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Contents

Ideologue:

- Eghosa E. Osaghae
Political Scientists and Governance in Nigeria 1

Articles:

- Fikile Mabel Vilakazi
Will the majority of poor and unemployed citizens
of South Africa benefit from Vision 2030? A closer look
at the National Development Plan [NDP] - Vision 2030 11

Olajide O. Akanji

- The Paradox of Ethiopian Federalism..... 27

Michael Ogu

- The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty and
Nigeria's National Security 43

Dr. Mohd Shafi Bhat

- India's Look East Policy- A Critical Assessment of
Relations with Nations of South Asia 55

Alao, David Oladimeji, PhD; Iyanda, Rachael,

- Oluseye, PhD; and Alao, Fisayo
Human Trafficking and the Challenges of
Strengthening Human Security in Africa 67

Briefing

- Kolade Omoyeye
Nigeria and South Africa in Africa and International Politics:
A Power Theory Approach 87

Conference Keynote

- Michael Vickers
Perspectives Down the Corridors of Time..... 105

- Book Review*..... 117

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Journal of International Politics and Development (JIPAD)

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The Journal of International Politics and Development (JIPAD) is a bi-annual peer-reviewed journal with an international and distinguished editorial board. It is published jointly by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ilisan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Kokomo, USA. The journal is currently in its twelfth edition and is published in January and June.

Our Mission

JIPAD seeks to publish original research that advances knowledge about politics, economy, society and development at the global, international, regional and domestic levels. The journal is interdisciplinary in scope and welcomes full-length articles, briefings, book reviews, essays, conference reports and research notes that draw from, or can inform developments across disciplines, and across national boundaries. JIPAD also provides a forum for interaction between policy and practice on questions of governance and development, and thereby informs policy debates among scholars, researchers, policy makers and relevant audiences. The main criterion for acceptance of an article, though, is the high intellectual quality of such a submission, and the clear potential to contribute distinctly to debates in the subject of discourse.

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Editor's Note

The Editorial team of JIPAD is glad to bring to you the thirteenth edition of the Journal which brings together insightful analysis of issues affecting Africans from Lagos to the Cape, Nairobi to Gaborone and as further afield as Southeast Asia. We remain appreciative of the efforts of our reviewers who ensure that only the best papers make the cut, and our authors who continue to choose JIPAD. Less than 20% of the papers originally submitted to this edition were selected for publication upon the strength of our review process, and we promise to continue raising the bar.

This edition also heralds the formal end of our partnership with Indiana University, Kokomo, Indiana, USA. We remain ever grateful for the leadership and intellectual acumen that Professor Robert Dible and his team brought to JIPAD, and we look forward to other modes of collaboration in the future. Consequently, the editorial advisory board is also being re-constituted in line with this change and our subsequent editions will reflect this.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso, PhD

Editor

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IDEOLOGUE

Political Scientists and Governance in Nigeria

Eghosa E. Osaghae^Y

I will begin with Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye, the real subject of today's lecture, as a point of departure. If you studied under the Professor, you will leave with the feeling that the professional political scientist, the thoroughbred political scientist, has no business getting involved in governance. Professor Adekanye also came through as somebody who was an advocate of the distancing of academic political science from the practice of politics. And he still says it! He says, "Look at them! Look at them, see what they are doing!" He has never said "see what we are doing." Very rarely, I think only twice in our discussions, have I caught him saying we, and I said "...Sir?!" And then he says, "Well, what do you say? You know these people..." So if you were a disciple of Adekanye straight from school, chances are that you would have nothing to do with the politics, with government politics, because that is what a truly professional political scientist should be doing.

So I begin by asking the question: who is a political scientist? I say to my first year students – I like to teach first year students – what do you think politics is? Most begin "in my view... in my opinion..." to which I would say, "Well, it's good to have an opinion, but you don't have the training yet to have an opinion! So, you don't qualify to offer any definition." As I insist, a political scientist is someone who is trained in the systematic study and analysis of politics and who has proven through that training to be valuable to the profession in terms of scholarly contributions to the body of knowledge that we advance to the study of politics. That is a political scientist.

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^{*}Being Text of Distinguished Personality Lecture, Special Edition in Honour of Emeritus Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye organised by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Nigeria, held 15 October 2014.

Now, what does a political scientist do? S/he doesn't only teach like us professors, the political scientist goes into several other things in the private and public sectors and is expected to use the skills acquired in the course of training to systematically analyse political phenomena. If we follow – or excuse – Professor Adekanye's distancing thesis, you would say, what the political scientist should do is to analyse things and tell society where it ought to be going on the basis of proper (read as scientific) analysis. It is another matter if society decides to make use of that knowledge. If it does, that is good; if it does not, it loses. Political scientists are conscious of this responsibility and have tried to refine their methodologies and elements of analysis. Over the years this activity has been central to the definition of political science and the political scientist. We have had our own revolutions in the form of paradigm shifts, on the basis of which and it can be argued that political science is a very complex discipline and not least because politics itself is very complex – they say it is ubiquitous, meaning it is everywhere! Thus, when you focus on one part of politics, you can study that in isolation, but: politics is much deeper than that.

The conclusion that political scientists have reached is that we don't need to be one political science. We can have great and enormous diversity- which indeed we have- that allows us to branch out into different terrains of politics and try to piece them together for the proper analysis of our discipline. Professor Adekanye's own speciality for several years has been civil-military relations, but he's branched into conflict and peace studies, and I see also that he's venturing into gender studies, thanks to Mama Adekanye [Professor Mrs T. Adekanye] who has been in the forefront of gender equality.

But that's the diversity of political science for you, and yet there's a 'science' after 'political' that tries to bring a convergence, to provide a coherence where we all meet or agree. Some say the 'science' after 'political' is honorific, only because we want to be like the rest of them – economists, sociologists, psychologists. All these other social scientists claim to be scientists, so why not political scientists, never mind that for a long time, politics was studied as part of moral philosophy, studied as part of law, and even as part of history. Yet here we are, we have come of age! What is this science in our political science, and what does it do? It says, like Professor Adekanye professes, that it is possible to capture regularities objectively about human tendencies and patterns which can then be used to explain and predict human behaviour in politics. But, of course, there are those who insist that in order for us to be able to do this, we can only dwell on the tangibles, the verifiable and empirical constructs of our political science. More, that we

should leave the baggage of those value laden concepts like justice, rights, and so on, and even the state. And so we had to embrace a whole new vocabulary, what the author of 1984, George Orwell, called “newspeak”: new terminologies and more. So in place of the State, for example, we should use 'political system'. So we get rid of all those concepts that are value laden and we begin to pursue concepts that can be directly observed, that can be measured for accuracy.

There was a huge debate following the behavioural revolution with some conservatives arguing that we were reducing the relevance of political science because if you dwell only on the tangibles, you are likely to sacrifice a robust comprehension of politics. Relevance and responsibility – these became major criteria that we had to bother with. Political science has a responsibility not only to tell society what is wrong but also how to get out of it. That's a huge responsibility if you ask me, but if you are not able, your relevance becomes questionable. And so, all of us got round again, and told one another, in this discipline we should do those things that are amenable to scientific study as well as those things that are not so amenable, but remain in the realm of politics, so our relevance and responsibility do not wane. That's where we are! We have come round full circle and accepted that you can study politics differently – qualitatively if you like, quantitatively if you like – do the best of science that you can but also leave room for the ones that don't believe in newspeak. Otherwise – and this is a very critical point – how do you factor in ideas or concepts like greed, lust, these intangibles of politics that are so critical?

Yesterday, I was teaching POS 111 to first year students and I asked them, what are the sources of power in Nigeria? That is, how do you become politically powerful, wealthy and influential? One response was, it's the constitution; another, it's the party you belong to. But there was a young guy seated at the back who was a real genius. His response was 419! And now you think of it: can your political science analysis about politics in Nigeria be complete without factoring in 419 (advanced fee fraud)? Now, now, now, you think of it!

I ask many political science students, especially those that got involved in other things outside of the classroom after graduation, what has your political science taught you? The common reply goes something like this: “well, you know, it has given me vocabulary (newspeak), but the world outside is different; it has not really fitted into the world we learnt about in the classroom.” This means, and I believe the students, that there is something we need to revisit in our political science. It means that the time has come to

do what the Yolamu Barongos did in the late 1970s. They came up with the book, *Political Science in Africa*, and I like a particular chapter in which Sam Oyovbaire talks about the Tyranny of Borrowed Paradigms. Now this is not our political science, in a manner of speaking. This political science has grown out of the corpus of Western thought, and our political science is indeed something in need of a fundamental review. We need to decolonise our political science; it is still very colonial. Discerning political scientists like to say anthropology is the most colonial of the social sciences, but I daresay that our political science is no less colonial. We need to deconstruct our political science, we need to decolonise it; we need to make it more useful; we need to make it more responsible and more relevant.

Let us turn to governance. This is part of the new-speak of the reforms regime of the post-Cold war neo-liberal theme. When you move away from concepts that are value laden to concepts that would not only be empirically verifiable but also useful instruments for reform, this is where governance has grown out of. It is a process, they say. On the one hand it has to do with procedure, it has to do with public management, it has to do with effective management of human affairs under the auspices of the state and government. So whereas government has more to do with the institutions of the state and the operations of those institutions, governance has a lot more to do with the processes, and the dynamic side of government. It has a couple of principles that are like the touchstones of proper governance, never mind that they say there is good governance, and there is bad governance. Our brand of governance, given all of those empirical criteria for evaluation, including transparency, responsiveness, accountability, rule of law, inclusiveness and so on, on the basis of those criteria, we must rank very low because our governance is poor. So, we proceed on the basis of poor governance to talking about failed states and fragile states, states that are simply not able to carry out the functions of states.

Using the criteria, we belong to the lower rungs of the governance ranking in this part of the world. However, we have always recognised that governance is flawed in Nigeria; that here governance is even more flawed. So there's a problem. What should a political scientist be doing in the face of this? I am happy that Professor Adele Jinadu is here. He is one of the pillars of Nigerian political science, together with Professor Bayo Adekanye. They recognised that they can make a difference to our society, and you must make those contributions that will make our country a better place to be in.

Professor Adele Jinadu served in our electoral commission and was our electoral commissioner, and they went there doing what they believed was

best to do. Professor Adele Jinadu has spent several years not only writing about Franz Fanon, but also about ethnicity, about federalism, about electoral systems. And so he has had an opportunity to make a contribution in practical terms.

Professor Bayo Adeganye being a distancer has not done that. What else would the two of them then do? They then probably said, look, we have the Nigerian Political Science Association, we must strengthen it to do things even the American Political Science Association has not been able to do. Professor Adeganye thus served as Director of Research and was editor of the association's journal, the Nigerian Political Science Journal. Professor Jinadu has done a similar thing. I remember there was a debate in that forum on the state of affairs in Nigeria, the political economy and so on. One would expect that the outputs of the Nigerian Political Science Association would – or ought to – inform policy, like those of the Nigerian Economic Society, whose output from its annual conferences and other platforms arguably inform policy. I think that the Nigerian Economic Society has done better than the Nigerian Political Science Association, because the economists outside the university took over the Nigerian Economic Society and so, even the Governor of the Central Bank could become president of that society – something that the Nigerian Political Science Association would never allow because, you know who we are?: Products of the newspeak. But, those who should make use of the things that the professor have done, they have deaf ears, they are blind, and they will never see.

Now that's the problem. So it's like speaking to the deaf and the dumb. That's the lesson we have learnt, but will they listen after all? And I am sure Professor Jinadu would accept this. When we had the Constitution Drafting Committee in 1975-76, and it had Professor Billy J. Dudley, Professor Oyeleye Oyediran and so on, we were told (because you know we were very impressionable undergraduate students then), that when Professor B. J. Dudley made a contribution there, it was something that was beyond the comprehension of other delegates. So what did they do? They reproduced it with all its mathematical jargon in their report. I'm sure they just said, “you know, Professor, we'll just humour you, this is what you want to see, so you'll get it.”

Years later we had the Political Bureau. And the Political Bureau was a very important part of the process of transition in Nigeria. Many of our eggheads in political science that served in the Bureau helped to tease out things that only philosopher kings would have done or dared to do. We are told that the program on MAMSER, the social mobilisation part of it, came

out of the draftings, the ideas, the thinking of these very powerful political scientists, and many of them served in government, with people outside watching to see what difference this would make. So beginning from the point where we thought we were on top and things were looking different, including the fact that we were able to manufacture two political parties – one to the left a little, one a little to the right – we thought these things were really, really wonderful.

When the harvest came and it was a harvest of failure, the first people we ostracised were the political scientists that were associated with those governments. The Nigerian Political Science Association, in fact, had a debate on what to do with our senior colleagues that had gone to serve the government. Now, that's not happening only in Nigeria. In Kenya, we also had a couple of the political scientists who went into government (one of them actually became a senior minister having been executive secretary of the African Association of Political Science). And the whole world watched them and observed how different office had made them – they were no longer the same people! It means that our political science does not have the resilience to make a difference when people are in government and when they are out. Or in Zimbabwe, where we had political scientists that served in critical areas of government. They did not make a difference, even though they were critical to the land reforms in that country and which we say have made Comrade Mugabe unpopular.

So, how can political scientists affect positively or even critically, the process of governance? We have seen the platform of the Nigerian Political Science Association that has unfortunately become moribund; it doesn't exist anymore. And government is happier that that body does not exist – because in recent times we have seen things in our country that we would have considered unthinkable several years ago. I have a little book called *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*, and I said on one of those pages that, several years ago, you would hear things about Idi Amin, and some other fellows in other countries, and we would hear about Cameroon, and so on, and we would say to ourselves, they would never happen in Nigeria; they would never, ever happen in Nigeria. But see where we are now. The rest of Africa is asking: what is happening in Nigeria?! Every time you meet someone from Togo, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and so on, they ask, what is the problem in Nigeria? Remember, I said awhile back that when you graduate you are asked whether you have the relevant background in political science, and the tools to do analysis. Then they ask you, for instance, how did the elections go? And the political

scientist has difficulty explaining how the elections have gone. I am reminded of an article I read on Nigeria's 1983 elections. The conclusion simply was this: you don't even begin to try to explain electoral outcomes in Nigeria. Your task simply is to present the facts as they are and say that's all you can say. The [electoral] outcomes defy logic; there's no logic, there's no explanation! The only way you can explain it is to say, this party won and this party lost. So again, we need to go back to our tools of analysis to find out where we might have gotten even the analysis of elections not so right.

So, what is happening in Nigeria and why is political science not responding? Let me begin with the easier explanation. In this country, there is very little respect for expertise. Nobody cares what you have studied. And unfortunately for political science, it's a double jeopardy. We ourselves do not have tools that we have refined to the extent that we can make a difference and provide a different kind of explanation. So how easy is it to be on a TV program where you have ten minutes only to make an impression, to be told: "we are not talking theory here!" - they say - "Professor with all due respect, this is not time for theory!" Unfortunately, with the reality of Nigeria, and you assume that your theoretical world is divorced from reality, what they don't know is that your theory comes from that reality.

Where does this leave us? We have a society that is still very pre-industrial, with all due respect to all of us, because we don't recognise, much less respect, expertise and specialisation. People specialise and we must respect those specialities, and so when you want to solve a problem, look for the expert. Who are those attempting to confront the problem of Boko Haram today? Professor Adekanye is not there! Prof Amuwo? Prof Makinde? Professor Jinadu.? You see, because, when government and other elements in society sit down with contractor pseudo-academics, it's a cash and carry business. I have seen people using the public domain of the radio and TV platforms to masquerade as knowledgeable people, but they mislead government, and mislead citizens, because they are not political scientists, unfortunately. So until we begin to tap into the specialised knowledge provided by political scientists, there is a difficulty about how we'll go ahead.

Let me give you an instance. We all saw the South Africa's transition in 1994. South Africa then and now is probably Africa's closest to a scientific society.

The apartheid regime sat down, brought all the experts in constitutional, political and social engineering and said to them, "we think apartheid is going to have to come to an end, what do we do?" The experts sat down and built scenarios for them. And they then analysed scenarios and picked the ones that

were most suitable, – the broederbond – was behind this. They spent time to reach the conclusions on how to manage the end of apartheid, and the next 10, 20, 40, after 50 years after apartheid. South Africa is what it is today, because they are following the script of a transition blueprint that was worked out by experts.

Now, many Nigerians don't know this: when the South African experts at that time did a SWOT analysis, they concluded that one of the key threats to successful post-apartheid transition was Nigeria. Nigeria. Nigeria. Not because we are a big, populous and wealthy country, but because, as they rightly said, Nigerians have a penchant for being disorderly, for being lawless, and for destroying everything that most rational people would regard as reasonable. So as a matter of policy, they deemed it fit restrict the entry of Nigeria and Nigerians into South Africa. When in the name of Ubuntu and crass nationalism, the black government did not appear to be budging, they went into a regime of demonisation. So the Nigerian is a demon. But we proved to be even greater demons than the South Africans could ever imagine! Now they have seen that we can bring 15 million dollars locked up in suitcases. But they know it's not the first time, and it won't be the last time. We do these things all the time, but when they want to show that 'you see how useless the Nigerians are?' then they speak up. But Nigeria is very smart. I don't know who is doing the thinking now, but the guy says the South Africans are saboteurs, they are sabotaging us. But all of this is acting according to a script, a script that was adopted as long ago as 1985. Now if our country really has a problem, or in fact problems as everyone knows, and the kinds of problems we have are so serious that one cannot even begin to think of how to resolve them because they are hard to understand, then what is political science expected to do?

I think that one of the things that we might do first, is to get our Nigerian Political Science Association back. We must get the NPSA back. We must get a voice again for political science, a voice that is respectable, a voice that can be heard! We don't have a voice anymore. That's the first one. The second thing is that, those political scientists that have been in the corridors of power and have remained there, must use the advantages that they have for the professional entry points of political science. Third, we ourselves must have a review of our political science. I have said the first requirement of that review is conscious decolonisation. We must have our political science deconstructed so that we can get back to the ways that would strengthen and extend the relevance and responsibility of our discipline as it is today. People must take us seriously. People must not wish us away or ignore us or pretend

that we don't exist.

Finally, I think we must have more occasions like this to celebrate people like Professor Adekanye in the hope that the younger people here would have heard things that they would not normally hear in the classroom, that will yet fire their imagination, and that they will yet see these things that show that – as the Babcock by-line says – the Future is Bright. Thank you very much.

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ARTICLES

Will the Majority of Poor and Unemployed Citizens of South Africa Benefit From Vision 2030? A Closer Look at the National Development Plan [NDP] - Vision 2030

Fikile Mabel Vilakazi^Y

ABSTRACT

The national development plan of South Africa known as Vision 2030 has prioritised infrastructure investment as one of its strategies for economic growth for the next 16 years. The plan intends to create 11 million jobs by 2030. The benefits of infrastructure investment have been proven in various parts of the globe to play a key role in improving the quality of life for the poor. However, public corruption and state capitalism pose as a huge threat to Vision 2030. In paper, the plan is a grand initiative although following in the footsteps of the Growth Economic and Redistribution strategy [GEAR] and the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa [ASGISA] taking a capitalist economic approach to economic growth and poverty eradication with very little hope for reviving the commitments of the Reconstruction and Development Program of the first democratic government. A compelling argument in this paper is to show how the Harrod-Domar economic model of the 50s still troubles economic development plans of developing countries even today, with specific reference to South Africa.

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Introduction

The South African government recently adopted a national development plan that intends to accelerate investment in infrastructure to boost economic growth by the year 2030. The areas of priority include public investments in (1) transport, (2) energy, (3) telecommunications, and (4) water, (5) education, (6) housing, health (7) inter alia . The plan is to create 11 million jobs by 2030, improve transport linking facilities to enable accelerated business practice, improve electricity supply by ESKOM, increase clean water supply where shortages exist, improve the quality of education by increasing tertiary university intakes through the construction of more universities in Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape, improve the quality of and access to health care and to curb corruption inter alia.

This was followed by budget allocations in the 2013 fiscal year dedicated towards ensuring that the objectives of the National Development Plan are met. indicates that government has allocated an amount of more than 'R820 billion' towards infrastructure development to be shared between the state and state owned enterprises [SOEs]. This paperintends to demonstrate how South Africa has gradually become a capitalist state since the 80s and what the political and socio-economic implications are for public service delivery, particularly infrastructure provision. This is done be examining theories of economic growth in relation to the concept of investment based growth. The focus is on classical and neoclassical theories of economic growth between the 20th and 21st centuries, particularly the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth and its influence to current economic growth models globally through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund .

Furthermore, the papersurfaces challenges and opportunities of investment based growth with specific reference to infrastructure as envisioned in the National Development Plan. In addition, a comparison is made of financing alternatives for infrastructure investments. A case is made that ideally public financing should be the prime source of funding for public infrastructure programs. However, thepaper highlights public corruption as one of the challenges facing public private partnership [PPPs] in South Africa and how this thwarts the country's ability to sustain economic growth and develop committed tax payers to boost its revenue base. The paper begins with a theoretical analysis of economic growth highlighting specifically the Solow and Harrod-Domar models for economic growth and proceeds in section (2) to show how the use of such economic models have pushed South Africa into a path of capitalist development. This is followed in section (3) by a discussion on the importance of infrastructure investment for economic. Furthermore, the potential role of public corruption to stifle the NDP's vision for economic growth in the context of South Africa is discussed. This is

followed by concluding remarks in section four.

Economic Growth: a theoretical analysis

The theory of economic growth based on investment in infrastructure dates back to the 20th century. Neoclassical economic theorists like Robert Solow insisted that economic growth depends on direct investments in 'capital' inter alia (Lucas, 1988:8). confirms this notion. Capital can take different forms to include 'physical', 'economic', 'human' and 'social'. The interest in this paper is on 'physical capital' which refers to 'the potential value (financial, social and cultural) of a (physically) built environment like roads, bridges, dams, amongst other things. . The interest is to theoretically discuss the contribution that physical capital creates to economic growth. It is important to state that the theoretical concept of physical capital is understood in this paper to refer to the concept of 'economic infrastructure' as employed in the South African National Development Plan and the South African National Budget Speech .

The two concepts will therefore be used interchangeably to refer to infrastructure in the context of this paper. Nonetheless, returning to Robert Solow's economic growth model; it is important to note that it is an extension of the Harrod-Domar Growth Model which insists that 'every economy must save a certain proportion of its national income, if only to replace worn-out or impaired capital goods (buildings, equipment, and materials), however, in order to grow, new investments representing net additions to the capital stock are necessary'. The fundamental assumption here is that savings are paramount to economic growth. The more a country can save the faster it can grow economically.

The challenge with the Solow and the Harrod-Domar models is that most developing countries (Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Caribbean) who cannot afford to save resort to foreign aid for assistance thereby increasing their indebtedness and eventually stifle their ability to grow the economy since the attention sways towards debt servicing. This is evident in how the Structural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund affected most African economies like Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa inter alia since the early . confirms that 'the World Bank policies are essentially based on the Revised Minimum Standard Model that can be traced back to the Harrod-Domar Model of the 1940s'. writes that Rostow was an advisor to former US president Kennedy and had great influence in pushing for foreign aid policies to developing nations as a strategy to prevent those nations from adopting the former Soviet Union's communist strategies for economic growth, which seemed to work perfectly well at that time. The idea was to stop communism from spreading globally and to advance capitalism instead,

as it became evident over the years in the way that the United States capitalist agenda dominated the rest of the global economy (Throne, 2002:1-5).

Rostow is remembered as an unapologetic economic evolutionist from the United States 'who has never believed that (modernization) was a problem and, in fact, (he) ... openly used (his) work as an instrument of American foreign policy'. What is also important to note is that he adopted the Harrod-Domar Growth model to develop his evolutionary stages of economic growth.

The logical conclusion then is that both the Solow and Harrod-Domar Growth models are capitalist theoretical tools that have been used by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to advance neoliberal capitalist economies globally and the South African economy is not immune to its effects. This leads to the next discussion on how South African economy has been affected by SAPs and how the location of South Africa in the global economy positions it as a neoliberal capitalist economy.

The South African State: a Neoliberal Capitalist Economy

The South African economy did not experience direct structural adjustment impositions by the IMF and the World Bank, but had already begun succumbing to its pressures globally by instituting internal economic reforms to privatise, deregulate and reduce state intervention in the economy by the late 1980s. This was due to notable economic decline since the 1960s measured in GDP rates which stood at 5.5% in the 60s, 3.3% in the 70s, 2.2% in the 80s, 1.9% in 1993 and 2.3% in 1994. indicate that even though the labour movement succeeded to resist privatisation in the late 80s, the state resorted to commercialisation of its assets successfully indirectly privatising transport services to Transnet, the telecommunication and postal services were divided into Telkom and the South African Postal Services Limited and electricity provision transferred to ESKOM inter alia.

So, by the late 80s, provision of basic economic infrastructure was being transferred to the hands of private capitalist enterprises with reduced and/or shared state intervention. Since then, the provision of economic infrastructure has always been seen as pivotal in facilitating economic growth in South Africa; even though various ideological approaches influenced such an investment drive throughout the 90s. points out that post 1994, the ANC government introduced the Reconstruction and Development Program [RDP] premised on Keynesian economic growth theory which promotes growth through 'reconstruction, redistribution, direct state involvement and a living wage' for the majority. The RDP White Paper highlights some of these commitments in relation to the importance of social and economic infrastructure for economic growth even though its content

had shifted from the basic tenets of the RDP document. further asserts that the (RDP White Paper) 'unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile the original Keynesian approach to the RDP with a set of policy statements and recommendations that were inspired by the neo-liberal framework that had long been the alternative offered, even if in different variants, by big business, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and, not least, the apartheid state itself in its twilight years in the form of the Normative Economic Model (NEM)'.

As a result, the RDP was abandoned for the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy [GEAR] in 1996 (Manuel, 1996:1-66), and later in 2006 replaced by the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa –ASGISA. GEAR and ASGISA were largely criticised for their capitalist neoliberalism approach to economic growth with very little benefit to poverty reduction for the majority of poor citizens of South Africa. The current National Development Plan and the Industrial Policy Action Plan follow a similar economic growth path with a large role set for capitalist markets in the form of state owned enterprises [SOEs] and Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises [SMMEs] and Foreign Multinational Corporations [FMCs] in the anticipated drive towards economic growth. The heavy reliance of South African economy on capitalist markets since the 80s points to a conclusion that South Africa is largely a capitalist economy.

Define state capitalism as 'the widespread influence of government in the economy either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or through the provision of subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies'. The challenge of capitalist driven economic growth is that it is concerned with capital which is understood in Marxist terms to mean 'surplus value captured by capitalists, the bourgeoisie, who control production means, in the circulation of commodities and monies between the production and consumption processes whilst exploiting those who do not have or own the means of production'. notes that in such an economic system 'as economic forces develop class struggles become more intense' and their existence is not coincidental but a deliberate structural act of capitalist elites to maintain that very system of capitalist modes of production. This has been observed in public private partnerships [PPP] that emerged in South Africa during the demise of apartheid and operated throughout the democratic dispensation thus far in the form of state owned enterprises [SOEs] and expanded public works programs [EPWP] and in the role of BIG business in the economy inter alia.

Observed that 'private sector firms often approach local governments and their impoverished communities with the message of power sharing, but once the process is in motion the interests of the community are often

overwhelmed by those of the most powerful members of the partnership—the private sector firms'. So, the vision of a transformative developmental state that was once envisioned in the RDP became an intellectual project that launched democracy only to be swiftly abandoned for neoliberal capitalist GEAR and ASGISA amongst other policies. Interestingly though, asserts that racism in South Africa is in fact a capitalist agenda, whose struggle is not just about racial differences, but a deliberate construct of a dual capitalist economy providing security for the white minority whilst creating deep vulnerability for the black majority.

A compelling argument is that the battle was not virtuously racial but also economical; it was a battle of resources, an 'intense class struggle' that degenerated into racial and later ethnic conflicts. In essence, South African capitalism developed even far earlier than the 80s, it may be as old as the struggle against apartheid or even colonialism, if understood in Burawoy's terms. As a result, any attempt to tackle economic growth that could redress the imbalances of the past needs to be conscious and responsive to the intersections of race, class and ethnicity that embed the South African economy. It is against this background that vision 2030 of the National Development Plan needs to be located and contextualised. Whilst it may be worthwhile to elaborate on the NDP 2030 vision in details, the scope of this paper is limited to analysing the possibility of driving economic growth through direct investment in economic infrastructure in South Africa between now and 2030. The question is whether this will work and how different is it going to be from the previous attempts of the RDP, GEAR and ASGISA as mentioned above. The next section expands on this question in detail.

Investing in infrastructure to boost economic growth in South Africa

The term 'infrastructure' is often used to include both social and economic infrastructure where economic infrastructure includes physical assets like roads, transport, energy, water and telecommunications; whilst social infrastructure includes assets such as housing, education, health, safety and security inter alia . The South African National Development Plan makes specific reference to 'economic infrastructure' as defined above whilst not directly referring to social infrastructure but to its attributes like 'human settlement', 'education', 'health', and 'safety' . My sense is that it is critical to keep this distinction to enable critical analysis of the contribution made by both social and economic infrastructure to economic growth. The tendency in socio-economic planning is often to prioritise the latter at the expense of the former, whereas the interplay between both matters to enhance balanced economic growth.


There is no doubt that 'lack of infrastructure continues to be a key obstacle to growth and development in many low-income countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, only 16 per cent of roads are paved, and less than one in five Africans has access to electricity whilst transport costs are the highest in the world and act as a significant constraint on trade expansion'. Whilst this is happening, there is an on-going debate on whether provision of public infrastructure should be privatised or remain the responsibility of the state. In South Africa, this debate has been going on since the 1980s and continues unresolved creating a perpetual dichotomy between the state, the labour movement, business and civil society. The situation is further aggravated by the heightened levels of state corruption witnessed within government procurement processes geared towards infrastructural development *inter alia*.

The United Democratic Front highlights some examples of state corruption since 1999 thus far to include '(1) the Arms Deal-1999-R30 bln, (2) Oil Gate-Petro SA- 2003- R15 mln, (3) UN-Oil for Food Program-2005, (4) Travel Gate voucher scandal-2005, (5) Hitachi/Eskom/Chancellor House Holdings-2006-R38.5 bln to ANC Chancellor House, (6) Karoo Gas exploration by Shell -2011- R1.6 trln to the ANC Batho Batho Trust, (7) Gautrain-SACP scandal and SANRAL-e-toll-COSATU scandal of R24 mln *inter alia*'. The list is endless. So, the debate on infrastructure investment needs to be coupled with deliberate strategies to combat public corruption, otherwise, it may be a futile exercise in the end and stifle possibilities for 'real economic growth'. Nonetheless, 'to the extent that infrastructure improves the quality of life for the poor, the development of infrastructure is likely to alleviate poverty'.

The benefits of infrastructure investment to economic growth are noted as having impact to the '(1) physical environment-reducing time and space for traveling, communication and doing business, (2) creation of employment opportunities thereby increasing consumption, (3) the input and output markets, helps determine spatial development patterns and provides a large network to individual users at low cost, and (4) generally considered a foundation for doing business'. Besides the prevalence of corruption in South Africa, there are cases where infrastructure development has benefitted the poor, like the Public Works Programs (clinics and houses etc.), electrification of rural and urban informal settlements, construction of roads and dams in remote areas and increased access to mobile technology amongst others albeit the process remains painful for the majority of tax payers in South Africa since very little is being accomplished with lots of millions of Rands of tax payers' money in this area whilst the class division between the rich and the poor is widening.

However, the prioritisation of economic infrastructure investment for economic growth in the National Development Plan is a grand initiative. The most important aspect requiring attention is the actual financing of such an investment given the fact that it involves tax payers' money, big business profits and therefore sensitive and can easily cause conflict.

Table 1:1. Public/Private financing of public infrastructure in South Africa



Source: author's compilation based on budget amounts from the South African National Budget 2013

Table1:1 above gives indications for public/private financing of public infrastructure based on the recent national budget speech of 2013. The observation is that about 99% investments for public infrastructure come from the private business sector and about 1% comes from government, and most of that 1% is spent through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) who are monopolistic in nature like ESKOM and Transnet inter alia. A pure monopoly is defined as a single seller of a product, that is, 100% of market share.

Nonetheless, budget allocations above suggest that the (government) public responsibility of infrastructure development is being relegated to (capitalist) private power. This is a problematic economic prognosis for agovernment aspiring for a developmental state. This further confirms how South Africa has rapidly become a capitalist state since the 80s and how such a move is embedded in South Africa's history of colonialism, racism and recently ethnicism . The question is 'who should fund public infrastructure, the state or the private sector?' What are the implications for development and


economic growth on either, or and both financing mechanisms? Essentially, most if not all public spending including infrastructure investments should be borne by the fiscus through 'designated tax revenues and public user fees'. The role of the private sector should be very minimal in providing public infrastructure and limited to take the form of corporate social responsibility.

However, it is observed that 'the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to replace and complement the public provision of infrastructure has become common in recent years. Projects that require large upfront investments, such as highways, light rails, bridges, seaports and airports, water and sewage, hospitals and schools are now often provided via PPPs'. The role of ESKOM, Transnet, SANRAL, the South African Post Office Limited, Telkom and Petro SA are amongst the examples of observable PPPs in South Africa. Whilst financing of public infrastructure through public/private partnerships has benefitted some countries globally, the problem in South Africa is that of public corruption. locates high levels of corruption in the country to 'exceptionally high levels of social inequality, manifested not only in income level disparities but also in access to services'. Other scholars found that there are different things that cause corruption. cites 'lack of trust in the political system, perpetual underdevelopment of a country, political and socio-economic history and longevity of stable political systems as some of things that cause public corruption.

In addition, demonstrates that there are various theories that explain corruption; some locate its causes at individual level '(public choice theory, bad apple theory)' and others locate it within institutions '(organisational culture theories)', broader society '(clashing moral values theory, the ethos of public administration theories)' and others claim a combination of individual, organisational and societal factors '(correlation theories)'.

So, whilst, levels of inequality and dispersed income levels may be one of the causes of corruption in South Africa, it is certainly not the only one. There is a combination of factors that may be responsible for it. However, it is an established fact that 'half of South Africa's 50 million people live in poverty, earning less than R500 per month. Between a quarter and half of citizens cannot find work. Nearly one in five is living with HIV, contributing to a national life expectancy of just 52 years. A mere 10 % of income is shared by the bottom half (mostly black) while close to 60 % goes to the wealthiest 10 % (mainly white), making the mineral richest country also the most income-unequal on earth'. This is the harsh reality that the NDP faces.

Table 1:2. Money and Politics Project [MPP] analysis of inequality in South Africa by 2011



Author's compilation based on MPP figure

This means that the anti corruption strategy as set out in the National Development Plan (Manuel, The National Development Plan: Vision for 2030, 2011) requires more rigorous and sober attention than received in the last couple of years. Whilst corruption was a feature of the apartheid government, the country can no longer afford to blame it on the past and do nothing about it. The National Development Plan is very vocal about this aspect (p401). It is time for the democratic government to exercise its full muscle against corruption to avoid possible deterioration of the South African economy, deepening of unemployment and poverty than already experienced by the majority of citizens. The cost of corruption is very high on economic growth prospects.

(MPP, 2011) indicates that 'the total drain of corruption on South Africa's economy is estimated in the hundreds of billions of Rands per year or 10-25% of GDP. Auditor General Reports of unauthorised, irregular, and fruitless/wasteful spending found roughly R15 billion in 2009 and R26 billion misspent today...while the total cost of public corruption cannot be known, these data clearly show that corruption is not confined to isolated incidents of quid pro quo but remains deeply engrained in South Africa's political culture. So, the success of public infrastructure investment and the NDP vision depends highly on the country's ability to mitigate factors related to corruption amongst other things. The Industrial Policy Action Plan 2012-

2015, for instance, sets out promising possibilities for growing the economy through employment creation in various industrial sectors.

One example is the suggestion for 'local production of electricity and telecommunication cables that has the ability to create 1250 jobs' (DTI, 2010) between 2013 and 2015, whilst strengthening the possibility for increased access to electricity and telecommunication where shortages exist in the country. This could address some of the challenges faced by ESKOM and Telkom respectively. However corruption in tender bidding processes may affect such possibilities. So, there is a need to improve efficiency in public administration.

Conclusion

The National Development Plan Vision 2030 and the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2012/13-2014/15, have potential to advance South Africa into a different growth path capable of creating jobs and reduce poverty for the majority of the poor. However, it is crucial to note that South Africa is gradually becoming a capitalist state since the 80s. This has resulted in the gap between the rich and the poor widening. The class struggle continues to intensify between the capitalists (market oriented) and the socialists (state oriented). The South African state is itself directly involved in breeding capitalist modes of economic production through its neoliberal; market based economic growth policies from GEAR, ASGISA and now the NDP. This development is traced back from the Harrod-Domar and later Solow models of economic growth since the 50s finding their way to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund foreign aid policies.

Whilst the Structural Adjustment Policies did not directly impose itself to the South African economy, the global pressure to fit in caught up with South Africa in ways that pushed the country from implementing a pro-poor Reconstruction and Development Program in the 90s into a completely capitalist neoliberal economic path that persists even today. The neoliberal economic agenda basically promotes the role of free markets, reduction of budget deficit, social spending cuts and reduced state interference and leadership in the economy. In this instance the state becomes only a regulatory mechanism with very little influence to the direction of its economy. Infact the economy gets relegated to the power of capitalists. This context is very crucial in understanding the vision of the NDP, the Industrial Policy Action Plan and the pattern of government spending priorities as set out in the 2013 budget and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework of 2013-2015. This is seen in the envisaged financing role of infrastructure

development by the private sector.

More than 90% of the budget in 2013 is anticipated to come from private business with about 43% of that coming from the Industrial business sector. The financing role of state owned enterprises is very minimal, a mere 1%. This clearly indicates where the power lies in terms of influence to economic decisions and possibilities. Nonetheless, infrastructure investment has proven to be one of the great sources of economic growth globally. Whilst its financing should be the responsibility of the state, there seems to be a growing interest in the concept of public/private partnerships [PPPs] in financing and providing infrastructure developments. The challenge though in such partnerships is the level of public corruption observed, particularly in South Africa. The United Democratic Front revealed that the post-apartheid state has been engaged in acts of corruption since 1999 beginning with the Arms Deal right up to the recent e-toll saga in 2012. There seems to be a continuation of embezzlement of tax payers' money whereas little is being done to address the situation. Whilst, there is a huge potential to shift the economic situation to a better place by 2030, the rate of public corruption remains a huge threat to that possibility. It is crucial for all role payers in society to work towards the eradication of public corruption as a matter of urgency.

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The Paradox of Ethiopian Federalism

Olajide O. Akanji^Y

Abstract

One of the most controversial issues in conflict literature is the role and place of federalism in generating or mitigating conflict. Ethiopia which adopted federalism as a mechanism for achieving national integration given its pluralistic nature, has found that it does not provide the cure for all its maladies. The paper a desk research relied on secondary data, which were sourced from scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles, relevant books, government and institutional publications and materials downloaded from the internet. Data were analyzed and presented in themes. The paper argues that federalism in Ethiopia, though unique in that it accommodates the right to autonomy of the component units, has deepened a number of state pathologies. These include ethnic and sub-ethnic armed conflicts, condition of extreme poverty, and inter-governmental crises, all of which have serious consequences for human security. The pathologies, the paper concludes, are pointers to Ethiopia's fragility, since they affect government's ability to deliver core functions to the people.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the nature and impact of Ethiopian federalism on the country's development, peace, security and stability. It is concerned primarily, on the one hand, with federalism i.e. the division of political power between a central government and the component units of the state, and, on the other hand, with state fragility i.e. a situation in which a state is dysfunctional. Federalism, the world over, is a political system for accommodating differences among people divided by ethnic or cultural affiliations; it is a system predicated on achieving unity among populations of

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diverse cultures. In theory, political power and resources in a federation are shared between the central government and the governments of the constituent units.

In practice however, the use of federalism varies. In certain federations, such as Nigeria, the central government controls enormous political power and economic resources to the detriment of other levels of government (Suberu, 2010; LeVan 2005; Ojo 2005; Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005). In some others, the component units of the federation are granted substantial political and economic autonomy. Among the notable federal states where either of the two positions above exists are India, Canada, United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, Australia, Malaysia, Switzerland, Nigeria and Ethiopia. However, the extent of national integration, ethnic accommodation and the level of social, economic and political development attained by some of these federations show that they are successful federations. The United States of America, Germany, Canada and Switzerland are some examples in this category. On the other hand, a number of other federations, including Nigeria (Ojo 2005; Onwudiwe & Suberu 2005), are lacking in these qualities, being rather replete with numerous pathologies including high susceptibility to ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts, weak government, insecurity of lives and property, and dysfunctional socio-economic system that undermine their survival.

This raises a number of questions, particularly with respect to Ethiopia which is the focus of this study: To what extent has federalism fostered national unity, sense of belonging and inclusive and participatory government in Ethiopia? Has Ethiopian federalism impacted negatively or otherwise on the country's peace and stability? How has the nature of Ethiopian politics and governance impacted on federalism? The paper answers these questions by examining the nature, operationalization and consequences of federalism in the country. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section is introduction, followed by a conceptual analysis of federalism, nature of Ethiopian federalism, the dynamics and centrifugal forces of Ethiopian federalism and finally, concluding remarks.

Federalism: a conceptual note

Federalism has been well discussed in the literature. As a result, the concept has multiple definitions, all of which tend toward the same conclusion: the division of political power between a central government and the component units of the state. For example, federalism, according to Heywood (1999: 125), refers to “the legal and political structures that distribute power territorially within a state.” To King, quoted by Alemayehu (2004: 10), federalism is “an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign

state, and distinguished from other such states solely on the fact that its central government incorporates regional units into its decision procedures on some constitutionally entrenched basis.”

Borzel (cited in Teshome and Zahorik, 2008: 2) argued that federalism “refers to a spatial or territorial division of power between two or more levels of government in a given political system.” For Stevenson (2005) federalism is a type of political system in which legislative power is divided between a central or federal legislature and a number of state or provincial legislatures.” But to Riker (cited in Alemayehu 2004), federalism refers to a state in which “two levels of government rule the same land and people; each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous; there is some [Constitutional] guarantee...of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere”. However, Alemayehu (2004:10) considers federal arrangement as, “partnership between a territorially based regional units and a central government whose relationship is regulated by a constitution or covenant.”

Notwithstanding the near-convergence of opinions on the meaning of federalism, there is ambiguity in the area of typology and workings of federal systems. This is because there are different types of federalism, including 'dual federalism', which refers to a situation in which federal and state governments occupied separate and indestructible spheres of policy power (Heywood 1999: 128). Others include 'cooperative federalism', construed as being based on the growth of 'grants in aid' from the federal government to the state and localities; and 'coercive federalism', a system in which the federal government brings about the compliance of the states and localities by passing laws that pre-empt their powers and imposing restrictions on them (Heywood 1999: 128). Similarly, a variety of interpretations and nomenclatures of federal structures of government exists. These include 'presidential federalism', 'parliamentary federalism' and 'executive federalism', among others, leading to the conclusion that there are no two identical federal structures.

The array of nomenclatures is attributed to the fact that a number of issues, including geopolitical, historical, social, economic and cultural, as well as external factors, often influence and shape the formation of federations and the adoption of federal systems by states. However, though there are different federal structures the world over the central feature of all federations has been identified as the sharing of sovereignty between central and peripheral institutions.

Andrew Heywood, for example, noted that federalism, in theory, requires the existence of, at least, “two distinct levels of government, neither of which is legally or politically subordinate to the other”, and “its central feature is the notion of shared sovereignty” (Heywood 1999: 125); as well as “reciprocity”

and “mutuality” (Proudhon [1840] cited in Heywood, 1999). Accordingly, CFR (2004) noted that “federalism is a system of government or power arrangement crafted deliberately to deal with a sociologically complex polity”, such as presented by Ethiopia's multiethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious composition (Kefale 2003).

Thus, federalism is a mechanism for managing ethnic relations in plural societies, because it recognises and accommodates the ethnic distinctiveness of the constituent ethnic groups in plural societies and envisions and advocates successful integration as the critical end result of inter-group contacts (Osaghae 2006; 2004; Coakley 2000; Hechter 2000; Ghai 2000). For example, Eghosa Osaghae, cited in Teshome and Zahorik (2008:7), referring to Africa, argues that federalism is a mechanism for managing the problem emanating from diversity such as inequitable social and political relations, and unequal development of groups.

However, the recurring problem of ethno-religious conflicts and socio-political marginalisation of ethnic minorities in some federations such as Nigeria (Suberu, 2010; Ojo, 2005; Onwudiwe & Suberu, 2005) suggests the failure of federalism, and corroborates Arend Lijphart's comment (cited in Shulman, 1999), that “...in almost all theories of integration, a high degree of cultural homogeneity, and especially a homogenous political culture, is considered to be a pre-requisite for political integration....” Nevertheless, it is contended that focusing on homogeneity for integration to occur, as argued by Lijphart, is misleading.

Purcell and Sawyer (1993) argues that such emphasis leads to the presumption that conflict arises out of the collective demand of the group against the dominant segment of society, and that resolution of such conflict lies in the benevolent allocation (of resources and power) or in the marginalized ethnic group accommodating its demands to the universal organizational principle of the society. It is however in view of the divergence in scholarly opinions on the conflict mitigating role of federalism and the mechanisms for fostering integration that this paper examines Ethiopian federalism, as a way of determining its nature and the extent to which it has or otherwise contributed to peace, stability and development of the country.

The Nature and Dynamics of Ethiopian federalism

The origin of federalism in Ethiopia has been a subject of scholarly debate. For instance, while some scholars, including Abbink (1997), argued that federalism has always been part of Ethiopia's political tradition, others such as Serra-Horguelin (1999) argued that federalism is a recent development in the country. Notwithstanding, it is generally accepted that Ethiopia has evolved a unique type of federalism, popularly referred to as 'ethnic

federalism'. Though unique, Ethiopian federalism in Ethiopia is however controversial. The uniqueness of Ethiopian federalism relates particularly to the recognition of the rights of the ethnic groups, and especially to the right of secession of the constituting ethnic groups of the federation. The controversy however bothers on a number of issues, including the rationale, the essence and implications of the ethnic colouration of the federal system, and whether federalism is only part of the contemporary history of Ethiopia or predates the country's modern history.

To some scholars, including Chabal and Daloz (1999), Hechter (2000), Cohen (1995), Henz (1998), and Kidane (1997), ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is a potential instrument for promoting and fostering national unity and integration; since it recognises the right to self-determination, including the right of secession, of all ethnic nationalities within the Ethiopian federation. Conversely, Mazrui (1994), Keller (2002), Ottaway (1994), Abbink (1993) and Huntington (1993) observed that ethnic federalism portends a serious threat to Ethiopia's democratic survival and corporate existence. The major thrust of their arguments is that ethnic federalism engenders ethnic cleavages which fosters ethnic conflicts and political instability that will eventually result in state collapse and disintegration.

However, despite the controversy surrounding the practice of ethnic federal system in Ethiopia, the system has endured till date. The major driving force of Ethiopian ethnic federalism is the country's federal constitution of December 1994. The constitution, which was a product of the overthrow of the Marxist military government in 1991 by the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), recognised Ethiopia as a federal state. Article 1 of the constitution, which addresses the nomenclature of Ethiopia as a federal and democratic state; chapters 4 and 5, which relate to Ethiopia's structure and the structure and division of powers; chapter 6 (articles 55 & 62), which bothers on the powers and functions of federal legislative bodies; and articles 94-98 on financial expenditures, revenue and power of taxation point to the federal content of the 1994 constitution.

There is sufficient evidence in the constitution that recognition and emphasis is placed on the rights of the constituent nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, which portends the decentralisation of power, than the concentration of power in the federal government. The first paragraph of the preamble of the constitution, which reads: "We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our rights to self-determination..." (FDRE, 1994), and Article 8(1), which asserts that "all sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia", as well as Article 39, which focuses on the rights of

nations, nationalities and peoples, show that Ethiopian federalism is based on ethnic lines. Accordingly, substantial power is given to the ethnic groups (referred to as nations, nationalities and peoples in the constitution)¹.

For instance, article 47(2) recognises the nations, nationalities and peoples within the officially listed nine States in the constitution as having the right to establish, at any time, their own state, subject to fulfilment of laid down procedures. Similarly, ethnic groups in Ethiopia have the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (article 39, subsection 1).

Besides the right of secession, which by international standard is an external self-determination right, the other being decolonization (Alfredsson, 2000), ethnic groups in Ethiopia equally have access to internal self-determination rights, which by international human rights practice are the rights that groups and minorities exercise within the framework of a sovereign state (Alfredsson 2000). These, in the case of the Ethiopian federal constitution include the right of ethnic groups to speak, write and develop their own language; to express, develop and promote their culture; and to preserve their histories (article 39 subsection 2).

There is also the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that they inhabit and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments (article 39 subsection 3). The section equally contains the conditions for secession. These include: (a) approval by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned, and the demand is presented in writing to the State Council, (b) referendum to be organised by the federal government within one year after receiving the request for secession, and (c) majority vote in the referendum.

Given the novelty of the 1994 constitution, particularly regarding the right to self-determination, the framers of the constitution intended that Ethiopian federalism would decrease ethnic demand for secession by increasing ethnic right to self-government. However, Vestal (1999) and Walle (1997) cited in Teshome and Zahorik (2008) opined that Ethiopian ethnic federalism is the “divide and rule” policy of the Tigry People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the core organisation of EPRDF, which represents only 10% of the total population. The policy, it was argued, was designed by the TPLF to strengthen its position in the country.

1. A “Nation, Nationality or People” for the purpose of the Ethiopian Constitution of 1994, is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (article 39 subsection 5).

Furthermore, in a bid to resolve conflicts over representation, resources and sharing of revenue, the constitution provides for a bicameral federal legislature comprising representatives of all ethnic groups, including minority nationalities and peoples. Article 54, relating to the composition of the House of Peoples' Representatives, provides that; "Members of the House shall be elected from candidates in each electoral district by plurality of votes [and] provisions shall be made by law for special representation for minority Nationalities and Peoples" (FDRE 1994). By this provision, the right of representation of Ethiopians, including minorities are constitutionally guaranteed. In the same vein, articles 94 and 95, relating to financial expenditures and revenue respectively, established the pattern of fiscal relationship and responsibilities of the federal government and the states. Article 95, for example, provides that the sharing of revenue between the federal government and the states must take the federal arrangement of the country into account. This was aimed at forestalling conflicts over sharing of revenue.

Moreover, the provisions of articles 96-100, which relate to state and federal powers of taxation, concurrent taxation, undesignated powers and directives of taxation, further address the fiscal responsibilities of the states and the federal government. The fact, according to article 98(2), that both the federal government and the states can levy and collect taxes on income derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas operations, and royalties on such operations was intended to make the states self-sufficient, and prevent fiscal centralisation which occurs whenever the states depend on the federal/central government.

Similarly, the provision of article 52 on the powers and functions of states determined the nature of inter-governmental relations in Ethiopia. Among other things, the article stipulates that "All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States" (FDRE 1994). This means that State governments have residual power to legislate on issues that fall within their jurisdiction. These include administration of land and other natural resources, and imposition and collection of taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the States. The significance of the residual power is that States have a measure of financial and legislative autonomy from the federal government.

The Federal structure and centrifugal forces in Ethiopia

Federalism in Ethiopia has had multiple but mixed impacts on the country. These include decentralisation of power and resources to the ethnic States. This has engendered a modicum of participatory government in the country.

This is evidenced by the fact that since the adoption of the federal constitution in 1994, Ethiopia has held four successful, though controversial, general elections in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010, and a number of other elections. Also, federalism has engendered a measure of fiscal autonomy and fiscal responsibility of the sub-units of the federation, as they are constitutionally granted control over some resources and mandated to provide certain basic services to the people.

However, these gains of federalism in Ethiopia, namely, participatory government and sub-national autonomy, have been undermined by a number of factors. These include the increasing overbearing nature of the executive vis-à-vis other arms of government, rising incidence of corruption, lack of social accountability, and inadequate human and institutional capacity at the sub-national levels, as well as the dependence of the sub-units of the federation on the federal government for fiscal resources (African Development Bank, 2009). For example, despite the constitutional provisions on fiscal autonomy, States remained dependent on federal funds for capital projects because their financial and resource bases are not as expansive as those of the federal government (Abbink 2009). In the same vein, operationalization of the provisions on fiscal relationship between the federal and State governments has not prevented fiscal centralisation (Abbink 2009). This shows that though the constitution grants substantial autonomy to the States, a number of forces/factors have been undermining the exercise of the autonomy.

Besides inter and intra-ethnic conflicts and secession movements in the country since 1991 have been linked to the nature and practice of federalism. According to Abbink (2009),

In post-1991 Ethiopia ethnic identities, mainly in the form of linguistic-cultural background...were recognised politically and made the basis of regional and local administrations, to be filled by local people (often to the exclusion of so-called “non-natives” despite their job qualification). As such this was a new answer to the problems of multiethnic Ethiopia, but tensions between population groups on the national and local level were far from solved by it. Ethno-political competition emerged, also exclusionist discriminatory practices, and conflicts on power and budgets. Indeed, in looking at the number of local-level communal clashes – many violent – and the changing popular conceptions of the “causes” of conflicts, it can be said that a conflict-generating dynamic was perpetuated Abbink (2009: 13-14).

In the same vein, Teshome and Zahorik (2008: 21) noted that, 'In the post 1991 Ethiopia, major and minor ethnic conflicts have been raging in many parts of the country including the capital, Addis Ababa, due to political, economic and border problems'. Similarly, the official report of the Ethiopian

Federal Police (cited in Teshome and Zahorik 2008) noted that in 2000 EC² (2007/8 Gc³) alone, there were 28 ethnic conflicts in the country. These included conflicts between the Oromo and the Somali ethnic groups; Oromo and Harari, Somali and Afar; Oromo and Southern nations, and Oromo and Amhara.

Abbink (2009:15) equally pointed out that, “In 2008, apart from the Dirashe-Gauwwada [conflict], there were lethal clashes between the Borana and the Somali, the Konso and the Borana, the Guji and the Burji, and the Gumuz and the Oromo”. The prevalence of ethnic conflicts, and their implications for human security, underscores Ethiopia's fragility. This is because the conflicts, among other things, resulted in the death of many innocent people, the destruction of property, and the displacement of many people, as well as the closure of schools and the expulsion of ethnic minorities from various regions (Teshome and Zahorik, 2008:22).

While there is no doubt that many of these conflicts predated the adoption of a federal constitution in 1994, the nature and operationalization of the federal constitution has contributed to the escalation of many of the conflicts in a number of ways. Firstly, the constitution promotes, though inadvertently, ethnic identities at the expense of a common national identity for all Ethiopians, as States and their political power arrangements reflect the identities of the dominant ethnic groups. For example, the State of Afar and the State of Amhara are named after and controlled by the Afar and Amhara ethnic identities respectively. Even though Article 47 Section 2 of the 1994 Constitution provides that ethnic minorities in the States have the right to establish, at any time, their own States, the process (as contained in section 3a-e of article 47) by which the right is to be exercised is cumbersome and open to manipulation by the dominant groups. This has been to the disadvantage of the ethnic minorities, and underlined some of the intra-State conflicts in the country.

Secondly, the use of the identity of the dominant ethnic group/nationality to identify a State and the inclusion of the right of the ethnic minorities to demand for self-government forecloses the possibility of peaceful inter-ethnic relationship. This is because the idea has dichotomised Ethiopians into natives/indigenes and settlers/non-indigenes in the State in which they reside. The implication of the native-settler dichotomy has been the institutionalisation of ethnic discrimination and preferential politics through the constitution, which is inimical to successful national integration and unity. Put more succinctly, the fact that the 1994 federal constitution, the

² EC (*Ethiopian Calendar*)

³ GC (*Gregorian Calendar*)

basis of the country's federalism, ethnicized social and community relations makes conflicts in the federation, between and within ethnic groups/nationalities, inevitable.

Furthermore, since the adoption of the federal constitution in 1994 secessionist wars have escalated in some parts of the country. The cases of the Ogaden and the Oromo secessionist wars are examples. The two ethnic groups have been seeking to secede through their guerrilla forces, namely, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Both groups have been challenging the legitimacy of the Ethiopian state since the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Between 1975 and 1994, these groups and similar other ones agitated unsuccessfully for self-determination.

However, the adoption of the 1994 constitution, with its recognition of the right to secession of ethnic groups, has encouraged the groups to intensify their demands through constitutional means. For instance, the Ogaden clan, which dominated the State of Somalia assembly (one of the nine States/regions in the country) opted for secession by exercising its constitutional right to external self-determination in 1994.

The effort by the group was, according to Hagmann and Khalif (cited in Teshome and Zahorik 2008: 22), aborted by the federal government. This heightened the group's demands for independence, and the use of its ONLF guerrilla force to actualise it. As a result, by 2007, the ONLF had resorted to the use of terror tactics against the Federation by attacking oil exploration sites and government facilities, which resulted in loss of lives. The government response to ONLF and similar groups has been a massive counter-insurgency campaign that has further resulted in human (civilian) losses (Ibid).

The prevalence of armed conflicts in the country, with serious implications for human security, and many other issues such as poverty, corruption and absence of social accountability in government (African Development Bank 2009), underscored the description and designation of Ethiopia as a fragile state by scholars and international development agencies. It has been noted that:

Ethiopia might still be called a “failed state” because it targets civilians in insurgent areas (Ogaden, Oromiya), cannot offer millions of people basic food security (every year), fails on basic services, cannot guarantee basic rule of law for all, follows arbitrary practices whereby citizens cannot be secure of life and property, where due judicial process is not guaranteed and people are often deeply humiliated by government agencies (Abbink, 2009: 20)

The categorisation of Ethiopia as a fragile state by international development agencies, including the World Bank, and major donor countries such as Canada (CIFP 2012) is predicated on the conceptions of fragile states/state fragility in the literature. Though there is no universal consensus on the definition of fragile state, the central feature of all existing definitions is the inability of the state to discharge its core responsibilities to its people (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2010a & 2010b; Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009; Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, 2008; Carment et al 2008; OECD 2007; DFID 2005; World Bank 2005; Valling and Moreno-Torres, 2005; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002).

The OECD, for example, describes fragile states as states that are 'unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (OECD 2007). The Department for International Development DFID (2005) also defines fragile states as 'those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor'. Whilst Ethiopia falls within the frameworks of fragile states described by OECD and DFID, as the country ranks among the poorest in the world with, for example, 38 percent of the population in 2009 living below the poverty line (ADB 2009), the definitions by Stewart and Brown (2010) and World Bank (2005) explain better why Ethiopia is a fragile state. According to Stewart and Brown (2010), fragile states are states that are failing or at the risk of failing in service delivery, security provision and democratic ideals. This depicts more accurately the condition of Ethiopia, characterised by protracted violence, insecurity and poverty.

In the same vein, Ethiopia's fragility is better captured by the World Bank's conceptualisation of fragile states, as low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below (over a range of 1 to 6) on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (World Bank 2005). This is because the CPIA ratings of the World Bank are based on the key internal elements that are within each country's control. These are economic management, nature of structural policies, policies for social inclusion, and equity, and public sector management and institutions (World Bank 2005). Ethiopia's poor performance on these indicators, due, among other things, to food insecurity, absence of basic services to the people, and the existence of an overbearing federal government (Abbink 2009), underlined being ranked among the most fragile states in the world in 2011 and 2012 (CIFP 2012; OECD 2013).

Concluding Remarks

This paper examined the role of federalism in Ethiopia, showing that it has been a paradox. The paper demonstrated that, whereas federalism was adopted as a mechanism for managing the country's plurality, specifically to

foster integration and unity; it has had significantly mixed impacts on the country. On the one hand, federalism has promoted decentralisation of power and resources to the ethnic States, and encouraged the growth of participatory democracy, which in turn has engendered a modicum of political stability when compared with the period between 1974 and 1993. On the other hand, however, the paper showed that federalism is implicated in inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements in the country. This is in spite of the fact that the country's federalism accords the ethnic States a number of rights, including right to draw their own official language, develop their own administrative systems, establish separate police forces, and collect certain taxes.

The failure of Ethiopian federalism to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts can be attributed to a number of reasons, including the fact that the initiative for the rights of the ethnic States came from the federal government rather than the ethnic States. This arrangement, Teshome and Zahorik (2008:16) described as “imposition from the top” or from the “Center scheme”. Aside from other effects, armed conflicts, caused or catalysed by the nature of the country's federalism, undermined the overall capacity of the Ethiopian state to discharge its basic responsibilities to the people, underscoring its fragility and categorisation by international development agencies and donor countries as a fragile state.

As a result, it is imperative that the Ethiopian government adopt measures by which it can foster national cohesion and unity and a sense of belonging among its people. Among the options suggested in the literature include the creation of a “national public” (Levine 2008), and re-arrangement of the ethno-linguistic borders delineated by the constitution (Abbink 2006). Besides, the Ethiopian government must ensure adherence to and respect for the provisions of the constitution; it should provide the platform for the people, minorities and majority alike, to exercise and enjoy their individual human and group rights. This will mitigate secession tendencies and armed conflicts among the people.

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The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty and Nigeria's National Security

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Abstract

Are there factors that could affect the successful implementation of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty in Nigeria? The proliferation of arms, obviously, has been a major security challenge to nations of the world, especially in Africa. Several strategies and policies; national and international have also been formulated to cushion the increasing proliferation of small arms as well as reduce the level of insecurity this situation poses for nations that face them, but the question remains; to what extent can these international policies be implemented in Africa in general and Nigeria particularly, considering the dynamic nature of the African environment? Having undertaken a qualitative investigation in data gathering and a descriptive analytical interpretation of these data, the study concludes that the arms trade treaty is a laudable initiative and a very potent policy to effectively mitigate small arms proliferation, but this treaty unfortunately, is likely to fail like the ECOWAS Moratorium at the regional level and similar national policies, expect conscious steps are taken to ensure, among other factors, a responsible and reliable leadership that can deliver on the people's mandate. The Nigerian social structure, it can be argued, does not encourage the implementation of a policy on non-proliferation of small arms; rather, its very nature promotes it.

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the emergence of a bi-polar world, arms race has been a major security challenge for both the developed and the developing countries of the world. Several actions,

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activities have been carried out, and several national, regional and international policies decisions have been made to curb the illicit trade and transfer of arms and ammunitions across borders, and even of more recent concern, the transfer of small arms and light weapons among non-state actors within territories of the state. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is one of such policies adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations to curb the illicit and indiscriminate transfer of small arms and Light weapons globally. Other such policies against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons include; ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP), International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA), West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) among others. However, this paper would be particular about the Arms Trade Treaty and the implications of this international treaty for the security of the Nigerian state.

The Arms Trade Treaty was opened for signing at the New York Headquarters of the United Nations Organization in April 2013, and barely one month later; precisely June 20, 2013, 72 of the 158 member nations of the United Nations had already signed this treaty for implementation in their territories.

Nigeria has made laudable efforts in institutionalizing its war against the illicit trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons in the country. The inauguration of the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North and Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the 24th of April 2013, as well as the Nigeria National Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons Bill 2013 passed by the National Assembly can be regarded as several steps in the right direction.

Despite these efforts, proliferation of small arms has continued to be a major challenge to security in the country, which raises questions that go beyond mere policy implementation.

Key Points of the Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty happens to be arguably the most recent international treaty against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), following the ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa which was established in 1998; over a decade ago. One might be forced to be inquisitive as to what impact the Moratorium has had on the perceived increasing level of proliferation of SALW across the continent, especially in the conflict ridden

areas of Africa.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a 28-article treaty that contains rules, principles and guidelines for the purchase, use and transfer of conventional arms; which according to Article 2 of the Treaty include, “Battle tanks, Armoured combat vehicles, Large-calibre artillery systems, Combat aircraft, Attack helicopters, Warships, Missiles and missile launchers and Small arms and light weapons”. The Treaty, which is intended to 'contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability, reduce human suffering and promote cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties involved in the international trade in conventional arms-building confidence among State Parties', has two major objectives, namely:

1. To establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms
2. To prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversions, for the purpose of; contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; reducing human suffering; promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among State Parties.

The Treaty, as usual, opens with a preamble highlighting the terms upon which states parties accept to be subject to the provisions of the treaty, guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, based on eight (8) specific principles, which summarily acknowledge the right of all States to individual or collective self-defence, territorial sovereignty, respect for humanitarian laws, regulate international trade in conventional arms and implement national control systems and respect for States legitimate interests to acquire conventional arms for self-defence and peacekeeping operations as well as produce such arms.

A few articles in this treaty are worthy of special mention as they contain obligations that are more specific to Africa and Nigeria in particular, especially, being an arms importing developing State. We will go further to examine how the dynamics of Nigeria's 'developing' status and other factors affect the implementation of these articles both in Nigeria and beyond subsequently.

Article 5 captioned 'General Implementation', provides information as to how each State Party to the treaty is advised to go about implementing the treaty within their territory; State Parties are encouraged to keep in mind the principles summarized earlier, establish national control systems and list which should be made available to the national and international public, designate competent national authorities to ensure effective and transparent

national control systems and establish national points of information and contact. These recommendations for implementing this treaty appear to be more curative than preventive and are arguably inappropriate for the African continent where a number of other issues could be responsible for the proliferation of such conventional arms.

Articles 8 and 9 border on 'import' and 'transit or trans-shipment' respectively, again not putting into consideration the nature of weak institutions in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. For instance, Article 9 recommends; "each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms ... through its territory in accordance with relevant international law". Such appropriate regulatory measures can only be implemented by institutions that are tested and trusted overtime to be effective and efficient, and these institutions rarely exist in Nigeria.

Article 14, lays emphasis on 'enforcement', recommending that State Parties should enforce national laws and regulations that would assist in implementing this treaty. This recommendation may prove difficult to efficiently implement, considering the nature and complexities of the Nigerian judiciary and law enforcement institutions.

Hence, my argument here borders on the fact that most, if not all of the provisions in this treaty, arguably, may prove a herculean task in many of the 'developing' countries of Africa, especially in Nigeria and this is as a result of the weak institutions, corrupt law enforcement units and personnel and other social dynamics which may not have been aptly captured in this section.\

Juxtaposing the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with the ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa

Upon due consultations and consideration with African and international organizations, civil society and weapon manufacturing countries, a Moratorium (suspension of an ongoing or planned course of action) on importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in Africa was signed by members of the ECOWAS sub region of Africa, in Abuja, Nigeria on the 31st of October 1998 for a renewable period of 3 years with effect from November 1, 1998 when the Moratorium officially took off. Tracing the history of the Moratorium, Egeland et. al.cited in Lodgaard & Ronnfeldt (1999), observed that Alpha Oumar Konaré; the President of Mali, proposed at a UN conference in Bamako in November 1996, a moratorium on import, export and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa. Within the political framework established by the moratorium, measures would be taken to mop up illicit arms and create a secure environment for development.

The idea of the Malian President which received wide acceptance from

the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU); former Organization of African Unity, amongst other regional and international organizations, according to Vines (2005) was renewed in 2001 and in 2004 respectively. The Moratorium which was signed by the sixteen (16) Heads of States and Governments of the ECOWAS states, based on certain agreed terms, was to bring to a halt the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states.

The Moratorium, unlike the Arms Trade Treaty didn't have provisions broken down into various articles, instead, the 16 Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, on the December 10, 1999, signed a 17-article Code of Conduct for the effective implementation of this mechanism based on agreed principles, which encourage transparency in military and security matters (Fung et.al., 2000).

The Code of Conduct for the Moratorium also has specific articles that are worthy of note. Article 2, for instance, captioned 'Scope of Moratorium' states that 'the Moratorium shall apply to the import, export and manufacture of light weapons...' One can deduce from the incessant intra-state conflict events that plague the continent, that arms are not necessarily made available by imports or exports, let alone manufacture, even though these exist to an extent, they do not supersede the cases of illegal transfer of arms within the state. The sources of these arms are not our concern in this section.

Article 4 is similar to the recommendation of a national control system, the Article 5 of the Arms Trade Treaty recommends the 'establishment of National Commissions, made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and civil society, assisted by guidelines prepared by a collaborative effort of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED).

Article 7 in agreement with the fourteenth article of the ATT recommends legislative and administrative measures to enhance the implementation of the Moratorium, also not taking into cognizance the dynamic of institutions in Africa, especially those of law enforcement and security.

One may argue that the success of implementing the Moratorium in West Africa and in fact other parts of Africa, as contained in Article 17 of the Moratorium, was a factor responsible for the United Nations establishing the Arms Trade Treaty a decade and half after the signing of the Moratorium. However, the questions that need answer still steer us in the face; has the proliferation of light weapons in West Africa been successfully addressed?

Arms Proliferation in Nigeria

Nigeria is regarded as the giant of Africa, having the highest number of black population on the continent. Hence, among other factors, this may well

qualify her as a good enough yardstick for a study of this nature on the continent. Judging from the pockets of conflict situations that have plagued several African countries in the recent past, one can conveniently say that conflicts are still a major challenge in Africa. Although these conflicts are more of 'intra' than 'inter'-state conflicts and they involve non-state actors than those who possess the legitimate use of force – the armed forces.

According to the Small Arms Survey report; *Development Denied* (2003: 4); there are over 1100 companies from 98 countries producing Small Arms and Light Weapons today and it is also estimated that about 640 million, if not more, small arms are in circulation globally today. We must mention however that the existence of arm in Africa were majorly as a result of activities of the 'West' – the developed countries in the late 80s and early 90s. The United Nations Security Council (2003) in its 4720th meeting on the 18th of March 2003, identified West Africa as one of the most badly hit areas of the world with regards to small arms; this view was captured in this assertion:

“(...) the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the phenomenon of mercenaries pose complex challenges to West Africa, involving security, humanitarian and development dimensions. The upsurge in intra-state conflicts and violence has created a staggering demand for small arms, and has contributed to the continued proliferation of bandits, rebel groups, mercenaries, uncontrolled police and militia in the entire sub-region.”

Arguably, armed conflicts have been the major cause of the loss of several lives in the sub region, although it may be difficult to establish the exact number of fatalities that can be credited to armed conflicts. Although, March (2005) reported that there are an estimated 10-20 million small arms been transferred within the West African sub region.

Nigeria has continued to face serious conflict challenges; more of these conflicts have been ethnic and inter-communal violence which have been experienced in several parts of the country especially since the end of military rule in 1999. Jekada (2005) argued that the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in Nigeria is traceable to the failure of the Nigerian government to effectively implement a comprehensive arms collection programme after the 30-month civil war between the Federal Government of Nigeria and Republic of Biafra (1967 - 1970). This situation has further been aggravated by the growing rate of crime, endemic corruption and ethno-religious conflicts as well as increased leakages from government armories for a number of reasons which are not limited to the ones highlighted above.

Expectedly, the Nigerian government has been attempting a number of measures to curb the increase in proliferation of these weapons that have

arguably accounted for a greater number of casualties including defenseless civilians; especially women and children. The Firearms Act of 1959 was one major legal initiative by the government to address the issue of production, import and export of light weapons, the Act was reviewed in 2001, partly as a result of the arrest of 12,000 people between 1990 and 1999, in relation to arms trafficking and illegal possession of weapons, although fewer than 50 of these arrested persons were successfully prosecuted (Jekada, 2005). The Federal Government also, in July 2000, set up a twelve-member National Committee on Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in Small and Light Weapons (NCPTAW) with the aim of gathering information on the proliferation of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and recommending appropriate measures to deal with this challenge. Although, in July 2001 it publicly destroyed 428 rifles, 494 imported pistols, 287 locally made pistols and Dane guns seized by security agencies (Jekada, 2005), the NCPTAW has since inception not produced any official report of its findings, hence the speculations among interested parties that the committee has had very limited or no impact at all in curbing small arms proliferation in Nigeria. Another committee set up for similar purpose was the Special Committee on Disarmament, which was inaugurated by former President Obasanjo in 2004. Even more recent was the inauguration of a seventeen-member Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons by President Goodluck Jonathan on April 24, 2013, to ensure that, based on 'the framework of cooperation with neighboring and other countries in ECOWAS and Sahelian region' the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is strictly addressed. The committee, which is supposed to provide advice and international linkages to relevant government departments, was charged with establishing links cooperation with similar institutions and other agencies that can help build capacity for security, enhancing information sharing and develop multi-level international support relationship as well as strengthen regional cooperation, put forwards policy situations, review existing ones and recommend implementation strategy to combat illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, enhance border security, propose legislations and regulatory framework to strengthen control of arms proliferation in line with international standard. In inaugurating this committee, the Nigerian President, observed that 'the effect of small arms and light weapons in Africa is worse than the effect of nuclear weapons' and re-affirmed the readiness of his administration in ending violence and insecurity in the country as well as called on industrialized nations involved in the manufacture and transfer of arms to Africa to desist from such acts, likening it to the production and distribution of harmful drugs and in fact more devastating than that and finally called out to the United Nations to

come up with 'comprehensive' approach to the control of small arms and light weapons.

Implementing the ATT In Nigeria

Despite the several strategies that have been debated and implemented both regionally and nationally, arms proliferation still remains a 'hydra-headed' monster posing a challenge for governments in fulfilling their uncompromising requirement of national security. In fact, a study by the Department of International Development (DFID), cited in Egungbemi (2013:80) concluded that “*it is safe to say these strategies have no chance of working at all*”.

There are several factors that have lead to the proliferation of arms seeming like a problem that would never go away, major among these is the mere abundance and ready availability of these arms themselves; the more arms are in circulation within the country, the more prone agencies are to give up combating such proliferations. Krause (1996) captured this idea more aptly by asserting that, “the availability and use of more sophisticated weapons has contributed to the erosion of state authority”. The mere availability of guns, scholars have argued, is not the major cause of crime or conflict, rather, concurring with Jekada's view, “crime (or conflict) is rooted in the inept structural forms which create or sustain human insecurity in its broad sense” and that the proliferation of arms is “partly (if not increasingly majorly) a response to demand for personal security when normative social relations collapse or are seen to be on the brink of collapse” (Jekada, 2005: 45). A case in point is the increasing rate of purchase of small arms by residents of communities in Lagos for self-defense from armed robbery attacks and the alleged tardy Police response in times of such danger, reported in The Guardian newspaper of September 26, 2013, pg. 16. These are issues that must not be swept under the carpet if any progress is to be recorded in curbing the proliferation of small arms and the challenges that come with it.

Good governance is another factor to be carefully considered. LeVan (2005) asserted that 'Nigeria possesses many of the factors that arguably impede government performance such as ethnic and religious diversity, an economy highly dependent on natural resource exploitation and a history of political instability'. Although it can be argued that these factors identified by LeVan are not potent in impeding government performance, all other things being equal, but the situation described by LeVan above seems to correctly reflect the Nigerian condition. In 2003, the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index ranked Nigeria as the 151st of the world's poorest and most underdeveloped nation, a status that would

obviously have been reached as a result of a combination of several factors, perhaps including the ones identified by LeVan above. Further, this condition/ status arguably has a dual impact for implementing 'anti-arms proliferation' strategies: first, such a nation would have more of its attention, in terms of policies and programs, focused on improving the more 'common' indices of development such as increase in per-capita income, health care provisioning, education among others, hence less attention will be paid to the more dynamic issue of arms proliferation. Secondly, the level of underdevelopment in such nations can push individuals to 'doing for themselves what the government has failed to do for them'; citizens, by all means, tend to provide for themselves education, health care, better standards of living and the list goes on, and as such the possession and in fact use of small arms may prove very useful to them in such an endeavor. Alluding to this fact on in the broader context of West Africa, Krause observed in Jekada (2005: 46), that “the absence of functional and caring government has led to the spread of lawlessness and criminal violence”.

Leadership is the last, but by no means the least, of the factors we will consider as negatively affecting the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in Nigeria. Nigeria's foremost writer and novelist Late Professor Chinua Achebe dismissed the issue by concluding that 'the trouble with Nigeria is leadership', and Rotberg (2004: 14) quoted in Adebani and Obadare (2010: 393) asserted that Nigeria, like the rest of Africa, “has long been saddled with poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers”, under whose leadership Rotberg continues, “infrastructure...has fallen into disrepair, currencies have depreciated, and real prices have inflated dramatically, while job availability, health care, education standards, and life expectancy have declined. Ordinary life had become beleaguered: general security has deteriorated, crime and corruption have increased, much needed public funds have flowed into hidden bank accounts, and officially sanctioned ethnic discrimination – sometimes resulting in civil war – has become prevalent”. While these assertions do not describe the future of Nigeria, they (to a large extent) describe the present condition of the leadership in Nigeria, and I will leave you to conclude what implications this kind of leadership can have on arms proliferation and non-proliferation strategies, because your guess is as good as mine.

Conclusion

We have been interrogating the possibility for effective implementation of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty in Nigeria, and we have successfully highlighted a few points that would not allow for the effective

implementation of this Treaty in Nigeria, especially when compared with the level of success that have been achieved by ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa as well as other National Committees on Small Arms that have been inaugurated by the government. The impact of arms proliferation, we have concluded, is devastating for citizens and governments alike; even though the scope of damage will differ depending on what side it is calculated. However, several lives have been lost, not merely by the proliferation of small arms, but by the activities of those who have taken advantage of this proliferation to unjustly (or justly) inflict untold danger on their fellow humans.

Although it may be too early to evaluate the success or failure of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, since it was signed to be implemented in Nigeria on Monday, August 12, 2013 by Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who signed on behalf of the Federal Government Nigeria in New York, making Nigeria the first African country to ratify the treaty for implementation in the country. The several issues discussed in this paper; leadership and governance, to say the least, cannot guarantee a successful implementation of this treaty in Nigeria. If the provisions of the arms trade treaty are to be successfully implemented, then leadership must be responsible and accountable to the citizens and the government must fulfill its promise of a better life to the people as well. Positive changes in these areas will influence law enforcement agents to discharge their duties without fear or favor, citizens will also be satisfied, to a greater extent, and almost naturally, arms proliferation will decline because there will be increasingly no need for it.

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India's Look East Policy - A Critical Assessment of Relations with Nations of South Asia

Dr Mohd Shafi Bhat^Y

Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between India and other multilateral organisations formed with India since Independence; India's search for cooperation with other countries on various aspects such as environment, economic development, security and strategic affairs; and, the emergence of 'India's Look East policy' at the time when India's economy suffered a huge setback. India took a significant step towards forging deeper economic integration with its eastern neighbours as a part of new realpolitik in evidence in India's foreign policy, and the engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the recognition of India's economic importance in the region. This paper also examines how the liberalisation, privatization and globalization (LPG) model changed the overall economic perception of India.

Evolution of the Look East Policy

India's Look East Policy is an outcome of various changes in the political scenario of India since Post Cold War era that affected the foreign relations of all political systems in the world; changed perception and expectations of India in the international environment. The disintegration of USSR brought fundamental changes in India in the eyes the international community. The concept of regional cooperation in the third world countries presumptuously has greater importance which led to the series of reforms undertaken with respect to industrial sector, trade as well as financial sector aimed at making the economy more efficient. The basic aim of Look East Policy was to lead

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India towards liberalisation, privatization and globalization (LGP model) to make it growing faster in economy to compete globally.

With the outset of reforms and the changed geo-political scenario and economic realities of the post Cold War required new power alignments to unite for economic development and for achievement of modernisation, to open up a new chapter in the history of India and for her billion plus population, fortunately, different regions realized that cooperation alone offers the best opportunities for fulfilling the aspirations of, particularly, the third world countries. This change in economics impacted upon India's foreign policy in a big way and India took bold initiatives in its politics as a response to the evolving circumstances and economic issues started moving from the periphery to the centre stage of its foreign policy.

The Look East Policy was launched officially in the year 1991 by the government of Prime Minister P.V.Narasima Rao, although the term "Look East Policy" was mentioned for the first time in the Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs, 1995-96⁴. I. K. Gujral had stated that, "What look east really means is that an outward looking India, is gathering all forces of dynamism, domestic and regional, and is directly focusing on establishing synergies with a fast consolidating and progressive neighbourhood to its East in Mother Continent of Asia."⁵ (3) India's look East policy, thus, marked a dramatic shift in India's perspective of the world. According to Dr.Thongkholal Haokip, "The Look East policy is being rigorously pursued by the successive governments of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh."

After Second World War period it was postulated that India will follow traditional values held after Independence in 1947, such as self-reliance and socialistic policies of economic development, comprises of restrictive forms of governance, resulted in the isolation, overall backwardness and inefficiency of the economy, amongst a host of other problem in India. But, India remained inconsistent to their cultural and traditional values and adopted track to prosperity by fostering the relations with regional organisation to safeguard the national interest that helped the nations to tackle the problems of economic development and of bargaining power of underdeveloped and developing regions of the third world nations with the developed nations or north bloc by reducing their dependence on industrialization within Asian region. The two regional organisations ASEAN and SAARC played an important role in Southern region of world in

⁴ *Annual Report, 1995-96, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 7 & 118.*

⁵ *Statement by I.K.Gujral, Minister of External Affairs of India, in ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Jakarta, July 20-21, 1996. <http://www.aseansec.org/4308.htm>*

context of economic-development and mercantile.

“In the initial stage the focus of the Look East Policy was much on ASEAN. India's conscious efforts to forge closer economic ties with ASEAN member states paid dividends; bilateral relations between India and ASEAN improved rapidly. India became a 'Sectoral Dialogue Partner' in March 1993 in the three areas, namely, trade, investment and tourism, a full dialogue partnership in 1995, member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1996 and finally to a Summit Level Partnership in 2002.”⁶ Pertinently relation with ASEAN countries moved up a notch towards the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000. The then Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee intended to ameliorate India's Look East Policy by promoting the concept of "extended neighbourhood" and pronounced strategic flavour to delimit the extension of Look East Policy to the countries other than ASEAN member like Australia, Japan and South Korea. India's then Foreign Minister Jaswant Sinha heralded the second phase of the Look East Policy in 2003, by saying: "The first phase of India's Look East Policy was ASEAN-cantered and focused primarily on trade and investment linkages. The new phase of this policy is characterised by an expanded definition of 'East' extending from Australia to East Asia, with ASEAN at its aim. The new phase also marks a shift from trade to wider economic and security issues including joint efforts to protect the sea lanes and coordinate counter-terrorism activities. On the economic side, phase II is also characterized by arrangement for FTA and establishing institutional economic linkage between the countries of the region and India.”⁷

In 2003 second phase began to extend relationships from Australia to East Asia. It remained comprehensive in its coverage with ASEAN as its core. This phase marks a shift from trade to wider economic and security cooperation, political partnerships, physical connectivity through road and rail links. India-ASEAN covers wide field of cooperation including trade and investment, science and technology, tourism, human resource development, transportation and infrastructure, health and pharmaceuticals.

The another feature of the second phase of Look East Policy is that now India is trying to establish air and road links to East and Southeast Asia. As parts of its road diplomacy, India is now actively building transports corridors to the region. These include the trilateral highway project involving Myanmar and Thailand and the proposed rail link between New Delhi and

⁶ Haokip, Thongkhohal (2011) *Man and Society-A Journal of North East Studies*, Vol. VIII, Summer 2011, pp. 161-172.

⁷ Sinha's ,Yashwant,29 September 2003, speech at Harvard University, Cambridge, at www.meaindi.nic.in

Hanoi. Besides these, the second phase of India's Look East Policy has allowed India to break the artificial political barriers between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia. India's membership in the groupings like BIMSTEC and MGC has opened the door for the first time since independence to break out of the political confines of the subcontinent that have severely limited India's grand strategic optimism.⁸

India also signed “Long Term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” with ASEAN, which is the cornerstone of India's Look East Policy.”⁹

India had further reforms and advanced relationships with the other nations and still is in the process of restructuring her economy, with aspirations of elevating herself from her present desolate position in the world, the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has played an important role in the rapid economic growth of most of the Southeast Asian countries and importantly China, India has embarked on an ambitious plan to emulate the success of her neighbours to the east and is trying to sell herself as a safe and profitable destination for FDI.

In the era of economic globalization, expansion of foreign trade and investment is, of course, somewhat anaemic, reflecting the impact of global recession, although still vigorous in the sense of continuous international transmission of technology, information, ideas and social media. It has many meanings depending on the context and on the person who is talking about. Though the precise definition of globalization is still unavailable a few definitions are worth viewing, Guy Brainbant states that the process of globalization not only includes opening up of world trade, development of advanced means of communication, internationalization of financial markets, growing importance of MNCs, population migrations and more generally increased mobility of persons, goods, capital, data and ideas but also infections, diseases and pollution. The term globalization refers to the integration of economies of the world through uninhibited trade and financial flows, as also through mutual exchange of technology and knowledge. Ideally, it also contains free inter-country movement of labour. In context to India, this implies opening up the economy to Foreign Direct Investment by providing facilities to foreign companies to invest in different fields of economic activity in India, removing constraints and obstacles to the entry of MNCs in India, allowing Indian companies to enter into foreign

⁸ Mohan, C. Raja, October 9, 2003, “Look East Policy: Phase Two”, *The Hindu*,.

⁹ Address of the External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Republic of Korea on “India's Look East Policy” on 17/09/2007

collaborations and also encouraging them to set up joint ventures abroad; carrying out massive import liberalization programs by switching over from quantitative restrictions to tariffs and import duties, therefore globalization has been identified with the policy reforms of 1991 in India.¹⁰

Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization

In the beginning of the 1990s the economy of India had undergone tremendous policy shifts. India had adopted new model of economic reforms commonly known as LPG or Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization model. The cardinal objective of this model was to make the economy of the seventh largest in the world these fastest developing economies in the global world with capabilities that help it match up with the biggest economies of the world.

The chain of reforms that took place with regards to business, manufacturing, and financial industries targeted at lifting the economy of the country to a more proficient level. These economic reforms had influenced the overall economic growth of the country in a significant manner. India by 1985 having balance in payment and by the end of 1990 Indian economy was in deep crisis. The government was close to default, its central bank had refused new credit and foreign exchange reserves had plummeted to such a point that India could hardly finance three weeks'; Inflation had roared to an annual rate of 17 percent; fiscal deficit was very high and had become unsustainable; foreign investors and NRIs had lost confidence in Indian Economy. Country was close to default loans, and at the same time in Western and Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere transpired many unforeseeable changes that swept the economies of these nations. Also, there were the economic compulsions at home and abroad that called for a complete overhauling of economic policies and programs. Major measures initiated as a part of the liberalization and globalization strategy in the early nineties included the following:

Devaluation: In order to resolve Balance of Payment [BOP] crises, devaluation of Indian currency by 18-19 percent was taken against major currencies in the international foreign exchange market.¹¹

Disinvestment: To make globalisation process smooth, privatization and liberalization policies are moving along as well. Under the privatization schemes, most of the public sector undertakings have been sold to private sector.¹²

¹⁰ Malik T, 2004. *Impact of globalization on Indian economy*; accessed on April 25, 2010 (Source: <http://www.fibre2fashion.com/industry-article/8/738/impact-of-globalization1.asp>)

¹¹ *Ibid*

¹² *ibid*

There are numerous political, economic, securities and socio-cultural factors at making Asia Pacific a highly dynamic region. India needs to have a long term strategy to make use of these opportunities arising in the Asia-Pacific while keeping in consideration the security challenges. The Asia-Pacific is marked by the following key trends:

Rise of China, the rebalancing strategy of the US. These strategies are applied to maximise security and development opportunities 'Asia-Pacific' to sets out long term approach for India. The focus is mainly on Indo-ASEAN relations while other countries are discussed in brief.

Rise of China

“China's rise has created a flux. An economic giant, with a GDP of USD 7.3 trillion (2011-World Bank) & an annual military expenditure of Yuan 650 billion (approx USD 103 billion) in 2012, China has overtaken Japan in economic and military terms and may overtake the US' economy in the next 10-20 years depending upon the growth rate differential between the two countries.”¹³

According to Guo, Sujian (2007). China's “peaceful development” was an official policy in China under the leadership of Hu Jintao. The rise is altering the balance of power globally & regionally. The confidence in China's peaceful rise and peaceful development has been seriously dented due to rising tensions in South China Sea and in East China Sea. The new leadership is nationalistic & sharply focused on China's 'core' interests.’

According to Henry Kissinger in his book *On China*, Zheng Bijian provided the "quasi-official" policy statement for China in a 2005 Foreign Affairs article. Zheng promised that China had adopted a “strategy...to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge.” China sought a “new international political and economic order,” but it was “one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations.” China would “not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War.”¹⁴

China's fast military modernisation and protection of its power beyond immediate neighbourhood has raised apprehensions among its neighbours. It has developed a powerful navy – with aircraft carriers, submarines, anti-ship

¹³ Gupta, Arvind (2013) *India's approach to Asia Pacific* [source http://idsa.in/policybrief/IndiasapproachtoAsiaPacific_agupta_190913]

¹⁴ Bijian, Zheng (September–October 2005). "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status"

missiles – which is rivalling that of Japan and the US. China is following Anti Access Anti-Denial (A2D) strategy to deter the US from entering the island chain in the area of Chinese influence.

It is quintessential to view rising tide of nationalism in China that has caused anxieties among neighbours. China's formulations on 'core' interests with attendant focus on sovereignty, has created doubts in the minds of the neighbouring countries about China's intentions. China regards the South China Sea as its internal waters. This will have major impact not only in the neighbourhood but also for international shipping. On the other hand, it must be recognized that China's rise has also benefitted the neighbours, particularly in the economic field. According to Arvind Gupta, director of Indian based think tank, IDSA “China-ASEAN trade is \$ 380 billion. The ASEAN economies have got integrated with that of China. People-to-people contacts between China and its neighbours have also deepened with greater connectivity, openness and transparency.”

He further states that China is getting integrated with the regional architectures. This has increased the role of China in regional stability. The economic and social interdependence of China has increased. “China is participating in RCEP negotiations. RECP will bring about a higher level of economic integration between the ASEAN, China, Japan, Australia and India.”

The future is unpredictable and China's economical performance is riddled with many problems which suspect its growth. It will be interesting to study elasticity of China's economic performance and how long it will maintain its longevity of growth. Also, at this moment, it would be inconsequential to containment of China given the growing interdependence between China and most major economies of the region.

US Rebalancing Strategy

As President Obama enters his second term, continuing to shift U.S. attention and resources to the Asia—/Pacific will be a leading U.S. foreign policy priority. While many in the region have welcomed this renewed commitment, the U.S. "pivot" to Asia has created heightened concerns in China about U.S. intentions¹⁵ according to Ely Ratner, “U.S. efforts to expand its military force posture in Asia, to strengthen security ties with allies and partners, and to enhance the role of regional institutions are viewed by many in Beijing as directly aimed at constraining China's rise and as the principal

¹⁵ For an official articulation of the "pivot" or "rebalancing" strategy, see Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.

cause of regional instability as well as the deterioration of China's strategic environment.

China's rise in economic and political influence is the single factor that will reshape the international politics of 21st century. Though, China is not a threat but a challenge for America and other nations. Therefore, the focused should go to address the Chinese competition not through economic protectionism but rather through sustained investment in the education and economic sector. Since America deepens its diplomatic, economic and military engagement in Asia, it would be a perceived sense of deterrence for USA to feel the presence of China in Asia. Furthermore, from a broader regional perspective, continued engagement with China will be a key element to actualizing the rebalancing strategy and ensuring that the United States can advance its multitude of interests in Asia.

“The US has been a key player in the security and economic architecture of the region. The biggest challenge before the US is to adjust to the rise of China. Having got entrapped in the highly expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and having been affected by the economic slowdown, the US is in a perilous condition. The US has been compelled to reduce its defence budget due to lack of resources.”¹⁶

Many political and economic pundits believe that China will supersede US, though it will remain military and economic power in the foreseeable future – but if the situation worsens it can bounce back due to its vast capabilities in innovation and technology. Yet, according to certain speculative analysis across the globe China will overtake the US in the next two or three decades.

According to Fran Shor United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after World War II, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors.¹⁷ This lead to the US to build on the rebalancing policy

¹⁶ Gupta, Arvind (2013) *India's approach to Asia Pacific* [source http://idsa.in/policybrief/IndiasapproachtoAsiaPacific_agupta_190913]

¹⁷ John Gulick, 'The Long Twentieth Century and Barriers to China's Hegemonic Accession', *Journal of World-Systems Research* 17:1, 2011, 17.

pivoting to Asia, Obama's second phase in administration has adjusted rebalancing strategy, aiming at strengthening existing alliances, searching new partners like India, Indonesia, forging economic partnership (TPP) and achieving a constructive relationship with China.

But, it is pertinent that Beijing suspect rebalancing attempt as to contain China. It is obviously suspicious of the US partnership especially with India. Nevertheless, China has developed their own A2D strategies to preclude US from coming too close to the China shores. The Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea, East China Sea and other areas are part of its strategy to keep the US away and to signal Chinese area of influence.

There is a conjecture view about the US-China relations. Some analyst believe US is concerned about China but it has to avoid open confrontation. The US statements on China indicate the US' desire to engage with China as deeply as practical. The strategic and economic dialogue between the two countries has been institutionalised. Yet, the relationship between the two countries is far from smooth. Elements of competition and confrontation are manifest in the US-China relations. The rest of the world is also unsure about the direction in which the US-China relationship is proceeding.

Readjusting: Other Countries

It is pertinent to note that other countries are adjusting their policies. Since 1997 ASEAN countries, divided by numerous internal fault lines, has sought to put its act together on Asian financial crisis engaged with outside world while emphasising the ASEAN centrality and are attempting to resolve their disputes through consensus and dialogue. ASEAN countries are crucially dependent upon internal as well as external factors and have emerged as a formidable economic force with a combined GDP of over \$ 2 trillion (2011) and total trade of \$ 2.4 trillion (2011). However, ASEAN is trying to forge an economic union by 2015. ASEAN+6 have Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) even as the US is pushing for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which excludes China. Some countries like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia have doubts about joining the TPP negotiations on the other side China and the US factors have brought ASEAN to a crossroads. ASEAN unity is under strain. Vietnam and the Philippines are directly affected by China's rise. The South China Sea is a hotspot of tension and is likely to remain so. The mistrust between China and ASEAN is increasing because of South China Sea issues.

Prime Minister of Japan, Abe is determined to restore Japan's primacy and is getting Japan revitalised. Japan is planning to devote more attention to contrive New Defence Policy guidelines to re-craft its military strategy and enhancing its defence postures. It has felt security concerns from China's

assertiveness and North Korea's nuclear programme, therefore, Japan is focussing on India as security partner. Prime Minister Abe is reported to have proposed “a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific... I am prepared to invest to the greater possible extent, Japan's capabilities in this security diamond.”

The Indian Prime Minister spoke of India and Japan as “natural and indispensable partners for...a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous future for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.” Clearly, India-Japan relations are important in the context of peace and stability in Asia Pacific.

There is another ineluctable factor, Australia. It sees opportunities for itself in the Asian countries, and, is adjusting to the rise of China in this regard Australia is pulling out all stops to deepen its relations, at the same, is seeking partnerships with India, Japan and South Korea. Australia is hedging against China by building its own defence capabilities and supporting US rebalancing and pivoting to the Asia Pacific; India also needs to deepen its relations with Australia, particularly in the context of coal and possibly Uranium in the future besides getting help in education and skill development.

It has become challenge for South Korea to preclude any skirmish with North Korea because of its nuclear and missile programme and its unpredictable behaviour. South Korea is worried about sea lanes of communication in the East Asia region and laid down major emphasis on it.

Also, seek cooperation with India in this regard. Despite prescience that Chinese hegemonic outlook in the region South Korea maintains close ties with India, the Cheonan incident and Yeon Pyieng Island shelling in 2010 have highlighted the increasing military trend in that area. The RoKs realise heavily on international maritime lanes and shipping. In recent track-2 level discussions, South Koreans have underscored desirability of a cooperative mechanism and dialogue between RoK and the Indian navy; institutionalising an official bilateral mechanism for planning and coordination of maritime issues on the lines of an annual maritime dialogue. The South Koreans also want maritime cooperation with India such as joint naval exercises.

Conclusion

Since 1991 India has seen high growth rates, rapidly expanding domestic market, and rising international competitiveness in services, information technology and a range of manufacturing products. It is because of economic reforms and liberalisation of Indian economy. It proved vital for India to open up economy and invite foreign investors to invest into the domestic market to

create employment and other avenues to lead in parallel with global market.

India's speedy growth has escalated its demand for imported resources, energy, technology, consumer products, as well as new export markets. The LEP has facilitated East Asia's rising share of India's international trade and made the region more important to India's growth. By looking east, India has significantly strengthened institutional ties with East Asia and made itself a 'member' of the emerging Asian economic community. Having examined the LEP by exploring its links with India's reforms, growth prospects and integration with East Asia, three general observations can be made.

First India has used the LEP to support economic reforms and liberalisation, to sustain rapid growth, facilitate its economic integration with East Asia and promote equality-based domestic development.

Second, India has built up strong institutional links with East Asia through a web of engagements at bilateral, sub regional and regional levels.

Third has become an influential member of Asia's economic community, and has used its influence to shape agendas for Asia's economic integration.

India has made equal partner of ASEAN, China, and South Korea. It is pushing for FTA that will cover trade in goods and services as well as investment arrangements.

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Human Trafficking and the Challenges of Strengthening Human Security in Africa

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Abstract

Human trafficking is now the third most profitable illicit business globally and largely conducted nocturnally with attendant human security challenges. The challenges motivated this study to examine the effects and assess the regional efforts to curtail the trade. The study was descriptive while data sources were largely from secondary materials such as relevant books, journal, Internet source and international convention and other legislations. The study found that human trafficking occasioned inhuman treatment of victims and various international conventions and national legislations are still insufficient to redress the challenges due to inadequate collaborative efforts among nations, lack of accurate data base and corrupt practices by law enforcement agencies across nations. The study concludes that high poverty rate and unemployment in Africa contributed to the trade while unified perspective internationally Africa is required to make the legislations effective. The study recommends further collaboration among governments and exchange of security information, the establishment of rehabilitation centers for the victims and strengthening of legal regime in Africa to ensure stiffer penalty for agents of human trafficking while governments in Africa must focus on socio economic transformation to guarantee employment opportunities and reduction of poverty to discourage the illegal trades.

Introduction

To every living organism at any particular stage of development, security is of crucial importance and largely none negotiable except when forces stronger than the organism overwhelm it and no hope of respite. The concept

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of national security has undergone transformation in terms of its application but it is perceived in this paper as a state in which the citizens see themselves as living under a safe condition, that allows for the conduct of their legal businesses without undue hindrances, while their welfare is also not compromised and the core values of life are respected and secure. National security and the welfare of the citizenry constitute important aspects in a national life and within the global system that could not be downplayed or politicized. This explains why nations globally affirmed that the security and welfare of the citizenry constitute the primary duty of government. The threat to human security are diverse and ranges from poor governance, armed banditry, terrorism, religious and ethnicity crises, drug trafficking, poverty, unemployment, cross border bandits, kidnapping, militancy as well as human trafficking.

Human trafficking is not a new challenge to human security globally. From time immemorial, particularly in Africa even before the era of commercial slave trade, it manifested in parents voluntarily sending their children to serve people they were indebted to for a specific number of years to offset the debt. In contemporary society, human trafficking is perceived as a modified form of slavery. The basic components of human trafficking include the recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring and receiving a person through the use of force, coercion and other means for the purpose of exploiting them NAPTIP (2013). Human trafficking is therefore an offence against humanity. The illegal business is transnational and a country may be classified as the origin, transit or destination of the victims or be involved in two or the three classifications.

This paper is conscious of the effect of globalization as observed by Schulte (2000) that has led to redefining the concept of national boundary as well as recent sub regional drive for integration in West Africa. This could not but leave the borders more or less geographical expression open to or supportive of human trafficking. The nexus between human trafficking and national security becomes important with the redefinition of human security that now focuses on people and development UNDP (1994). Human trafficking therefore constitutes one of the greatest challenges to human security in the sense that victims become endangered species within the region and beyond. This to a large extent informs this study to interrogate human trafficking and the challenges of national security in Africa.

Statement of Problem

Man inhumanity to man has a long history, while every human being is born free, societal challenges such as war, poverty, poor governance impose a lot of constraints that hinder individual realization of its potentials. One of the

outcomes of the inhumanity is the modern day slavery called human trafficking. It violates the core values of all civilized nations and makes citizenry an object to be enslaved or commercialized rather than been a subject of the nation. Such a situation permanently hinders the socio-economic development of those trafficked and kept the next generation improvised, vulnerable to many form of abuses and further complicate the task of governance by breeding a generation that may not be able to significantly contribute to national development. This constitutes a serious challenge that this paper intends to examine. Thus, the main objectives of this study include to examine how human trafficking in Africa has affected human security; to evaluate the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms in combating human trafficking; and to determine the effects of human trafficking on human security in Africa.

Conceptual Clarification

National security

Security constitutes a topmost consideration a nation. In 2001, the DAC Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC) defined it as:

An all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing (CPDC, 2001).

The term national security emerged for the first time to explain America's relationship to the world during and after the World War II though other scholars might trace it relevance to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 with the emergence of nation states. It is often seen as a pivot of socio-economic and political development. The traditional notion of the term was predicated upon military arms buildup, an indication of national power as this formed the basis of comparison of the military strength among nations when first adopted in the US. To a large extent, armament races, alliances with friendly States, geo-politics were considered of strategic importance then prior to 1990.

The expanded understanding of the notion “national security” was a result of the concerted effort of The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in sensitizing the global system in its 1994 *Human Development Report (HDR)*. It was defined to encompass everything that

constitutes freedom from want and freedom from fear. To this extent, hunger, disease, pollution, affronts to human dignity, threats to livelihoods, environmental challenges political insecurity and other harms in addition to violence outside the traditional understanding of the notion came to be seen and appreciated as inevitable human security issues. This position agrees with Maier (1994) who describes national security as “a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing”

The Canadian government policy paper (2004) observes that national security should focus on “*events and circumstances that generally require a National response as they are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone*”. Various measures are often adopted by nations in order to guarantee national security which includes diplomacy, espionage, economic power, armed forces to deal with external forces. Internally, nations adopt measures such as rallying the citizenry to support the government, civil defense, as well as securing classified information among others.

(http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/National_security).

For national security to be meaningful therefore, nation state cannot but achieve economic, energy, and socio-political stability since they don't contend with external energy sapping issues alone but other challenges emanating internally from terrorist groups, drug cartels, human traffickers, multinational organization and even natural disasters. The implication is that government needs the support of the citizenry to cope with these challenges.

This can only be guaranteed when the citizens perceive the government to be working for their best interest while this cannot but accommodate the war against human trafficking. In a broad term, Iredia (2011) defines national security as the ability of a State to overcome any of its challenges no matter what the challenge is. The need for security of lives and properties has become more pressing as rightly observed by Dempsey (2012) that “*today's world has become, “more dangerous than it has ever been*”. This explains why contemporary literature on national security largely situate human security as an integral part of national security with emphasis among others on food, employment, health, environment and human rights from which this study locate the nexus between human trafficking and human security.

Human security

The concept human security or citizen security is an offshoot of wider understanding of security that emerged after the Cold War with increasing research efforts in areas such as human rights and developmental issues

among others. It is borne out of the understanding that for sovereignty to be meaningful, a nation must be in position to meet the minimum standards in good governance that could be measured in terms of ensuring the security of its citizens and its social responsibility in guaranteeing their general welfare (Rugumamu, 2001:2). The first attempt to redefine human security was by the UNDP in the Human Development Report 1994 entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security* that “*Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity*” (UNDP, 1994:229). It emphasized the need for a change of focus exclusively from states, territory and military questions to individuals as the heart of security concerns. The key components were identified as economic, food health, personal, community, environmental and political security

According to Skons (2007: 243) that “*If the ultimate objective of security is to save human beings from preventable premature death and disability, then the appropriate security policy would focus on prevention instruments and risk reduction strategies for their causes.*” Prevention strategy in this instance cannot but include government intentional and concerted effort to meet the basic needs of the citizenry while loopholes that encourage human abuse as found in human trafficking is appropriately addressed.

This position could have informed Alkire (2003) to view human security as “to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfillment”. This agrees with the comment of Keizo (1998) that “*It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired.*”

In effect, human security is guaranteed when the events or occurrences at the national level are conducted in such a way that the effects are not injurious to international system by a way of adding to the challenges of other nations as found in human trafficking. Relevant in this instance is the misplaced priority of most nations in Africa with the notion that the most important consideration in national and human security is huge spending on military hardware.

The urgent need to refocus attention particularly in developing nations on the major components of human security informed many international organizations and agencies to propose more integrated and comprehensive policies and strategies to place human security at the top of local, national, regional and global agenda. The agenda among others include to protect and empower individuals and communities as well as creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. This position agrees with Stewart (2004) that human security forms an important part of people's well-being, and is therefore an objective of development which aims at the enlargement

of human choices while insecurity cuts life short and thwarts the use of human potential.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is not a new phenomenon but a global trade network. Lipede (2007) regards it as the world fastest growing illegal industry and the third largest criminal enterprise surpassed only by drug and gun running. Shelly (2010) in Pak-Hung, (2011:3) observes that human trafficking violates human rights, cut across state borders, and criminal laws. It involves organized crimes, coercive sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and juvenile delinquency which are transnational in scope and of late organ removal for commercial and ritual purposes. Apart from demand and supply issue in human trafficking, poverty, unemployment, greed, poor legal regime and insufficient collaborative efforts among global community encouraged the growth of the trade among others.

The UNODC, (2012) covering the period between 2007 and 2010 shows at least 136 different nationalities were trafficked and they could be found in 118 different countries. This illicit business involves millions of victims both at domestic and international levels. Within the same period according to the report, nearly half of the victims detected worldwide were trafficked from a country within the same region as the country of destination. In addition, 24 percent of detected cases were said to be part of a transcontinental trafficking flow. In view of the nocturnal nature of the illegal business, significant number of the victims could go undetected as this could constitute a great challenge to the statistics presented regardless how meticulous the study conducted. The International Labour Organization estimates that 20.9 million people are victims of forced labour globally.

A scary breakdown of the purpose of trafficking as contained the report revealed that 58 percent of the trafficked persons were for sexual exploitation, 36 percent for forced labour (estimated that 20.9 million people are victims of forced labour globally) and 1.5 percent for begging while it has been detected that many countries worldwide are now involved in human organ business for ritual and other purposes.

The United Nations (UN) Protocol to prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) defines human trafficking as:

“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the treat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of a

payments of benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”

Exploitation is further defined as prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour of services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (NAPTIP, ND). From this perspective, human trafficking is a crime against humanity.

In an attempt to domesticate the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking to Nigerian peculiar situation, Section 64 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 as Amended 2005 defines trafficking as:

All acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within or across Nigerian borders, purchases, sale, transfer, receipts or harbouring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion, debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person whether for or not in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive) in forced or bonded labour, or in slavery conditions

Lawan, (2005) observed that two million children were trafficked annually in Nigeria alone while Lipede (2007) quoting UN statistics noted that human trafficking generates an estimated of \$9.5 billion as annual revenue. Various methods are often use to recruit the victims such deception, force, fraud, or coercion to exploit fellow disadvantaged human beings for some form of labour or commercial sex purpose and ritual purposes through organ sale.

The UNODC (2012) data base revealed that nearly all human trafficking flows originating in Africa are either intraregional while the destination is largely Africa and the Middle East or Western Europe. The data base further revealed that the profile of the victims detected 2007-2010 was that of 6300 trafficked persons 68 percent (4200) were children. For form of exploitation, the record revealed that forced labour came first with 49 percent, followed by sexual exploitation with 36 percent, Organ removal was 0.8 percent while other types of trafficking in persons stood at 14 percent. A study by UNDP (2011) on the situation in Lesotho revealed the prevalence of adult men trafficked for forced labour in the mining sector. Same is also true of trafficked men and children from Benin Republic and Togo serving in quarries around Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria as contained in NAPTIP (2013) report.

A closer examination of the statistics provided above cannot but among others lead to three conclusions. First, that the inhuman treatment of fellow human being has been deep rooted. Second, inordinate urge to get rich through any means and poor legal regime and insufficient international

collaboration or cooperation in checkmating the trade. Lastly but equally important is that due to the fact the business has been consistently conducted nocturnally, there is the tendency for gross underestimation of the victims and the revenue associated with it particularly as only eight countries in Africa volunteered to provide the data required as rightly observed by Laczko and Gramegna (2003) and corroborated by UNODC (2006: 34) and ILO (2001: vi).

For instance, the discovery of recent of evil forest at Soka in Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria where more than 20 decomposing bodies were found and 19 in chain in an underground building might be just a tip in an ice bag as many centers of human organ sale located all over Nigeria yet undiscovered (Atoyebi, 2014). In addition, the discovery of baby factories Owerri, Imo State, Ilu-tuntun, Okitipupa Local Government Area and Ore, Odigbo Local Government Area all of Ondo State, Nigeria and confirmation that that business has been brought to the notice of government since 1991 without serious action to checkmate it portends a great danger (Adelakun, 2013).

Theoretical Framework

It is an established fact that agents of human trafficking get involved in the illicit business for various reasons particularly for cheap final gains while a single theory could not be sufficient to underpin the issue. The study adopts regional security complex (RSCT) and sustainable development theories. The RSCT was propounded by Busan and Waever (2003) with emphasis on how security is clustered in geographically shaped regions while security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of the other actors. The implication is that of security interdependence within the region but not between regions. The concept, “region” need be understood because there is the tendency for buffer states to be of strategic security importance while this might not be given sufficient consideration. A typical example is the reference to Greater Middle East that span beyond Middle East into Africa with huge implication on human security beyond the region.

The theory is applicable to this study in that human trafficking and its attendant implication on human security is a complex business beyond the geographical confine of a nation and to a large extent, a region as it has assumed an international dimension as right observed by Lipede (2007), and UNODC (2012) among others. In addition, Schlte (2000) noted that the effect of globalization has led to redefining the concept of national boundary and the increasing concerns for regional and sub-regional integration. This explains why Shelly (2010) in Pak-Hung (2011:3) further advancing the effect of globalization to note that the better modes of communication and transportation make the cost of trafficking lower but higher profitability.

Therefore, this has left the borders more or less open to or supportive of human trafficking with security implications. In effect, internal security system alone without relying on other nations for information sharing and cooperative effort cannot effectively curb the ever increasing business as rightly observed Hussein, Gnisci, and Wanjiru, (2004).

The state of human existence in Africa is vividly presented by Nyerere in Oladipo (1992) that most of Africa is now free from colonial rule but all of Africa States are still desperately poor and underdeveloped as independence has brought no change in economic condition and very little in social change and injustice even tyranny is rampant. Even if this statement may not have uniform applicability to all nations in Africa, it explains the nexus between sustainable development theory and human security.

The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987).in a spirited effort to address the problem of conflicts between environment and development goals formulated a definition of sustainable development: as the development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It consisted initially of three components and these are economic, environmental and social sustainability. The fourth component is referred to as institutional or good governance (Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2013) and U. N. Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Third Session (1995).This explains why UNDP (1994) emphasizes that the development patterns that perpetuate today's inequities are neither sustainable nor worth sustaining.

Human security as Stewart (2004) opines, constitutes an essential component of people's well-being, and is therefore an objective of development which aims at the “enlargement of human choices” while insecurity cuts life short and thwarts the use of human potential. In this sense, sustainable development might to a large extent reduce the danger associated with human trafficking.

Hasna (2007) notes that sustainable development tell of the development of all aspects of human life affecting sustenance. Gullick (1983) cited in Alao (2013) locates the invaluable role of government in ensuring the welfare of the citizenry. It is acknowledged that other agencies outside the government may still complement that role. Sustainable development in this guise calls for broad mindedness and sincere commitment of governments in Africa to the genuine needs of the citizenry and the development of humane means of meeting such. The vagueness of the term “sustainable development” constitutes part of the basic criticism as it has been regarded as a buzz word that is incapable of a single meaning (van Eeten and Roe 2002). However, it adaptation to the study of human trafficking and human security enlarges the

ways of understanding the causative factors of and what could be done to overcome the challenges.

Efforts by Governments in Addressing Human Trafficking in Africa

The scholarly works of Troung and Angeles (2005), Obakata (2006), Bales and Soodalter (2010), and Shelly (2010) among others presented global efforts in respect of war against human trafficking. International agencies such as UNDESA, UNODC, ECPAT, CESC and ICCPR among many others have played a significant role against the ever increasing human trafficking.

The major concern of these international agencies is to sensitize the global community to human trafficking as an international crime and called for the establishment of treaties, conventions, human right instruments, national laws and local agencies to develop appropriate enforcement mechanism in the battle against the illicit trade. The first known international effort in the war against the trade was that International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic in 1904 while its notable flaws being too expansive and revolved around regulating police measure against trafficking in persons led to the Convention of 1910 (<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/whiteslavetraffic1910.html>). This was followed by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Trafficking in Women and Children in 1921, others include Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Emphasized the dignity of human beings under Articles 1,3,4 and 5); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trades Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957); International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (1966); and the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979). The 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment called for effective administrative, judicial and Legislative measures against act of torture within nations' territories among others. This was followed with Child Rights Act of 1989. Of importance is the UN Resolution 50/167 of December 22, 1995 that ratified different laudable measures by government and International Organizations against human trafficking. Also, the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) recommended measures that government of nations of origin, transit and destination should take to curb the trade.

Among the list is the International Labour Convention (ILO)(182) on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) on the need to protect the victims and The United Nation Conventions Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNCATO) 2000 to achieve international collaboration against human trafficking so also the UN resolution 55/2. The UN Protocol Against

Smuggling of Migrants (2006) brought to the fore the organized criminals in the trade. The UNODC (2012) reported that as part of the concerted efforts of governments globally, one hundred and thirty-four countries and territories worldwide have criminalized trafficking by means of a specific offence in line with the Trafficking in Persons Protocol. The same report noted that the number of convictions for trafficking in persons is in general very low, of the 132 countries covered, 16 per cent did not record a single conviction between 2007 and 2010.

With specific reference to Africa, about 3,000 African trafficking victims were identified in 22 countries between 2007 and 2010 according to UNODC (2012) while West African accounts for the vast majority of the African victims detected, that is 2,300 victims. Nigerian victims were detected in 16 countries in Western and Central Europe, where they account for 11 per cent of all victims detected. Citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone have also been identified as victims of trafficking in many European countries. Trafficking of African victims also took place in countries of the Middle East. East Africans (Eritreans and Ethiopians) and North Africans were detected in the Middle East between 2007 and 2010. Trafficking originating in Southern Africa is mainly limited to countries within the sub region.

There is no doubt that so many protocols and conventions were in place in the war against human trafficking. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981 was one of the practical steps taken by governments in Africa concerning human security. Article 5 provides that;

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade and torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the 1981 charter, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) provided for all the State signatories to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, sales and trafficking of children for any purpose, in any form, by any person including parents or legal guardians of the child. The Committee on the Rights and the Welfare of the Child in 2002 identified child trafficking as one of the cogent issue to address. The Libreville (2000) Common Platform for Action that grew from sub regional consultation developed strategies to fight child trafficking in West and Central Africa through advocacy/ awareness raising efforts, establishment of appropriate legal regime, strengthening cooperation among member states, improving the care given to the victims among others. This was followed with various declarations by the Economic

Community of West African states as reflected in monitoring activities and urging the member States to establish a National Task Force on Trafficking in Person.

ECPAT (2008c) describes the Togolese National Action Plan that is being implemented and also in use in Benin Republic as a good step in the war against child trafficking. The plan as currently been implemented included the creation of a database on traffickers in Benin and Togo as well as improving legislation on children. The report equally revealed that Benin, Ghana and Burkina Faso are exchanging information on trafficking while effort is geared to improving co-operation between police, customs and immigration officers to checkmate the trade. The UNODC (2012) further reported that Côte d'Ivoire and Togo had already put in place Laws that criminalized only child trafficking, while Burkina Faso, Mali and Uganda had of recent included adult trafficking in their criminal codes. In addition, attention is being given to enhance educational opportunities for the girl child and street children as well as creating awareness and the rehabilitation and reintegration of child victims of trafficking (ECPAT 2008c; ILO 2001). On the other hand, the Togolese government noted that the fight against the child prostitution has been difficult to fight since there are no 'official brothels' (ECPAT 2007e: 11).

Iyanda (2014) observed that Gambia has been slow in reacting to the need for establishing a legal and political framework for combating child trafficking though it established Trafficking in Person Unit called NAATIP that took off in 2007. The enactment of Trafficking in Person Act 2007 by the Gambian government made human trafficking a grievous offence as it attracted a fine of not less than fifty thousand dalasi and not exceeding five hundred thousand dalasi in addition to a minimum term of fifteen years and maximum of life imprisonment. The Section 28 of 2007 Act was amended in 2010 to place death penalty on agents of child trafficking as against life imprisonment. Other related legislations against trafficking in persons include Tourism Offenses Act 2003, 2007 and the Women's Act, 2010. (http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3-1205402312_text).

In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution provided for basic human rights. Chapter Eleven, Section 34 guarantees the right to dignity of the human person which aligns with the Criminal and Penal Code of Nigeria of June 1, 1916. The establishment of the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking (NAPTIP) in Person in 2003 was the first major step in Nigeria to declare war on human trafficking while the amendment to the enabling stature is currently undergoing review. According to Agba Beatrice Jedy, the Executive Secretary, NAPTIP during a visit to their Abuja office in February 2014 confirmed that one of the proposed amendments is that of dropping that

ambiguous 'Other related offences' from the name to give proper focus to the organization.

The Nigerian Government had ratified many international Treaties including but not limited to Convention 182 on Minimum Age, Convention 138 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour and Sales of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.

In sub-Saharan Africa (apart from Mauritius, which reported that only local nationals were convicted for trafficking in persons), the number of foreign nationals among the few criminal proceedings conducted during the reporting period was surprisingly high. Ghana, for example, reported that of a total of five convictions, three were of East Asians. Lesotho recorded its first trafficking in persons-related conviction in January 2012, also of an East Asian citizen.

On account of concerted efforts in Africa on war against human trafficking, UNODC (2012) reported that cases of prosecution and conviction of agents of human trafficking were made. For instance, Mauritius and South Africa reported instances of prosecution while Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria had gone beyond prosecution and many agents have been convicted between 2007-2010. According to NAPTIP News (2011), eleven persons were convicted and sentenced between January – March, 2011. The NAPTIP (2014) noted that as at 2013, two hundred and twenty five human traffickers have been convicted and no fewer than six thousand survivors have been received and reunited with their families even beyond the shore of Nigeria. Also, NAPTIP was able to rescue one hundred and nine victims of human trafficking from Mali in an operation tagged *Operation Timbuktu in 2011*.

The greatest challenge in assessing the efforts of the government in combating human trafficking is based on inaccessible information as rightly noted by UNODC, 2012 as only 8 nations in Africa and Middle East provided information in respect of this illegal business in the study conducted by the agency. There is the need for more concerted efforts in all countries to increase the awareness of the scope of the problem, to increase the training of the law enforcement personnel and to improve the access to education for children, in order to increase their abilities to empower themselves. This position informed the immediate past Executive Secretary of NAPTIP to observe that the battle has just begun (NAPTIP News, 2011).

The Effects of Human Trafficking on Human Security in Africa

The UNDP in the Human Development Report 1994 provided a shift from the traditional meaning of human security by a change of focus from exclusively states, territory and military questions and placing individuals at

the heart of security concerns. It was given an expanded meaning that “*Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity*” (UNDP, 1994:229). The key components of human security were identified as economic, food health, personal, community, environmental and political security. This explains why Alkire (2003) viewed human security as “*to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfillment*” and Keizo (1998) said that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired. This understanding clearly provides a guide to understand the effects of human trafficking on human security.

Human trafficking is a direct challenge to victim's rights of productive living through which they could contribute positively to socio-economic development of the continent. Londo (2008) quoting the ILO, 2005 estimates observed that approximately 2.45 million people are in the forced labor as a result of being victims of trafficking and 12.3 million people engaged in forced labour globally. Some may reason that the trafficked were also engaged in productive services but without respect for their dignity. Forced labour has been defined as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29), of the International Labour Organization (United Nations, *Treaty Series, vol. 39, No. 612*), art. 2, para. 1).

The trafficking process of children and women from Benin and Togo and even across the continent as reported by Human Rights Watch (2003) was dehumanizing while Adepoju (2005: 84) presented a concise account of their experiences that:

In case of trafficked girls from Benin and Togo, who travelled by sea to Gabon through transit points in southeastern Nigeria, some were raped, a few prostituted themselves, and others sold their belongings in order to survive while awaiting their boats. Many died when their rickety boats capsized. At their destination, many girls suffered physical and emotional abuse and sexual exploitation by boys and men in the hosts' homes, experiences that pushed some to streets as prostitutes.

It is a common practice that when a child is trafficked for domestic purposes that amounts to forced labor, such is not helplessly free from sexually exploitation and subjected to all form of abuses and liable to cheaply contact sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDs with implication on the health and wealth of the national or/and international community beyond measure. The annual recirculation of such victims

further complicates their health challenges and the household of those hiring their services and their immediate environment. According to UNODC, 2012, 68 percent of trafficked persons in Africa and Middle East were said to be children.

Another dimension of forced labour in Africa is that of child soldiers. Cilliers (2004) noted that almost half of the world's child soldiers, that is 120,000 of an estimated global total of 300,000 are in Africa. The implication is that their future is bastardized and truncated while they may never attain their full potential in life and as well constitute nuisance to the nation in the short and long run. The relevance of human security in this context in relation to human trafficking is that States are duty bound to provide environment that will guarantee adherence to human rights of its citizenry while the current position falls short of expected standard in Africa.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The contemporary emphasis on human security focuses on individual human lives, the socio-economic and political arrangement in providing the needed facilities to making lives more secure at the same time reducing avoidable risks to human lives and ensure that basic human rights are guaranteed and protected. However the socio-economic lives of large percent of people in many African countries deplorable due to abject poverty while there is naked display of wealth by few rich ones with little or no opportunity for legal upward mobility for others. To a large extent, public facilities in most African nations have collapsed leaving the citizenry to become government unto themselves. Therefore, human security is secondary in importance in the calculation of many African governments. Human trafficking is largely the highest display of man inhumanity to fellow human being as manifested in the recent discovery of devils colonies at Soka in Ibadan Oyo State and other areas in Nigeria where human parts were on sale and kidnapped people were chained as animals waiting to be sold for years. The implication is that innocent lives in thousands were terminated prematurely, the relatives victims traumatized on account of unexplainable disappearance of their loved ones if not occasioned by them.

The study concludes that human security embraces all positive step towards making lives more meaningful while human trafficking negates same. It is acknowledged that global communities are rising to the challenges of human trafficking, the governments might be hopelessly helpless to fight the the battle without sufficient political will. The mere fact that the human trafficking cut across national borders and involves numerous national and international actors means that further collaborative effort is required, while the cooperation of the citizenry in indispensable to checkmate the illegal

business. This explains why the NAPTIP (2011) observed the battle has just begun while the syndicates in the business are not in haste to disengage from the illegal trade.

The study recommends that governments in Africa should honestly key into contemporary understanding of the term “human security” rather than military provisioning while the root causes that are linked to human trafficking should be holistically addressed. These include rising army of unemployment, hunger, poverty, diseases, weak legal regime and failed governmental institution that may collectively allow for upward socio-economic mobility and a disincentive for illegal trades.

The study further calls for the strengthening of international collaboration and cooperation in information sharing, monitoring, arrest and prosecutions of agents of human trafficking to serve as deterrence to others while all nations in Africa through the regional body should establish a functional resettlement/rehabilitation centers for victims of human trafficking. Such collaboration must accommodate security agencies at the border posts.

At the State level, government should collaborate with traditional institutions, religious organization, cultural/age groups like the Nigerian youth vanguard against human trafficking to sensitize the citizenry of the danger of the trade. Also, the agencies responsible for war against human trafficking should embark on workshops, seminars and conference to sensitize the enlightened community to the issue as members of the group might be consciously or unconsciously guilty of the crime through dehumanizing treatment of wards and house helps.

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BRIEFING

Nigeria and South Africa in Africa and International Politics: A Power Theory Approach

Kolade Omoyeye^Y

Abstract

Right from 1990s when the fetters of apartheid was dismantled; several incidences have been occurring between South Africa and Nigeria. As ordinary as the issues look; a scholastic experimental analysis shows that they are all realpolitik trends ever aimed at some objectives. Inveterate interrogation reveals that the objectives centre on becoming a hegemon in Africa. This paper however submits that the realpolitik which has now transformed into an international imbroglio, is at the expense of more important steps; steps which may include concentrating on individual nations' domestic problems and playing a role of Africa international good citizen through leading other afro-nations by example.

Introduction

Nigeria and South Africa shared several political, economic cum cultural history. Akinboye (2003:267-270) did a very fine trace of this. Coupled with several other detailed accounts of the relationship from several scholars (such as Such as Omoyeye 2014:3-8,50; Adebajo 2007; Akindele 2007:304; Garba 1987; Akiba 1998; Yoroms 2007; Akinyeye 2003:121-124), the following can be logically deduced: that just as Nigeria was predominantly of several nations (kingdoms/empires) prior to the arrival of Britain and the subsequent amalgamation; South Africa was of several nations before the creation of 'Union' in 1910 by the same Britain; While Nigeria suffered in the

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hands of Britain in the colonial era; South Africa was seriously entangled under the apartheid regime; From 1960 to 1994, Nigeria led other countries to live for South Africa. She raised fund to support all anti-apartheid parties, agents or movements; gave free education to deprived South Africans; made cases for South Africa apartheid government suspensions in international events and international organisations; At the obliteration of apartheid and arrival of true democracy in South Africa in early 1990s; Nigeria was under a harsh tyrannical military junta, so, South Africa attempted living for Nigeria via her president's intervention on some fundamental human rights related cases and calls for respect to the fundamental human rights of every Nigerian. In this period, South Africa called for Nigeria's suspension from international activities and organisations; From 1999, better diplomatic relationship based on the two nations' leaders' personal friendship was palpably obvious. The diplomacy/relationship could be said to be 'sitting on a keg of gun powder' because of some silent objectives (of national interests) secretly cold-kept; Right from the hopefully glancing arrival of the 'new' South Africa into Africa in 1994 till date; on and off the stage, there have been several traces of diplomatic row in the dual's bilateral relationship. These indirect instruments of national power have been in the forms of embarrassing deportations, unlawful attacks of citizens, accusations, unlawful detentions, physical assaults, ever opposing decisions/views, propaganda and most recently, the retaliatory 'principle of reciprocity' which are all gaining international recognition.

Several analyses and dignitaries have clarified the causes of the row. A South African diplomat declared it thus:

The tension between the two countries is mainly about who is the most powerful on the continent economically, politically, even militarily...we have been getting senior positions and membership in multilateral institutions... Nigeria doesn't like this. Nigeria also wanted to occupy these positions (Mail & Guardian June 8, 2012).

In a similar manner, Professor Bola Akinterinwa, Director General, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs lists the objectives and the *causis belli* of the power flexing as “to be the leading nation in Africa” and “to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council” (Okereocha 2012).

Premised upon the 'eye-openers', this paper seeks to critically analyze the 'realpolitik' involving the two nations as they struggle for the 'Soul of Africa'.

On The Theory Of Power

In all human societies, there are the rulers and the ruled; the leaders and the lead. The rulers/leaders exercise some forms of influence, command or authority enabled either through 'force, persuasion, coercion or manipulation (Mclean and McMillan 2009), or as 'it can be acquired, conferred, delegated, shared, or limited', in such that it (power) can be described as being either 'political, economic, social, legal or personal' (Chaturvedi 2006).

Power is a set of actions performed upon another person's action and reactions which though may not correlate but often incorporate violence; it is 'always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action' (Foucault, 1975:220). To Max Weber, it is 'the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of other persons'. Power has been described to be 'the production of intended effects- the capacity of an individual, group, party, class, etc, to get what it wants by securing the compliance of others through whatever means' (emphasis mine) (Chaturvedi, 2006).

Power is a social instrument that helps enforce an idea, a decision or a goal. Power features at virtually every stratum of the society; it exists and is exercised at the international, national and family levels, and in every other place 'wherever people are involved in relationships' (Anifowose 1999:109), and wherein there is 'disindividualisation' and 'automation' within the several segments or processes of bureaucracies (as a mechanism), rather than being wholly constituted in one individual or stage (Foucault, 1975). To Anifowose too, the bases of an actor's power include 'all the resources-wealth, opportunities, acts, objects, etc,' that can be favourably exploited.

Additionally, power as a social element is expectedly utilised with an 'intention' which is the productive realisation of its exercise's causation. The powers of two different actors can be quantified so that a balance comparison is achieved, for instance, Nigeria's national power and of South Africa comparatively (Mclean & McMillan, 2009:426-7). Conversely, these powers would only exist to the extent at which they are put into action (Foucault, 1975).

The traditional/classicist approach is one of the two forms to the study of International Relations. It concentrates its study on 'power politics' (Adeniran 2007:12) within the system because of power's crucial role in the international relations (Anifowose 1999:118). 'Power politics' is 'politics which has no other factor except going and retaining power by any means' for the sake of an end and not the means used (Chaturvedi 2006:248).

Power theory is of the view that in international relations, 'the ends justify the means'. Morals or ethics are immaterial 'means', just as 'all laws of self-deprivation, or self abnegation'. The theory implies that provided a

nation-state is able to achieve its main goal, the means by which any of the actors have achieved it is immaterial. Such means may have been bargaining, threats, inducements, coercion, bribery, threat of punishment or any other side payments (Folade 2009:28), or force (assault), domination (request) or manipulation (propaganda) (Anifowose 1999:110-111). All of these instruments/means' success is moreover determined within the ever important 'circumstances of time and space', which also proves the 'offensiveness' or 'defensiveness' of an action (Omoyeye, 2014).

The theory states that the goal of a state in the international community which is its preference (what it seeks, believe or tries to construct) is in most cases 'fixed and uniformly conflicting'. However, the preference (i.e. national interest) instigates and rationalises nations' activation, and display of resources-power. As Akinbobola (1999:337) pontificated, states' preferences are always 'the maximisation of national power in order to increase national capability'; just as Morgenthau has put the causation of power struggle to be either to preserve the favouring status quo, achieve the expansionist interest of hegemon spreading or to gain, maintain and sustain honour or prestige in the international community. All can be summarised as 'survival or security' (Falode, 2009:44).

From all indications therefore, power is very vital in that: it accounts for most of the activities happening within the international system; it explains the 'why' of the activities; it identifies the various important actors; and it locates power in issues psychologically (Adeniran, 2007). The power theory has been criticised for its failure to respect values, international morality and institution', and for its dependence on circumstance (Akinboye & Ottoh 2005). This is premised on the proof that 'persuasion, manipulation, propaganda, rewards, grants and other forms of assistance' may be more important instruments or tactics than 'power' in international system.

Review of Related Literature

Aggregated arguments (Hughes 2000:70; Akinterinwa 2007:710; Omoyeye 2014:37-40) and realities have shown that the perceived level of a nation's involvement in power politics or international relations, vis-a-vis its international character and behaviour is premised proportionally and appropriately to its national interests. National interest which has been described both as whatever a government official (mostly politicians) describe it to be; as 'public interest' (per say); and what is best for the nation (McClean & McMillan 2009: 356-7), is unambiguously defined as 'what a nation is doing or about to do as foreign policy in her external relations'; to ensure her self-preservation, economic well being, prestige and power, certain values, among others (Adeniran 2007:338).

The foreign policy of a nation is the summation of all her documented and defensible national interests; every action taken as a nation-state interacts with any other actor outside her international boundaries, i.e. within the international community. National interest directs, informs, guide the foreign policy of every nation (Akinboye 1999) towards the achievement of the goals of citizens' welfare and prosperity, promotion, external boundary security; gain prestige and reputation and live in peace within the international system (Akinboye & Ottoh 2005:117).

As various literatures have pontificated (such as Olusanya and Akindele, 1986 and Adeniran, 2007), nations' foreign policies are greatly determined by their political and economic structures, geo-political location, leaders' character or sincerity; its military power, demographic potentials, natural resources, economic buoyancies, and their domestic political situation. Very inter-connectedly therefore, the followings (particularly argued in Codevilla, 2008; Hughes, 2000; Akinboye, 1999 and Duncan et al, 2008) are used as instruments of foreign policy in international relations:

Diplomacy: This involves the use of state diplomats (ambassadors, envoys, etc) to manage states' international relations. It uses intelligence in negotiation mainly.

Force: It is resorted into where diplomacy and all other instruments have failed in a critical and sensitive international issue. It uses war and other related means such as brilliant 'low-level violence', harassment, embarrassment, deportations, unlawful detentions, etc of international element target(s), perpetrated with the aid of either conventional or unconventional forces.

Propaganda: This is using 'statements' through the media, literatures, etc, to influence any issue in another nation or the international community, with end reactions of possibly riots, strikes, violence, restiveness and any other negative possibilities.

Economic means: This involves the instigation of international actors to sanction a nation in the international trade system, or the use of donor, aids, loan, currency control, etc, by nations to nations.

The above simply explains the war between Iran and the US, Nigeria and South Africa frequent donations and aids to other African countries; South Africa's ever harassment, humiliation and embarrassment of Nigerian citizens domiciled in the rainbow nation; Nigeria's ever readiness to provide military aid through peace keeping to crises-ridden African states, Nigeria's preference to sell her crude oil to South Africa; behind the door's struggles for seats in AU and the UN, and several other immoral and unethical actions.

As well, the positive aggregation of the above foreign policy elements points at the strength of a nation's national power; given that the power of a

nation (national power) is 'constituted by its geography, economy, population, technology, ideology, morale, and internal leadership'(Charturvedi 2006:23). The national power of a nation can be said to be in her good geographical location, great natural resources, huge population, wealth and economic stability. Level of economic development, industrial base, technological advancement, transportation system, information and communication systems and military preparedness all constitute the objective elements; while the subjective elements includes national culture, national moral, quality of government, political stability and quality of diplomacy (Duncan et al, 2008).

Traces and Issues on the Quests

Several different issues have over the days spring-up between Nigeria and South Africa in their various quests to create a continent-wide recognised hegemon. The exercise of power (i.e. power struggle) is done upon some capabilities which will first be selectively tabled. The capabilities are the extent of the national power of the states which have given them (both) the assurance of near-goal achievement of their realpolitik. Beside, it is needful to bear the pieces of information in mind as a follow-up to the analysis thereafter.

Aggregated pieces of information obtained of both Nigeria and the rainbow nation show the followings of their national power as tabled below.

Table 1: Showing Sub-National Power Elements of both countries (traces in which each country is high(er) or better compared with the other, is asterisked [*], while figures in parenthesis are World ranking in such element/item)

| S/NO | ITEM | NIGERIA | S/AFRICA |
|------|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 1 | Total Area (land and water) | 923,768sq km (32) | *1,219,090 sq km(25) |
| 2 | Natural resources | natural gas*, petroleum, tin, iron ore, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, arable land | gold, chromium, antimony, coal, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphate, tin, copper, salt, vanadium, natural gas, uranium, gem diamonds, platinum, copper |
| 3 | Population | *181,562,056 (7) 2015 est. | 53,675,503 (28) 2015 est. |

| S/NO | ITEM | NIGERIA | S/AFRICA |
|------|--|--|---|
| 4 | Literacy | 59.6% 2015 est. | *91.3% 2015 est. |
| 5 | Total NO of Int'l organisations (participation & membership) | *64 | 62 |
| 6 | GDP (PPP) | *\$1,049t (21) 2014 est. | \$704.5b (26) 2014 est. |
| 7 | GDP (at official exch. rate) | *\$593.7b 2014 est. | \$350.1b 2014 est. |
| 8 | Exports | \$93.01b (43) 2014 est. (commodities exported include petrol and petroleum products, cocoa, rubber; partners include US, India, Brazil, Spain, France, Netherland and even S/Africa) | *\$101.2b (40) 2012 est. (Commodities exported include gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and minerals, machinery and equipment; export partners are China, US, Japan, Germany, and UK. |
| 9 | Reserves of foreign exchange | \$37.41b (41) 2014 est. | *\$50.55b (39) 2014 est. |
| 10 | National Debt (external) | *\$22.01b (82) 2014 est. | \$143.3 (41) 2014 est. |

Source: Culled from Centre Intelligence Agency's World Factbook, accessed in September 26, 2015

Other figures of interest as gathered variously show that:

1. While the total number of Nigerians in S/Africa is about 800,000; that of S/Africans in Nigeria is not readily available;
2. While there is no S/African in any Nigerian prison; there are 400 Nigerians in S/African prisons as at 2013;
3. There are over 100 South African businesses in Nigeria among which are MTN, Standard Bank, Multichoice, Multilinks, Shoprite, Protea hotel chain, etc; and
4. Main Nigerian businesses in the rainbow nation include the Dangote Group, Oando Petrol and iROKOTv, etc.

In the mid-1990s, there was a display of both fine diplomacy and thereafter, propaganda firstly by South Africa and then by Nigeria. The rainbow nation's president, Nelson Mandela, using friendship means, had intervened on and for the release of the famous 'Ogoni-9' and political prisoners, Olusegun Obasanjo and M. K. O. Abiola. General Abacha, Nigeria military Head of State, having assured Mandela of non-execution, went ahead executing the 'Ogoni-9'. Mandela then resorted into the use of foul language on Abacha that he (Abacha) 'is sitting on a volcano and I am going to explode it under him'. Nigeria retaliated through a propagandalist statement of the then minister of information; Walter Ofonagoro who called Mandela a 'black head of a white country' that could not be trusted.

Furthermore, South Africa recalled her diplomat from Nigeria. While Mandela moved then for Nigeria's expulsion from the commonwealth and Nigeria's sanctioning at the UN Commission on human rights; Abacha stopped Nigerian Super Eagles from going to the rainbow nation to defend its Nations Cup Championship holding there. The diplomatic row was eventually brought to rest through the wisdom of the then ANC head in Lagos office, Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki claimed that Mandela was doomed for failure by the western world which was at realpolitik, plunging South Africa against Nigeria while it (western world) continued businesses with Nigeria and protecting her investments in their home countries (Adebajo 2007:2-4; Akinboye 2003:271; Landsberg 2004; Shaw 1998; Okolo 2008, 3; Akindele 2007).

With the commencement of Libya's own Arab Spring in 2011; Nigeria's national interest as a Nigerian diplomat (Amedu Ogbole Ode who was then the Acting Director/Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) enumerated was to: defend democracy and freedom in Africa (upon the belief that there had been no democracy in Libya); protection of Nigeria's nationals in Libya (Vanguard, May 13, 2013); and the 'unstated' need and opportunity to remove the Libyan Head of State, Colonel Ghaddafi who had called for Nigeria's splitting (break/dividing) along religious line. The instrument used by the Nigerian government was propaganda-like: the announcement of her recognition of the then Transitional National Council, TNC. The announcement which came while most African nations including South Africa was rather than being quiet, in 'total disarray' (Vanguard, May 13, 2013) was in a harsh propaganda-like form, criticised by South African government. The claim from Pretoria was that Nigeria 'jumped the gun' by making a pronouncement ahead of the African Union, AU's resolution over the matter (Gopaidas 2012). Literatures and statements showed South Africa interest for protection in the issue to include: preventing Nigeria's political threat utilising the initiative; fear that African countries might follow in the

Nigerian way; and, the fear of her (South Africa)-over-reaching authority in African affair of being diluted due to the spring. In actual fact, it is on record that Nigeria's timely pronouncement in the issue opened the floor for AU and African nations 'sitting on the fence' to make their declarations, favouring Nigeria's own decision (Gopaidas 2012).

In what can be described as her usual xenophobic mannerism cum motives premeditated by ulterior intentions, South Africa deported 125 Nigerians who just flew-in into the famous OR Tambo International Airport, on 2nd of March, 2012. The excuse of South Africa was that the Nigerians allegedly possessed 'fraudulent Yellow Fever Vaccine Certificates' (Africa News Update 2012). This deportation was not only symbolic; it was an application of harsh treatment and a threat to the Nigeria government. This is a form of force as an instrument in realpolitik, earlier mentioned as unconventional warfare. The reaction of Nigeria to the inhuman treatment was an element of what Nigeria minister of foreign affairs termed 'the principles of reciprocity'. This principle implies paying every nation back in her own coin; good or bad, in Nigeria's convincing effort at defending and protecting the interest of all her nationals across the globe, and passing a message to the outside world (Tribune 2012). By the principle, on 5th of March, 2012, the Nigerian government deported 28 South Africans who just flew-in into Lagos upon the grounds of 'invalid documentation and relevant health certificate clearance'. Their inability to present their Letters of Invitation stating the purpose of their visit to Nigeria was another excuse upon which the South Africans were deported. The same day, South Africa reacted by deporting another 4 Nigerians (Daily Post, March 2012). Having vowed a big time hostility; Nigeria made 5 demands from the South African government to end the impasse. They included unconditional apology to Nigeria over the 125 citizens deported; compensation of the deportees; disciplining of the over-zealous officials who did the deportation; a review of the Yellow Fever Vaccination Card policy and a commitment that such a diplomatic slip will not reoccur (Daily Post, March 2012).

In a manner illustratable as either a show of weakness or false diplomacy; the South African government turned in her apology letter to the Nigerian government (Africa News Update, March 8, 2012) and have all other demands fulfilled through the standing Nigeria/South Africa Bi-national Commission which is always co-chaired by the two nations' Vice Presidents. A question was however raised in some quarters: what if South Africa remained adamant and decides to repatriate more and more Nigerians, who comparatively would be at a greater loss (Tribune March 9, 2012)?

On the seat of African Union, AU chairperson, both nations utilised a fine, better diplomacy, although conflicting. Nigeria had supported the

incumbent Gabonese former Minister Jean Ping against South Africa Home Affairs Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Nigeria's interests on the issue as claimed by Nigeria Foreign Minister were: to allow smaller African nations have a sense of belonging in AU by been allowed to hold certain top offices; and the need for her (Nigeria) to support ECOWAS position (Mail & Guardian June 8, 2012). That it calculated towards reducing South Africa's grip of Africa was never disclosed or confessed. South Africa-Dlamini-Zuma won the seat. The rainbow nation claimed her interest to be antagonism of Nigeria's lack of readiness to let AU be reformed, and by extension, her disallowance of any national from any nation who Nigeria could relatively dictate to (Okereocha 2012; Daily Maverick, May 24, 2012; Mail & Guardian, June 8, 2012.).

In a manner seriously lacking in international morality and value, both the South African government as variously represented through her agents-the Police, Immigration or Drug officials, and the ever xenophobic South Africans (Okolo 2008) apply domestic force on Nigeria as represented by Nigerians living or resident in the rainbow nation. While complaining to President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria during a state visit; the president of the Nigeria Union in South Africa (NUSA), Ikechukwu Anyene lamented that-

*Nigeria still receive inhuman,
disrespectful and degrading treatment
that suggest negative social profiling in
this country within the South Africa Police
Service as well other government
departments, especially the Home Affairs.
(Vanguard May 7, 2013)*

Critical inquisition on various documents show that at any flimsy suspense or allegation of 'dealing in drug' of a Nigerian resident in South Africa, State agents or locals unlawfully bounce on them (Nigerians), physically assaulting them, embarrassing and harassing them, detaining them and at times, torturing them to death (Okolo 2008; Vanguard May 7, 2013). For example, just three weeks after President Jonathan's state visit to the country; there was a forceful eviction of about 23 Nigerians from their homes into the harsh winter in Port-Nolloth community by locals upon drug peddling unsubstantiated accusation. Also was the case of one Obinna Ugboaja who was arrested by the South African Police and physically assaulted upon the allegation that 'he tried to swallow the drug when arrested'. He died 30 minutes later in the police custody (Premium Times, May 21, 2013). While Nigerian interest was that the rights of her citizens in South Africa are fully protected; it has been claimed that South Africa's

unfriendliness to domiciliary especially Nigerians is to economically emasculate them so that rather than possessing some economic powers in their land and dictating economically; 'Amakwerekweres' (a South African local language/word meaning 'foreigners are taking our jobs') live at their (indigenes) mercy i.e. turned into penury labourers (Adesanmi 2008). Hence, it is on record, as claimed, that Nigerians rank among the highest of foreign nationals that both the rainbow nation government and locals handle very unfriendly.

During the most recent political unrest in Cote d'Ivoire; Nigeria had some foreign policy or national interests she seek to protect. Documentary surveys listed them to include: the protection of the large Nigerian community therein; the enthronement and sustenance of democracy and freedom in Nigeria's most primary international community-ECOWAS (in which Cote de Voire belong to); protection of Nigeria's investment located therein; and the continual attempt to sustaining Nigeria's powerful hegemonic enclave in the continent (Gopaidas, 2012.). For all these reasons, Nigeria wanted the crisis resolved quickly. She asked the president, Laurent Gbagbo to vacate the seat having lost the election (Reuters, March 24, 2011). But in sharp contrast, South Africa's position was opposing. Though the rainbow nation's support for Gbagbo's holding on to power was against the view/take of the international community; yet, she attempted to present a "superior" alternative to Nigeria's (and invariably, the entire international community) clear position; a way to escape from being seen as one of the followers of Nigeria in afrocentric issues (lynch 2011). This was all her indirect interest.

For the period of the 'farmer-philosopher period' (Obasanjo-Mbeki presidency period) of peaceful better mutual diplomatic relationship, and in a way of passing a negative message not only to Nigeria but to the international world, South Africa, in 2001, detained a Nigerian sitting Aviation minister, Dr Mrs Kema Chikwe for several hours in her airport on the flimsy ground that she was not in possession of a valid Vaccination Card. Further, the minister refused an embarrassing attempt at inoculating her before the issue was eventually resolved (Obijiofor 2012) through 'interventions' (This Day, March 3, 2012). Very significant here was that the serving minister's detention in the rainbow nation implied that the later has shown her capacity (power) to unleash whatever gravity of hell on Nigeria. For the fact that the 'principle of reciprocity'; Nigeria's new foreign policy tactic was then not in place and that the reactions that followed the deportation of the 125 Nigerians was not exercised after Kema's incidence; the embarrassment repeated itself. In 2005, when Nigeria's noble laurel, Professor Wole Soyinka was denied access into South Africa and unnecessarily delayed for eight solid hours right inside the airport. Soyinka

whose presence in South Africa was official upon invitation to speak as a guest lecturer at the Madiba's birthday event was later let go upon special intervention from the former president's camp (Daily Champion, July 20, 2015).

Prior to the rebasing of Nigeria's economy in April, 2014; several scholars and senior government officials emphasised the need for the nation to do same. One of the most prominent reasons advanced for the urgency in rebasing was for Nigeria to take her real new place in Africa continent by possibly displacing all afro-nation(s) ahead of her. Obvious enough, South Africa stood out as the only afro-nation that Nigeria needed to displace. The so much publicised economy rebasing where Nigeria's GDP soared from 42.4 trillion naira or \$269.5b of 1992, by 89.22 percent to about 80.2 trillion naira or \$509.9b () and defeated South Africa's \$350.6b was intentionally and belligerently chorused most especially by Nigerian envoys and politicians through several local and international media. During most of these publicities, South Africa was mostly mentioned to have been defeated (Premium Times, June 24, 2014; PM News Nigeria, April 7, 2014); a way to scientifically point out propaganda as an instrument of Nigeria's foreign policy, and the original cause for the rebasing.

Her preference- the very urgent need for Nigeria to get weapon and defeat insurgency ravelling her, forced her into two secret arms deals with some South African firms (Saharareporters, September 16, 2014; BBC News, September 24, 2014; Vanguard, October 6, 2014). In view of the palpable frienemies between both nations, the choice of South Africa by Nigeria would raise questions, but the frustration the later faced from her allied nations answer it all. Logic and precedence can prove that Nigeria's disobedience to her own domestic laws, then, South Africa and international laws in the two arms deals are as a result of her (Nigeria) probable suspicion of South Africa's possible refusal, or resulting into propaganda (using the request). Nevertheless, at the discovery of each of both deals, South Africa; rather than utilising fine diplomacy in unveiling the facts secretly and confidentially from the Nigerian government, went on air (-propaganda), with her main jeopardising interest which also stands as that of realpolitik. While the international publicity of the deals earn Nigeria international embarrassment, discredit and presented her as a Bad International Citizen of the world; South Africa's preference which was to be seen not only as Africa's champion, but as well as been seen as a law abiding nation was achieved.

Nonetheless Nigeria was not at the centre (either as the cause or most affected) of the 2015 South Africa xenophobic incidences instigated by the vituperations of the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithine (Aljazeera, May 2, 2015; theguardian [UK], April 21, 2015), whose statement triggered the

action of the 'unconventional forces' who carried out the 'low-level violence'. Just like any other Africans therein, several Nigerians suffered bodily harm, harassment, embarrassment, with their properties destroyed (CNN, April 18, 2015; Vanguard, April 9, 2015). Though other Africans reacted to these incidences; the reactions from Nigeria was comparatively loud, fierce, spontaneous and instigating: Nigerians carried out series of protests against the attacks here in Nigeria; there was direct verbal and physical threats of closure of some South African businesses in Nigeria; the Nigerian government summoned both her then acting High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner to the rainbow nation; summoned the South African High Commissioner to Nigeria and officially protested to him; demanded the compensation of Nigerians whose properties were destroyed or looted; and threatened to formerly file a criminal case against the involved Zulu king at the International Court of Justice (Premium Times, April 20, 2015; Punch, May 6, 2015; theguardian[UK] April 19, 2015; Punch, April 26, 2015; Punch, April 23, 2015; Vanguard, April 23, 2015; Punch, June 1, 2015).

Conclusion

From the afore-argued analysis and every other documentary survey, the following statements can be validly and soundly deduced:

1. Nigeria and South Africa's aggregate powers both quantitatively and qualitatively seem very equal and therefore their relationship in the international system is symmetrical.
2. Both states are making and implementing highly 'negatively inter-related foreign policies' in their homes.
3. Both states have a goal which is to create a respected and superior hegemon, continental wide.
4. Theoretical application shows that every issue between both states are not mere coincidences; they are means toward an end.
5. While Nigeria plays the defensive (being a form of realism); South Africa is always rather belligerent and playing the offensive.
6. Each surpasses the other in the quantity and quality of some 'issue-relevant' power elements. For instance Nigeria has higher population, large economy, abundant natural resources, huge market, etc, while the rainbow nation has stronger economy, etc.
7. Already, and to a significant extent, each is succeeding in achieving its national interest.
8. Both nations have the capacity of establishing a hegemon in Africa and respect in the entire world.
9. Each nation is successfully creating a hegemon in its own Africa sub-region: Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in Southern Africa.

10. Factually, both states' conflicting desires and power struggle is polarising Africa.

Rather than the current rivalry and unhealthy competition; this paper is of the view that both nations can improve in their foreign policy consistency; solve more of their domestic ills such as insurgency, high poverty and unemployment rate, etc; and then, mutually Cooperate, Consult and Collaborate. With both nations being the most viable 'nucleus' on the continent; partnership can be formed with other significant states, like Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Algeria in Africa; World emerging (economic) nations like the BRICS; and the world powers like USA and EU. Then, both nations can create strong and all inclusive institutions in Africa which will acceptably handle all issues of conflict, politics, economy, poverty, human rights, health, good governance, etc. In this case, huge successes or activities of such institutions may not be too tied to any of Nigeria or South Africa. Within a short time, Africa will surely be transformed. In this case; none of the two nations will directly become a self-ordained hegemon, but will become recognised by all other African states as the leaders.

It is obvious that both nations are putting all machineries in motion to ensure that they (each) convincingly emerge a hegemon in Africa. These machineries come in various forms. For Nigeria, it includes her recent economy rebasing. Propaganda, inhuman treatment, vengeance, etc are some other means. Should both nations continue to stay apart; both will necessarily exist exclusive of each other. The truthful inclusiveness of Pan Africanism via high-wire consultation, collaboration and cooperation will rather build Africa through them, wherein they will be recognised as leaders rather than hegemons.

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Conference Keynote

Perspectives Down the Corridors of Time

*Presented at the Second Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference
of the Catholic University of Eastern Africa (CUEA), Nairobi, Kenya, held
25th to 29th June 2013.*

Michael Vickers^Y

INTRODUCTION

Earlier addresses have set the working frame of: Human Engagement/Spiritual Force; “Techno-Development”; and the Challenge of Growth/Development/ and Economic Achievement. I am grateful to these earlier speakers. They have done the Hard Work. They have made my task easy.

I shall be talking about the Broader Context within which all this activity has taken place/ is taking place now/ and, as I envisage it, will take place. It is in the form of a dialogue and commentary; these resulting from an encounter I had when visiting a few years ago the Grand Canyon, on the High Plains—at over 7000 feet—of the State of Arizona, in America. And the Canyon visit led to a further visit: to nearby Lowell Astronomical Observatory, one of the leading Observatories in the US.

This enlightening Canyon experience was largely made possible by two persons I met there. Ahmed, our Guide at the Grand Canyon Rim, originally from Darfur, in the Sudan, was a Maths graduate from University of Khartoum, and was now an Astro-Physicist at Lowell. The second person was his friend, Ambrose, a Zimbabwean; and a Terrestrial Ecologist, based at one of the Southern California universities, engaged on a project at Lowell.

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CORRIDOR OF THE PAST

Looking back down the Corridor of the Past, Kenya, indeed East Africa have their Great Rift Valley. It is vast, over 1000 km in length. It provides evidence of the first identified presence of early man, up to 1.9 million years ago, maybe earlier.

The Great Rift is not unlike Grand Canyon. But it is longer, wider, extends through two continents and displays its many features more openly. For me, the greatest feature and attraction of the Grand Canyon was that spectacular section—the narrow cut of the Canyon, where on the opposite wall, you can actually see between the clearly marked horizontal lines descending, what I term the “Packages of Life,” each covering many millions of years of the life of this our planet.

GRAND CANYON

Looking from the brink of the Canyon, down, it was a One mile/ straight drop. We were informed about our Earth's planetary life—so far as we have come to know something about it; this taking us down through 13 eras—all indicated by horizontal striated markers descending in orderly sequence below the far rim. And there they all were; these compacted “packages of life.

As we Peered cautiously down, Ahmed told us this covered only about 600 million of the 2 billion (or 2000 million) years—a quarter mile drop on the mile-deep canyon wall opposite—this being about half the estimated 4 billion-year life of our planet.

As for the remaining 3.5 billion years? About life and activity during this immense period of planetary time, little is known. Put simply, we have through the diligent works of our scientists, some measure of information—hardly more than minimal understanding—of perhaps 12% of the 4-billion year life of our Mother Earth.

HUMAN LIFE

When the others had dispersed, I asked Ahmed if he'd join me for a coffee? Which he did. Where, I asked, did Modern Man—that is man since first he started living in organised groups, round 10,000 years ago—fit in all those striations/ those “Packages of Life” on the far wall?

He laughed. This, he said, was a delicate subject. There was heated controversy between the specialists. “One group maintains that the depth of the strata for “modern man” (10,000 years) extends no more than 10-12 inches (200-350 mm) below the Canyon Rim.

The other group says “No.”. The depth is actually 18 inches—possibly 24 inches/ two feet (500-700 mm)—below the Rim.

I did a quick calculation. “So,” I said, “if we allow 1 mm for the 10,000

years we've been existing as 'modern man'; and compare it to the most recent 600 million years of known planetary time; then if we look down that road over there; and apply this scale; then we've travelled only 1 mm, of the 50 meters our planet has—most recently—travelled? Not so?"

Ahmed nodded his head. "It's true," he said. "A very great deal of living had gone on here on this planet BEFORE we made our recent entry."

Having secured this interesting response, I ventured further. I asked Ahmed if he could fill me in on how our planet Earth fits into the larger scheme of things? Like our Galaxies, and Solar System? The best thing, he said, would be for me to join him that night at Lowell. He was doing his regular night-time observations.

EARTH & THE LARGER SCHEME

And so I went. In a sense, he told me nothing I didn't already know, in principle. But what I saw that night virtually "exploded" my basic awareness—millions of points of bright light/ misty orbs of orange, of yellow, turning slowly in the indigo blue of eternity/ in the greater distance, millions more planets, stars, in massive slowly rotating movement.

Where, I asked Ahmed, did he think we—this our Earth—fit, in all this staggering display/ this infinite of the universe?

"Well," he said, "there are a lot of planets out there. And the universe we thought we knew, in fact exists further, and yet further beyond."

"And the relevance of our planet Earth?" I asked. "We have a pretty good idea of what's here—beneath our feet. And as the years progress we're learning more. So we are unique? There is nothing in your exploration of the universe/ those millions of other planets, to indicate they have evolved any creature as advanced as us human beings?"

"So far," said he, "nothing has been confirmed. ...But many of these orbs show signs—gases/ atmospheres—not dissimilar to our own. They could well produce forms of life, as we understand it."

"And what lies beyond?" I asked.

He smiled. "We can only speculate. We are very small; quite a new planet; the universe is very big; and seems progressively to be expanding; we are but making early probes."

I decided to take my questions one step further.

"So what about our chances/ our planet's chances of survival in all this churning indigo infinity? We see constantly, 'shooting stars.' We've seen showers of them tonight. These, we are told, are often millions of years old, and millions of light years away—the product of inter-galactic collisions/ cataclysmic burn-ups/ spontaneous infernos. ...Could this be our fate?"

Ahmed shrugged. "Yes, it could of course happen. There are no guarantees."

EARTHLY CONCERNS

Stepping outside the Observatory, we looked up into the night sky. At this altitude, in the clear mountain air, the stars seem so close you feel you could reach up and touch them.

I finally asked Ahmed, HIS view on development of our species/ Homo sapiens, over the past 10,000 years or so? He replied that while this was outside his territory, he did have a colleague, Ambrose, here at Lowell who was knowledgeable about these matters. If I would return in the morning he'd introduce us. Next morning I met Ambrose.

He was concerned with studying the terrestrial environment of planets, near and far—including our own. And as a “hobby,” he took a special interest in the peoples of our earth, their progress and their prospects.

I explained my interest—and my particular involvement with Africa Studies.

I asked him what his understanding was of the beginnings of “socially ordered man”? How did we get our start? Indeed, apparently right here in Africa—with evidence of early progenitors going back, nearly 2 million years?

“Nothing,” he said, ‘Comes from nothing. Something always comes from something.’ He went on to provide the standard account of man's emergence into social groupings—need for protection; emergence of leaders; a kind of hierarchy. The leaders led; and the others—I call these the 98ers, those who are NOT amongst the dominant few—followed.

He talked of 18th century Enlightenment thinkers and a theoretical ‘Social Contract’ between the original folk of the community and their leaders; a Contract through which leaders lead only in conformity with rules and limits set by the Community—the 98ers.

In practice, however, said Ambrose, things had worked out rather differently. It was the leaders who took control and exercised progressively extending authority.

SLIPPERY SLOPE FOR MANKIND

He laughed. It was, he said, the start of a very slippery slope for mankind; with Ordinary folk—the community 98ers—losing their autonomy, their independence; and leaders becoming progressively stronger and more dominant.

Having provided this capsule explanation of man's group origins, Ambrose went on to set forward an equally brief account of the origins of Civil Life as we know it. This taking us back 8,000 years, first to the Korean Peninsula/ China's Yangtse and Yalu valleys/ then round via the Indian sub-continent and the Indus Valley/and then up into the high flourishing cultures

of Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent—with all the 'golden age' miracles of art/ architecture/ monumental structures/ along with mathematics, astronomy, law, poetry and high aesthetic and religious cultures. “Throughout this early period of social groups,” he reminded me, the position of leaders strengthened; their powers increased.

What had emerged was in fact a one-way contract—one that greatly favoured the leaders. The community folk/ the 98ers had been relegated to a back seat. The pattern had been set. “The leaders having assumed the powers of leadership, increasingly extended these powers and acquired wealth, which they now took as their right.

He referred finally to man's more recent social evolution/ development up to the present day. He spoke of man's movement up through the Eastern Mediterranean/ Turkey/ then on to Greece, Rome—with considerable Africa input; only recently acknowledged—and on into the lands of Europe and its periphery.

“And that's it?” I asked.

He nodded. The basic values, the structures; the concepts of dominance of the powerful and wealthy; with associated Ethics of Exclusion/ division/ acquisition, were, he contended, now well-rooted. “In the West/ Europe/ East, indeed Africa, the dominant few took increasingly more powers to themselves. It's where we are today.”

And where, I asked, did he think things were going from here?

Ambrose shrugged. “Clearly the oligarchs/ rulers of today are taking big risks. The Contract—one-sided as it has become—can endure only so much strain.”

And then, I asked?

“Well, like the dominant throughout time, so focused are they on their individual concerns, they often fail to read the wider messages. This can lead to trouble.”

CYBERNETIC TECHNOLOGY AND WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATION

He now turned to our new cybernetic technology and the worldwide instantaneous communication it enables. “We've all seen the power and reach of social media and Internet communication,” he observed. “They have the capacity for immense impact on the lives of oligarchs and rulers. But mostly, of course, on the lives of ordinary folk—us 98ers.

“Were these modern methods of mass/ direct communication not in operation, it is unlikely there would have been the startling two-week turnover of the Tunisian regime/ Gaddafi would probably still be alive/ and Mubarak NOT removed—nor indeed would Syria and all the Gulf states be

teetering in varying stages of brinkmanship.

“So the point is, there are signs that the current, effectively one-way Contract may be subjected to Fundamental Amendment; and that the ordinary folk/ 98ers may Regain many of the powers they lost/ the autonomy they surrendered at that theoretical early point in their 'social group' existence.”

I asked him, did he not think that these developments were bringing forward the Light of a fast-evolving Inclusive society? And that by the same token, the Darkness of Exclusion was being pushed gradually outwards towards the margins?

Again Ambrose chuckled. “Clearly,” he said, “the 98ers worldwide, are restive. But, this game has only started. Perhaps these amazing cybernetic instruments of modernity will force folk apart? Perhaps Rulers and Oligarchs will secure control over them? To a degree, they have already done this. And they are making big new efforts.”

HORIZON FUTURE

Ambrose clearly felt the “Jury was out,” regarding the practical effect, and “ethic bending” impact of modern cybernetic technology on the present day world and its peoples.

I then asked him if he'd given thought to the future eras still to come; those well down the corridors of time? He said much of his time had been directed to the “horizon future.” So, I asked, what did he see?

“This, our current, amazing, fabulous era of technological invention and material achievement” he contended, was just getting started. “However, the structures of government and economy that have evolved to support it—virtually since day one—have seen better days. They have become perverted and obsolete. No longer do they serve the object for which they were designed—a Public object and rationale. They will fragment and pass—in fact, this process of decline and change is, as we all know, already well-advanced”

“And in their place?” I inquired.

Another laugh. “Clearly whatever does emerge, it will not reflect a repetition of our extreme oligarchic and exclusivist past.

He then gave the example of the “Africa Herder”—of cattle, sheep, goats; still a popular and vital occupation the breadth and depth of the continent—who today, has as company his transistor/ sometimes Blackberry. This often solitary Herder, he said, might look like a person living a traditional local life. And to an extent he was. But also he was participant in a worldwide community. Inside: in his Head, his Heart; increasingly his life was engaged elsewhere.

“When we look down the corridor of the future,” said Ambrose, “the successor of that Herder may be operating a large farm tract, with big cattle herds; and crops produced from equally vast lands no longer rough and desertified—a large-scale variation of the Israeli miracle of desert-land transformation, not so very long ago.

“And that successor is not only an educated, skilled professional, with extended family with whom he is able and happy to share much; but he is living in his own now re-established “Homeland”—in con-federated association with fellow Homelands, comprising folk with whom he feels comfort and shares values; these being folk of no necessary ethnic or blood relation, who may live in distant continents, as well as perhaps next door.

“You see, without particular effort, but simply by following out the logical progression of the world that is emerging, and his own Light that burns within, he brings himself and his 'extended family'—by interest, more than blood—near and far, into Life Engagement, an increasing bounty of Life Goods, and a satisfactory achievement.

“If I may put it this way: this successor of the Africa Herder is the ordinary actuated man of the future I see. And I would stress, there is another fundamentally important development to be grasped.

FORTRESS OF THE WEST: LONG BREACHED

This future successor of the original Africa Herder, he said, operates in a world where resources and life-sustaining goods and benefits, have long-passed from the grip of people in the so-called developed world. The “Economic Fortress” of the West had long been breached. The WTO (World Trade Organisation)—its principal “siege barrier,” with its one-sided Trade Agreements/ treaties and Tariffs— had long since been broken up and relegated to the economic scrapheap. Deployment of 95% of the world's resources to sustain a highly privileged 10% of the world's population had long passed.

“The world and its resources are operating on a much more level 'playing field'. The feral terrors present from the earliest days of the theoretical Contract, have been greatly eased.” Much darkness, he said, had been banished. Savage exploitation/ disease/ starvation/ early death; conditions once widely applicable to 98ers of the developing world; these conditions had greatly eased. Light within had been released; the bond of harmonious existence, always a presence and a possibility from the very start, had come forth. The 'Era of Inclusion' at last had arrived. And, he declared, “it will have its first and most powerful effect amongst the Peoples of Africa.”

AFRICA FOLK & INCLUSION

I asked why he thought this to be the case? “Africa man and woman, basically,

have never had trouble with Inclusion. It is part of their heritage. It is instinctive. Yes there are partings, cruel divisions, sometimes savage blood-lettings, but always there is in the end, 'coming together.'

“Indeed, we are 'Folk of Inclusion,' just as you Western folk, being the products of millennia of mechanism/ competition/ intense prolonged solitary focus and effort/ and the formidable mechanistic and material goals you have set, strived for and so often brilliantly achieved, are 'Folk of Exclusion.’

“While you have gained much in the way of Material benefits, and Temporal Achievements; the cost to you has been loss of your inner-connectedness, your balance, your harmony. Human spirit, common shared humanity has become divorced from your life. Africa man feels great sadness, compassion and pity for you and your people. It is a great tragedy.”

WHAT ROLE FOR AFRICA?

And so, I inquired, with the decline and fall of the West, and seemingly much of the formerly developed world, what then of Africa? Where did Ambrose see Africa, in the Future scheme of things?

This, he said, was obvious and clear. Africa had massive lands. It had also vast resources—oil/ gas, of course, but also a huge number of vital minerals, and duly mass-marketable agricultural products. And most important of all was Africa's rapidly growing populations of actuated, well-trained and educated people.

The successor of the Tuareg/ Berber/ Hausa/ Turkana/ Ndebele Herder, to name but a few, had his counterparts by the millions throughout the continent. These folk provided those skilled and diligent people who were driving the 'engines' of development, industry and production worldwide.

AFRICA: CONFIGURING INFLUENCE & CENTRE OF WORLD POWER

What then of the Central Locale; the dominant configuring influence on World Power, I asked? Where would it reside?

“In Africa, of course,” said Ambrose. “Africa will long since have 'called the tune' for these Resource Dependent Territories (RDTs)—which by then may little resemble what we see today. These curious multi-cultural/ multi-ethnic/ multi-national 'cages'—called 'Nations, and States'—into which we've been 'locked'/ in which we still live today; most will long-since have crumbled; devolved into those homeland communities folk have long sought—and indeed are actively seeking today—and within which we feel most 'at home.’

“Evolved Homelands, and establishment of networked relations, and configurations on basis of interest and issue, will have greatly altered the

psychic, as well as the actual structural institutions operative in the West and elsewhere. What we will see is an Africa as the dominant hub of a newly-evolving world configuration.

“Indeed, we shall be well on our way towards a 'World Without Borders'—at least not borders as we know them today. For where future division is on the basis of 'issue and interest'; then land and continents and geography recede into secondary concern and consideration.

AND MAN—THERE WILL BE A DIFFERENCE?

“And as for man himself, there WILL be a difference. You see, by a roundabout route, that original Social Contract, as envisaged by those Enlightenment thinkers, will have come nearly full circle towards its initial intention and legitimate purpose. Ordinary folk—98ers—no longer so ordinary, will be the folk exercising power and authority. The concept of an exclusive/ exploitative/ divisive/ acquisitive oligarchy will have long past from presence and activity—and indeed, in the minds of most, from memory.

It was my turn to laugh. “Is this not asking a bit much of folk? After all, as Ahmed noted yesterday; in the eye of time and the evolution of this planet, our species/ we human beings with only 10,000 years on the clock, are very much the 'new boys on the block'?”

Ambrose pondered for a moment. “Man made a start about 2.5 million years ago. He appears to have moved steadily along. Then quite suddenly he 'took off.' It seems to have started once he commenced 'group life' those 10,000 years ago. Astonishing achievements followed—and very quickly, by planetary time measure. These demonstrated his ability to think/ organise/ manipulate his environment/ to make and use tools of increasing sophistication and utility. The past 4000 years have seen extraordinary leaps in achievement. All have served to advance man's awareness of, understanding and control of his own life in relation to others and his environment.

“Indeed his movement has been 'on and yet back'—a sort of teleological progression— towards the independence and autonomy of person that was his before he entered that initial theoretical/ surmised Social Contract.

“Now some would say this is ridiculous. Evolution involves lengthy eras over many 1000s of years. But I would ask such persons to look at the huge leaps of just the past 100, even 50 years. We have moved from manual to push-button systems; systems that now respond to the stimulus of an artificial brain.

“What I am saying is: We are different from other creatures and species. We have moved far further in 10,000 years, than did the lordly dinosaur in 150 million. We human 'new boys' are having no problem at all. Indeed, if

there's any problem we do have, it may be that we're adapting and moving on, a bit too quickly.

“Surely it is possible for us to leap-frog forward at this astonishing accelerated rate? In fact—as with aviation and medical science—it has happened. Hence it is surely a possibility that change with a speed, and with results we can not—or dare not—visualise/ or conceptualise, is equally as great a possibility, as was the 'ludicrous prospect' envisaged by 'lunatic dreamers' of a century ago, that airliners the size of apartment houses, controlled by computerised touch-screens would ascend the skies and cruise at 35,000 feet?

“So, 'savage infant,' though man still may be—as we are reminded daily by the ever-breathless 24/7 media—there are promising possibilities down the corridor of the future. The cognitive/ material; and the metaphysical/ spiritual, show signs of coming together again; uniting in the person and being of each individual.”

PURPOSE AND DESIGN

Ambrose was in demand. There were colleagues waiting to see him. It was time to finish. I put a final point. “Whether we're talking in Light Years, or of the parochial present of a very new species, us humans; behind all this you've set forward; do you feel there is purpose, design; that there is a Creative Force, a Supreme Deity?

Ambrose pondered for a moment. “Certainly there is some infinite ordering and creative presence. From the vast and complex, to the tiniest organism, indeed to the exquisite integrated functions of our blood, bone and tissue; we can but observe in awe and wonder. Round us right here; out in the dark infinity Light years beyond this our small bit of terrestrial property; there is surely a Creative Force—if not a Creator with any bodily presence we might recognise.”

OUR WORLD: MOVING FORWARD?

“And this world,” I added, “you are confident it is moving forward?”

“Certainly it is changing, as it always has done. As I say, I can see clearly its outline; and also various important elements in place, as we've discussed.

There was another rap on the door. It was time to go.

“If I might sum up,” said Ambrose, “I would say this: we are living in a very exciting and challenging time. Things are moving at a fast and sharply accelerating pace. And in my view, the direction in which we're moving is worth working for—though I do sometimes feel the Creator is little interested in us; and given what would seem our numerous 'design faults,' he perhaps merely is using us as guinea pigs for creation of 'proper beings' in worlds light

years distant? He may even be surprised we have not yet 'pressed the button,' thus triggering our projection into eternity as yet another not very significant shooting star of millions providing a brief bright streak in the night sky?

“We can however only work within the span of cognition, feeling and spiritual range we can conceive. And in our own ways, and bounded always—as I see it—by the parameters above, we can but try to do our best.

“And that's what's important.”

CONCLUDING ODE

I SALUTE YOU

By Fra Giovanni (1513)*

There is nothing I can give you which you
Have not; but there is much that,
While I cannot give, you can take.

No Heaven can come to us unless our hearts
Find rest in it today.

Take Heaven.

No peace lies in the future which is not hidden
In this present instant.

Take Peace.

The gloom of the world is but a shadow;
Behind it, yet within our reach, is joy.

Take Joy.

And so, I greet you,
With the prayer that for you, now and forever,
The day breaks and the shadows flee away.

* FRA GIOVANNI—Friar of the Dominican Order, who later joined the Franciscan Order—Scholar/ Poet/ Architect/ as well as Priest. He wrote this ode in 1513, two years before his death.

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Book Review

Ayuba G. Mavalla, *Conflict Transformation: Churches in the face of structural violence in Northern Nigeria*. Regnum Books International, Great Britain, 2014, 237 pages

Adeola A. Adebajo

The book being reviewed aims at examining the role of three selected Christian denominations in transforming structural violence in Kaduna and Jos cities from 1992 to 2001 using conflict transformation theory as an explanatory framework. The three selected Christian denominations are the Church of Nigeria (Anglican), the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) and Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA).

Nigeria as a multi-religious, multilingual and multi-ethnic society has experienced violent conflicts since independence. As clearly explained by the author, Kaduna and Jos cities have been in the global news as a result of incessant conflicts that have been witnessed and affected the inhabitants at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels, and also have reverberating effects in other parts of the country due to internal displacement of people.

The book contains seven chapters which spread across two hundred and thirty seven pages. The very first chapter covers the background and theoretical framework. The second chapter deals with the role of the Christian Missionaries in conflict transformation, followed by chapter three which gave an in-depth analysis of Kaduna and Jos conflicts. Chapter four discusses Zango Kataf of 1992 and Sharia 2000 violent conflicts. Chapter six describes the impact of the violent conflict on Christian denominations while the seventh chapter is on concluding remarks.

The author examined the role played by three selected Christian denominations in transforming the structural violence in Kaduna and Jos cities from 1992 to 2001. Dr Mavalla acknowledged the fact that conflict is inevitable, natural, necessary and normal but should be handled in such a manner to prevent destruction of lives and properties from conflict transformation lens. Through appropriate use of historical approach, the author discussed what had happened in the time past that acted as the remote causes of the conflict, how relationship deteriorated between the conflicting parties and the triggers of the violent conflicts in the selected cities. In

gathering the data, qualitative research design was adopted. In-depth interviews were conducted to elicit information from the respondents on the research questions. Questionnaires were also administered to complement the interview conducted. The philosophical approach that underpinned the study is interpretivism.

A critical analysis of the approaches for responding to violent conflicts was carried out which include conflict prevention, conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Of all the approaches examined by the author, conflict transformation seems to be more appropriate because it deals with remote causes of the conflict and also transform personal, relational, structural and cultural dynamics that encouraged the violent conflicts.

On the causes of the violent conflicts in the Northern Nigeria, particularly in the selected cities, the author identified competition over scarce resources, hegemonic domination to control political and economic powers for selfish use, individual greed based on human nature and human propensity to self-preservation. It could be argued that scarcity over resources may not have caused violent conflicts experienced in Jos and Kaduna as stated by the author, but inability to manage the available resources could be a predictor.

Another argument generated by the author that the conflicts in the Northern Nigeria, particularly in Kaduna and Jos cities, was not due to a wide economic gap between the rich and poor but hegemonic domination. It should be noted that poverty and unemployment are the causal factors in generating and escalating conflicts in any society that is characterized by poor governance where the political leaders do not respond to the basic needs of its citizens. The youths easily become willing tools used by the political class who wants to maintain status quo. In a society where poverty reigns supreme, violent conflicts will abound and this corroborates the view of Adekanye that rising poverty can predispose citizens to rising conflict. It will be difficult to discountenance poverty as not a predictor to violent conflicts in the selected cities.

Besides, the author examined the role played by the Christian missionaries in conflict transformation between 1900 and 1960 in Zaria and Jos provinces (now Northern Nigeria). Two strong arguments were raised.

The first argument bothers on the deliberate perpetuation of structural violence in the colonial period in the Northern Nigeria in order to benefit some individuals socio-politically. The act of structural violence was put in place by the British colonial administration in order to perpetually subjugate the Non-Muslim Groups under the Hausa-Fulani Emirs using indirect rule system of administration. The second argument is on how the Christian Mission tried to transform the structures that allowed structural violence by

putting in place developmental projects such as education and health services. The author also revealed “unfriendly” relationship that existed between the British colonialists and Missionary Groups. He pointed out that British colonialists were in support of the Fulani Emirs whom they collaborated with to perpetuate structural violence against the non-privileged Non Muslim groups. On the other hand, the Missionaries allied with the Non-Muslim Groups who are found in the present day Middle Belt in order to protect them against the Fulani hegemony. It is noteworthy to state that the British colonial government and Missionaries were both imperial interests who connived together to exploit the Northern people under different pretenses. Many of the developmental projects put in place were to benefit the British. Education introduced was to train up clerks, typists and catechists that would be useful in running colonial administration and spreading the gospel. They did not have the interests of Nigerians at heart but imperial intentions. Although, many protagonists of the British rule have blindly argued that the missionaries brought enlightenment and civilization to Nigeria through the western education and preaching of the gospel. It must be poignantly stated that the missionaries preached “gospel” of peace and endurance, while the colonialists were busy carting our natural resources to their metropolitan country.

Dr. Mavalla clearly explained the activities of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and Seventy Day Adventist Church (SDA) in beaming the religious light in the non-muslim dominated North. This does not remove the fact that the Missionaries perceived the Northern region as a dark region as a result of the practice of the African Traditional Religion and Islam. The two religions were seen as “darkness” while Christianity was perceived as “good”. This perception still contributes in a great dimension in inciting and causing religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria till date.

Furthermore, the author revealed that the political structure put in place by the colonial masters was a trigger to religious conflicts. For administrative purpose and inconvenience, the colonial masters divided the Northern region into different types of native authorities which placed the Non-Muslim Groups under the hegemonic domination of the Emirs. He poignantly argued that colonial arrangement caused disunity in the Northern region rather than cultivating meaningful relationships that could engender peaceful co-existence. The superior-inferior among ethnic groups in the Northern Nigeria was perpetuated by the colonial administration. The societal status created by the Colonial masters was to prevent the Northern people from coming together to question imperial exploitation of their region.

With robust historical analysis, the author described how missionary churches became indigenized in Nigeria. Churches such as Church of Nigeria(CON), Evangelical Church of West Africa(ECWA) and Seventh Day Adventist(SDA), contributed greatly in trying to change the inferior status of the Non-Muslim Groups. Despite the social transformation put in place in form of developmental projects and evangelism, the missionaries failed in building peaceful relationships among the people of the North since gospel is about peaceful co-existence.

Dr. Mavalla in an elucidating manner gave an in-depth analysis of the causes of the Kaduna and Jos violent conflicts. He identified indirect rule system of administration, indigene-settler problem, economic and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani group. Meanwhile, the author failed to interrogate the reasons the colonialists and missionaries operated as if they were not close allies. It could be argued that both were imperial agents that came purposely to explore and exploit Nigeria's human and material resources for the development of their metropolitan country and also established a system that would encourage neo-colonialism as a result of disunited and dysfunctional system put in place. The two imperialist agents operated differently to deceive Nigerians not to form a common front against them.

Analysis of the Zangon Kataf 1992 and Sharia 2000 violent conflicts which claimed lives and property was delved into by the author. Some of the remote causes of the Kaduna conflicts in 1992 and 2000 as highlighted included struggle to maintain religious, political, economic and hegemonic domination of the Non-Muslim Groups by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. In the case of Kataf ethnic group, relocation of the Zangon Kataf market to another place and desire for emancipation from age long domination of the Hausa-Fulani group occasioned the conflict. The desire for liberation came as a result of exposure of the Non-Muslim Groups to education, thereby challenging the status quo.

The author lucidly explained the conflict episode of Jos in 2001 which resulted in dividing the city along religious and ethnic lines. The two major ethnic groups involved in the conflict were Hausa-Fulani and non-Hausa Fulani. Land ownership was the remote cause of the conflict while it later took a religious dimension. The discriminatory practices of the state government towards the non-indigenous population was another factor that fueled the conflict. As expected of a peace and conflict scholar, the role played by the three Christian denominations, the Anglican Church of Nigeria, Evangelical Church of West Africa and Seventh Day Adventist in transforming the conflict was vividly x-rayed by the author. Some of the strategies adopted by the churches included prayer and fasting, provision of

welfare packages such as health facilities, artisan skill acquisition, small scale businesses to reduce human sufferings, seminars, conferences and workshops where both Muslims and Christians were educated on peaceful co-existence irrespective of religious and ethnic sentiments.

The impact of violent conflict on Christian denominations in the Northern Nigeria was also given attention. Dr Mavalla argued that violent conflicts have brought about some degree of theological paradigm shift in form of re-thinking. According to him, rethinking includes new semantics in the language of violence, self-defence as an alternative to retaliation/vengeance, the precursor to self-defence retaliation and another interpretation of what it means to “turn the other cheek”. The author submitted that all the Christians interviewed were against the idea of retaliation as it contradicts what the gospel of Jesus Christ preaches. He further argued that using self-defence and resistance against “turning the other cheek” are unchristian behavior that are anti-peace which are not denominational standards but an individual Christian response behavior to conflict. It should be pointed out that the Muslims continually perpetrate acts of violence against the Christians because of the biblical teaching against retaliation or self-defence. Though, it is not biblical to retaliate but if the Muslims continue to hide under the thought that the Christians will not retaliate, it gives room for violence to reign supreme leading to more casualties among the Christians. At times violence can be used as the last resort to settle disputes. The author also talked about the non-violent means of transforming structural violence used by the Christian denominations selected such as provision of education and health services in order to promote peace. Also identified are ways of transforming protracted violent conflict which include context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, personal and group transformation.

On the concluding remarks by the author, the author gave an overview of the role of the three Christian denominations selected in conflict transformation in the conflict ridden cities of Jos and Kaduna. Ways and means of correcting structural violence were highlighted, how the denominations fostered interpersonal relationships among the populace and inter-religious groups were discussed. The author stated that interpersonal relationships were encouraged through the sharing of the gospel through national and state radio programmes.

The author has made great contribution to political theory by developing the theory of Geo-location in explaining a factor causing violent conflict in the Northern Nigeria. Dr. Mavalla espoused that Kaduna North is predominantly occupied by Muslim population while the Southern Kaduna

is majorly occupied by the Christians. He contends that geo-location division gives the people a separate identity which distinguishes them from other geo-locations and conflict can be caused in one geo-location if a new culture is introduced in the area.

As revealed by the author, the Christian denominations have been able to reduce structural violence and encouraged peaceful co-existence through developmental projects. However, it is imperative to point out that the author did not give attention to the fact that members of the Christian denominations selected could have contributed to violent conflicts experienced in the selected cities of the study. In as much as they could act the role of conflict managers, mediators, transformers, they could still play the role of perpetrators because of ethnic and religious sentiments. Also, the role of youths during the violent conflicts was not given attention. In any form of violent conflict, youths are usually the willing tools used in perpetrating acts of violence by the elites. In addition, the book suffers a methodological setback because the samples used for gathering data did not reflect gender representativeness. It is a well known fact that in violent conflict situations, apart from the fact that women are the most vulnerable, they play a great role in peace initiatives and conflict transformation. Women cannot be pushed aside when it comes to conflict management and transformation but that does not remove the fact that they could also be perpetrators. Nevertheless, the book really reflected the true academic character of the writer. The book is an excellent contribution to scholarship particularly, Peace and Conflict Studies.

Call for Papers

Manuscripts are invited that align with the mission of JIPAD. All articles submitted are anonymously peer reviewed by at least two referees. Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced and be between 6,500 and 8,000 words in length, including bibliographic references. Book reviews may not exceed 1,500 words. An abstract must accompany every article and should be less than 200 words. The manuscript must also be accompanied by a short biographic note about the author as well as a cover sheet with the title of the article, author's name and institutional affiliation, mailing address, email address, telephone and fax numbers. The prescribed style is that contained in the latest edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association. The editorial board requires that manuscripts be void of any language that might imply racial, ethnic, sexual, religious or other kinds of discrimination, stereotype, or bias. Accepted manuscripts are subject to editorial modifications before publication, while articles that do not conform to the above guidelines will be returned to the author without review. Submission of articles implies a commitment to publish in JIPAD, therefore articles submitted for consideration by JIPAD must not have been published in part or in whole in any other medium, and must not be under review by any other journal or publisher.

Only electronic submissions are acceptable, and these should preferably be in formats compatible with MS Word 2007. Two versions of each manuscript should be submitted: one version containing all aforementioned author's details and preliminary pages, and the second version containing ONLY the title of the paper, the abstract, and the body of the article. The second version of the manuscript (which will be the one sent to reviewers) should use a file name that does not name the author, remove all named properties attached to the computer file, and omit all details in the body of the article that may identify the author. All manuscripts should be sent to both of the following: Dr Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso, Editor, JIPAD, at jipad@babcock.edu.ng and jumoyin@gmail.com; and Professor Ayandiji Daniel Aina, Editor-in-Chief, JIPAD, at ainaay@babcock.edu.ng or dijiaina@yahoo.com.