encourages truancy and continue to give rise to a larger army of the talakawa who see the zakat and sadaqah as religious largesse and not as means of establishing themselves economically to create wealth. Consequently, the principle of Islamic free-giving has impacted negatively on poverty level and not the contrary in Northern Nigeria. (Ghazali,2013)

It is also important to note that perhaps due to the institutionalization of

poverty among the Hausa/Fulani ethnic infusion, poverty is hardly given due attention that it required. The state and local governments are hardly proffering solution to end the almajiri syndrome and the age-long tradition of poverty. This constitutes a big challenge to the collaborative efforts of local and international organizations like the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the UNDP's goal to reduce poverty by halve in 2015.

### **Poverty Alleviation in Northern Nigeria**

The United Nations target of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger is to “halve between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day” (UN 2010 Report on MDGs). This set goal for eradicating poverty is indicative of the challenge this has posed to human existence globally. The UN had in 1990 set a twenty-five years global goal of reducing poverty rate by half of those that earn \$1.25 a day. Within fifteen years (1990-2005) of setting this goal, the figure has reduced from 1.8billion to 1.4billion, while the poverty rate dropped from 46 per cent to 27 percent. (UN 2010 Report on MDGs)

Despite all measures to improve living standard of Nigerians, poverty alleviation is a new concept in Nigeria's economic and social experience. (Omale and Molem,2009). The collapse of crude oil in the international market from the early 1980s plunged the country into economic crisis. In order to stop the downward trend, the government adopted a structural adjustment programme (SAP) which is market friendly measure to revamp the economy. However, SAP had several policies some of which had negative consequences for poverty reduction. The Federal Government therefore designed palliative programmes to curb the negative effects of the adjustment and several policies and programmes were put in place for this purpose from 1986. (Ilori,2009). With the return of the country to democratic rule, the government at all tiers of its administration have embarked on other measures to alleviate poverty. But for the purpose of space, this study will focus only on the major steps taken so far to reduce poverty.

Inter-Governmental Interventions: From developmental perspective, human security aims at enabling people to exercise choices offered by human development, allowing these choices to be made safely and freely, while also guaranteeing that the opportunities brought today by development will not disappear tomorrow.(UNDP,2004) The New Partnership for African Economic Development (NEPAD), the strategic framework document formally adopted at the 37th Summit of the OAU (now African Union or AU, inaugurated at the Durban Summit of 14 March 2002) considers peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development. The Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs) also provide a framework for strengthening governance, promoting human rights, engaging civil society and promoting the private sector as a basis for MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. (Salih,2008)

The United Nations millennium development goal of solving unemployment as a way of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger in the world is to “achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people”. (UN 2010 Report on MDGs) That the UN has made unemployment and poverty its millennium development goal is a proof to their endemic and overbearing nature. Poverty, unemployment and inequality have been identified as the major challenges to developing economies, just as the three phenomena also constitute aspects of social injustice. (Killick, 1981, 1976)

**Multi-Sectoral Programmes:** Among the measures embarked upon by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) to ameliorate the adverse effects of SAP and reduce poverty were the multi-sectoral programmes. These include programmes of (i) the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) - this was a pragmatic approach to development with emphasis on all essential sectors of the economy, particularly in the rural areas; (ii) the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) established to combat mass unemployment and articulate and implement policies related to employment; and (iii) the Better Life Programme (BLP) established to alleviate poverty and ignorance, especially among rural women. (Ilori,2009)

The extent to which these programmes impacted positively on the talakawa of Northern Nigeria could only be measured by the sustainability of the programmes. Ilori (2009) further observes that, a host of factors constrained the effectiveness of the programmes in reducing poverty. According to him, the programmes were largely bedevilled by poor management and weak and adhoc nature of its conception and adaptability to the traditional settings of the diverse people of Nigeria.

**Almajiri System of Education as a solution:** Owing to the menace of street begging and the viciousness of the almajiri in Northern Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria embarked on measures to rehabilitate the almajirai mentally and reintegrate them socially and economically. To this end, the government introduced the Almajiri System of Education in 2012. Unlike the traditional almajiri, the remodelled school system introduces well-furnished classrooms, boarding facilities, provision of textbooks; designing of curriculum for use in the schools; provision of capacity building training for

teachers. (Elechi and Yekorogha, 2013)

However, experts in the field of education administration have criticised the almajiri system of education based on its aims and objectives and the mode of implementation. First, the system is seen as highly westernized. As pointed above, the age-long concept of Almajiri is borne out of the culture and religious belief of the people. In a nation with high religious divide like Nigeria, the 'reformed' system may be considered alien to the old tradition and as an affront to Islam. This may further give credence to the aversion to Western-style education in some quarters. Moreover, Boko Haram, now rechristened as a terrorist group have always hide under the garb of entrenching purist Islam to reject Western style of education in Northern Nigeria. How then will the government grapple with the challenge of eliminating poverty and at the same time tackling terrorism that has constituted a major security threat in Nigeria? Furthermore, probably due to the security situation in the North-eastern part of the country, the Almajiri System of Education is yet to have its footing there. With the challenge of poverty unabated, the security situation will remain high. Nevertheless, the introduction of the almajiri project is a major milestone in Nigeria, especially in the northern region for its education imbalance.

**Islamic solution to poverty:** Islam's primordial solution to poverty is sadaqah (alms giving). Every Muslim whether poor or wealthy can give sadaqah at any time as a way to increase their blessing (Ghazali,2013). It is believed that any good deed, no matter how small, will earn them an equivalent reward. Some of these good deeds include visit to the sick, attending funeral, assist someone in times of need such as helping a labourer carry some of his weight, interceding on someone's behalf and to say a good word, such as consoling the grief stricken, or encouraging a despairing one.

These are all known as acts of Sadaqah and one does not have to be wealthy to accomplish them.

### **Conclusion and Recommendation**

There is no better way to describe Nigeria's disposition to the scourge of poverty as Kalu aptly puts it that, "poverty is the single force that is eroding the dignity of the Nigerian" (Kalu, 2008:443) with grave human security implications. In other words, irrespective of the institutionalization of poverty among the Hausa/Fulani, Nigeria should not belong to the class of poverty nations, considering her abundant economic resources and endowments. It therefore behoves Nigeria to wake up to the challenge of eradicating poverty in line with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the attendant human security implications.

The institutionalization of poverty constitutes a major challenge to the eradication of poverty in Northern Nigeria compare to elsewhere in the country. This explains the ineffective or outright failed measures to curb poverty in the region. There is need for a new approach to poverty alleviation that should be adapted according to the tradition of each community in Northern Nigeria. Such schemes should identify the various classes of the poor, their characteristics and the programmes that can best benefit them.

The almajiri system of education should be adopted by all tiers of government and should be all inclusive by offering the parents sending their children to the almajiri schools educational opportunities as well.

- Street begging should be outlawed. There should be legislation that criminalizes those who persist in street begging.
- There should be vocational centres at the state and local government levels.
- Government should institute social security for the vocational trainees and give them financial leverage on graduation.
- Interventionist programmes that suit each community should be properly articulated to guarantee equity, operability, sustainability.
- Government should promptly fulfil its obligation to the citizens so as to create confidence in the poverty alleviation programmes.

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CONFERENCE REPORT

**First International Conference on 'Politics,  
Security and Development'**

Organized By the Department Of Political Science  
And Public Administration, Babcock University, Nigeria,  
held October 11th –13th 2016

Ngozi Nwogwugwu

The maiden international Conference on 'Politics, Security and Development' of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, of the Veronica Adeleke School of Social Sciences, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, was held October 11th – 13th 2016. The theme of the Conference was Forty Years of Local Government Reforms and Democratic Development in Nigeria: Critical Perspectives. Nigeria's first comprehensive reforms of the local government system were carried out in 1976 under the military administration of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo. The 1976 reforms elevated government at the grassroots level to the third tier of government within the country's federal system, mandating democratically elected local councils deriving their status from the constitution. In the forty years since, the powers of Nigerian local governments have been systematically pared down, encroached upon, and made nonsense of particularly by the overbearing political influence of the state governments and other economic and constitutional matters arising.

This conference thus, commemorating four decades of the 1976 local government reforms thus was timely and well-received by the public and relevant constituencies of academia and practice.

The keynote speaker at the opening ceremony on Monday, 11th October 2016, was Nigeria's former President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, His Excellency Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR, the very architect of the 1976 reforms. He presented a thought-provoking and engaging lecture that challenged the maladministration and abuse of the tenets of the

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constitution in the management of local governments, as being experienced across the states of the federation. The former President emphasized that the primary aim of instituting the 1976 Local Government Reforms are being continually truncated by the various state Governors across the country. Most of the State Governors have for some years refused to conduct elections at the local government level, preferring to use their cronies as members of Caretaker Committees and Transition Committee members with the primary aim of having unlimited access to local government allocations from the federation account through the State-Local Government Joint Accounts Allocation Committee (JAAC).

The conference attracted two hundred and three (203) Scholars and Researchers as participants, while one hundred and sixty three (163) research papers were presented across 18 panels which covered the various sub-themes of the conference during the two day conference. The conference served as a platform for scholars from across Africa and Europe to unveil their research on issues related to local governments, federalism, development and participatory democracy from perspectives which spanned different cultural, social, economic, geographical and political contexts. The conference was inter-disciplinary in nature and attracted scholarly research from the Social sciences, Management sciences, Arts and Humanities as well as Education. There was also participation by career civil servants from some State Local Government Service Commissions who made presentations from the point of practice of local government, resulting in the engaging integration of theory and practice at the conference.

Four specially selected Lead Speakers presented papers on various subjects bordering on the Nigerian Local government: Professor Alex Gboyega of the University of Ibadan, and perhaps Nigeria's leading expert on the subject, made a presentation titled "Nigerian Local Government in the Doldrums: Back to the Drawing Board"; Professor Iyabo Olojede of Lagos State University presented on "Women and Democratic Leadership in the Local Government System in Nigeria"; Dr Bola Dauda, a scholar and researcher from the United Kingdom presented his lead paper titled "Democracy, Development and the Unfinished Decolonization of the Nigerian Local Government" while Professor Kunle Awotokun of Obafemi Awolowo University presented on "The Challenge of Nigerian Local Governments in the 21st Century".

A communique was adopted by the participants at the conference after detailed analysis of the presentations from various panels. Among the highlights of the communique were: the need for amendment of the Constitution to grant full autonomy to the local governments thereby creating the enabling environment for them to attain development at the local

level; Abrogation of the State-Local Governments Joint Account Allocation Committee (JAAC) and direct release of local government allocations to the local governments; that State Governors should stop seeing local governments as mere appendages of their state's or party's political apparatus; and that State Governors should stop interfering in local government sources of revenue to enable the local governments generate revenue internally to meet with the developmental needs of their unique environment.

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# COMMUNIQUE

## **First International Conference on 'Politics, Security and Development'**

Organized By the Department Of Political Science  
And Public Administration, Babcock University, Nigeria,  
held October 11th –13th 2016

The 1st International Conference of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Ogun State with the theme “Forty Years Of Local Government Reforms and Democratic Development In Nigeria: Critical Perspectives” took place between 11th – 13th October, 2016 at the Babcock Business School Auditorium.

The Keynote Address was delivered by Nigeria's former President, His Excellency, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR. Four lead papers were presented and over 150 papers from academics, professionals and practitioners. Conference participants agreed the following issues and recommendations, emanating from the deliberations of the timely event:

1. The one-tier multi-purpose uniform local government system is not ideal for a plural society like Nigeria. This is a system created in 1976 as a result of the practice of unity of command by the Military Government. There is need for urgent review of the system.
2. The unified Local Government system has lost its relevance while the peculiarity of each state of the federation should determine the structure of local governments.
3. That extra-budgetary expenditures usually imposed on the Local Governments by the Federal and State Governments should be stopped.
4. That the unusual situation whereby some State Governments have now taken absolute control of local government funds should stop forthwith.
5. That the monumental corruption at the local government level should be checked. To achieve this objective, there is the need not only to educate the citizenry that whatever the local government has belongs to the people, but also to improve leadership/followership dimension at the local government level in the country.

6. That there is the need for democracy to thrive at the grassroots level in the country, thus in this regard, it is suggested that credible elections should be held at the local government level to elect people with integrity who will be accountable and transparent to their people and shun corruption.
7. It is strongly believed that many State Governors and political party Executives encourage corruption at the local government level through the choice of their surrogates and cronies as Sole Administrators, Chairmen of Caretaker or Management Committees and Executive Secretaries of local government councils, among other titles.
8. That the local government should really be local. That is, there is the need to localize participation as opposed to central imposition by political parties. It is suggested that anyone aspiring to contest for the post of a councillor should have lived in that locality for a period of one or two years.
9. That there is the need for transparency and accountability at the grassroots. It is suggested that budgetary preparations and reviews, disbursement of funds and project allocation should be made open for the citizenry who are currently shut out of participation.
10. Given the level of disloyalty of the middle-level and top officers of the local governments to the local governments they serve, the participants ask the question “Do we still use the Local Government Service Commission to handle the recruitment, deployment, training, promotion and discipline of these officers?” This is saying the officers need to serve loyally, the various local governments.
11. The conference called for a review of the electoral laws that govern elections into the local governments. It is suggested that INEC should take up the responsibility of conducting Local Government elections in place of the State Independent Electoral Commissions.
12. The participants recommended in strong terms the need for a National Constitutional Conference to discuss the way forward to ensure effective and efficient service delivery at the local government level.

**Communique Committee**

1. Professor Aluko, Jones Oluwole – Chairman
2. Dr. Ojo, Olawole – Member
3. Dr Alao, David Oladimeji – Secretary

## Call for Papers

Manuscripts are invited that align with the mission of JIPAD. All articles submitted are anonymously peer reviewed by at least two referees. Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced and be between 6,000 and 8,000 words in length, including bibliographic references. Book reviews may not exceed 1,500 words. An abstract must accompany every article and should be no more than 150 words. The manuscript must also be accompanied by a short biographic note about the author as well as a cover sheet with the title of the article, author's name and institutional affiliation, mailing address, email address, telephone and fax numbers. The prescribed style is that contained in the latest edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association. The editorial board requires that manuscripts be void of any language that might imply racial, ethnic, sexual, religious or other kinds of discrimination, stereotype, or bias. Accepted manuscripts are subject to editorial modifications before publication, while articles that do not conform to the above guidelines will be returned to the author without review. Submission of articles implies a commitment to publish in JIPAD, therefore articles submitted for consideration by JIPAD must not have been published in part or in whole in any other medium, and must not be under review by any other journal or publisher.

Only electronic submissions are acceptable, and these should preferably be in formats compatible with MS Word 2007. Two versions of each manuscript should be submitted: one version containing all aforementioned author's details and preliminary pages, and the second version containing ONLY the title of the paper, the abstract, and the body of the article. The second version of the manuscript (which will be the one sent to reviewers) should use a file name that does not name the author, remove all named properties attached to the computer file, and omit all details in the body of the article that may identify the author. All manuscripts should be sent to both of the following: Dr Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso, Editor, JIPAD, at [jipad@babcock.edu.ng](mailto:jipad@babcock.edu.ng) and [jumoyin@gmail.com](mailto:jumoyin@gmail.com); and Professor Ayandiji Daniel Aina, Editor-in-Chief, JIPAD, at [or\\_dijiaina@yahoo.com](mailto:or_dijiaina@yahoo.com).